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The Troubling Influence of Equality in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
From Brown to Miranda, Furman and
Beyond
Scott W. Howe

54 Vand. L. Rev. 359 (2001)

This Article identifies and critiques a view of the criminal-procedure clauses in the Bill of Rights that is revealed in
Supreme Court decisions after Brown v. Board of Education.
Professor Howe argues that the Court has gone astray in constructing these clauses by focusing on equality. He contends
that the criminal-procedure clauses are better understood as
discrete protections of individual liberty than as reflecting a
unified theory or separate theories about equality. Building on
this perspective, the Article proposes a reformulation of doctrine in varied realms of constitutional criminal procedure,
including police -interrogation,capital sentencing, and administrative searches and seizures.
The Article also calls on a more general level for rethinking how judges should implement a call for equality as they
regulate criminalprocedure under the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment directs states to provide "equalprotection of
the laws" to all persons, a command that applies to the criminal process. However, equality is a derivative idea in that it
always requires an external substantive standard for judging
likeness and difference. Consequently, Professor Howe contends that even an explicit command of "equal"treatment can
only serve as a rhetorical device, authorizing the judiciary to
construct substantive standards regarding governmental conduct. It is for this same reason that equality has no role under
the criminal procedure clauses, even as a rhetorical device;

those clauses already call for particularizedsubstantive standards.
The Article proposes that judges apply the Bill of Rights
and reconstruction amendments in criminal procedure by focusing on substantive standards concerning how government
should treat persons. Judges should implement the substantive values embodied in the criminal-procedureclauses. They
should impose further protections against discrimination
deemed to warrant constitutional proscription through the
more open-ended provisions, such as the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses. However, the resolution of what the
open-ended clauses should demand must itself build on the
substantive construction given those clauses by the judiciary
rather than on anything inherent in the notion of equality.
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During the three decades after Brown v. Board of
Education,I particularly during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren,
the Supreme Court demonstrated enthusiasm for pursuing social
change based on the notion of equality. 2 "People who are alike

1.
2.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See ALExANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 103 ('[A]

broadly conceived egalitarianism was the main theme in the music to which the Warren Court
marched."); PILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 98
(1970) (asserting that the Warren Court's most significant activism "has been in the development

of the concept of equality as a constitutional standard"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger
Court's Grapplingswith Sex Discrimination,in THE BURGER COURT; THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
THAT WASN'T 132 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (contending that, while equality for women was "not
on the agenda of the Warren Court," the performance of the Burger Court on this score was
"striking"); Michael Kiarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 216-17 (1991) (asserting that the Warren Court espoused for the first time "the notion
that racial classifications disadvantaging minorities are presumptively unconstitutional," "expanded equal protection to prohibit certain forms of wealth discrimination and infringements
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should be treated alike."3 On this idea, the Court declared an expanded array of state actions to violate the Equal Protection Clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment 4 and enforced similar rulings
against the federal government through the Due Process Clause in
the Fifth Amendment. 5
Various criminally oriented clauses in the Bill of Rights 6 also
became vessels for equality mandates. After Brown, the Court initially used the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to pursue
equality in the criminal context. 7 However, the Justices also soon
began to pursue equality under several of the more narrowly
worded, criminal provisions. For example, in the confessions area,
the Court used the equality idea to expand suspect protections under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." It then employed the
concept to reach its famous Miranda holding under the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 9 The Court also
declared that the Eighth Amendment calls for equality in the sentencing of capital offenders.10 The emphasis on equality substan-

upon the franchise" and, most importantly, began to "transform[] equal protection from a check
against deliberate governmental disadvantaging into an entitlement to particular governmentguaranteed outcomes"); see also ROBERT H. BORE, SLOUCHING TOWARD GoMoRRAH 107 (1996)
("The list of egalitarian decisions [by the Warren Court] not warranted by law could be extended
almost indefinitely as the Court, entranced with equality, extended the reach of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment far beyond any conceivable intention of those who

made the amendment law and far beyond anything previous Courts had been willing to do.").
3. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539 (1982). The
equality idea also includes the correlate, that "people who are unalike should be treated unalike
Id. at 540 & n.9. While there are as many substantive accounts of equality as there are substantive ideas by which multiple persons can be said to be "alike" or "unalike," it has frequently been
said that there is only one formal principle of equality. Id. at 539-40, n.8 and authorities cited
therein.
4. See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 133-56 (documenting the expansive use of the Equal Protection Clause by the Burger Court to combat gender discrimination); Kiarman, supra note 2, at
251-82 (documenting the expansive thrust of the Warren Coures decisions interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause).
5. The Court relied, for example, on the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment to
strike down a federal statute maintaining segregated schools in Washington, D.C. See Boling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). See generally Kenneth L. Karat, The Fifth Amendment's
Guaranteeof EqualProtection,55 N.C. L REV. 541 (1977).
6. At times throughout the Article, rather than use the term "criminally-oriented" clauses,
I substitute the terms "criminal" clauses or "criminal-procedure" clauses. With each of these
terms, I refer to the provisions in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, other than
the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment, that bear heavily or exclusively on the prosecution or punishment of persons for crime.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 92-150.
8. See Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
9.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

10. This rationale accounts for the Coures decision in Furman v. Gcorgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (per curiam), to strike down capital punishment administered under standardless sen-
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tially altered major areas of criminal-procedure doctrine in ways
that persist today."
This Article questions whether constitutional theory can accommodate the Court's focus on equality as a significant precept in

constructing various criminal clauses in the Bill of Rights. Little
scholarly attention has focused on this question. 12 Indeed, a dearth
of scholarship exists regarding, more generally, whether an integrated theoretical explanation can justify the Court's post-Brown
application of the Constitution in the criminal sphere. 13
The Article assesses the role of prescriptive equality in the
Court's adjudication of four of the criminally oriented clauses: the

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as applied to suspect interrogation; the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the Eighth Amendment
when applied to capital sentencing; and the Fourth Amendment as
applied to administrative searches. These areas represent only
some of those in which equality has influenced the Court's work

tencing systems. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring)
(asserting that, after Furman,a death sentencing scheme must "result in death sentences being
imposed with reasonable consistency"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (asserting that Furman had mandated that states replace "arbitrary and
wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death"); see also WELSH WHITE, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 135 (1991) ('Furman invalidated a system of capital punishment that
produced arbitrary results.").
11. See infra Part III.
12. The Coures focus on equality in adjudicating cases under the criminal-procedure clauses
has been evaluated at times in discrete doctrinal areas. See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO,
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 32-38 (1993) (criticizing reliance on equality arguments to
support Supreme Court doctrine concerning police interrogation and confessions); Scott W.
Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the CapitalSentencing Trial, 146 U.
PA. L. REv. 795 (1998) (criticizing the Court's use of the equality idea to construct the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments as that clause applies to capital sentencing).
13. Some have noted a scarcity of scholarship regarding integrated theory for application of
the constitution in the criminal sphere. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance To
PoliticalProcess Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.747, 763 (1991) ('Anyone pondering the constitutional
justification for the modern criminal procedure revolution cannot help but be struck by the utter
poverty of the scholarly literature."); cf. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The
Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 21 (1988) (asserting that little
scholarship has focused on how modern constitutional theory bears on questions to be decided
under the Fourth Amendment).
For a recent work that sets for itself the task of articulating "a coherent, integrated vision of
the entire field now known as constitutional criminal procedure," see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at x (1997); see also Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the
Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of ConstitutionalCriminal
Procedure,23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 591 (1990) (contending that a version of conservative
premises committed to preventing unjust punishment "has the potential to support a comprehensive and coherent theory of constitutional criminal procedure").
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under the criminal clauses.1 4 I focus on them to avoid unwieldiness

and because they embody some of the Court's most prominent decisions on criminal procedure.
The Article rejects the Justices' emphasis on equality in constructing the criminal clauses. It advocates a view of the criminal
clauses as discrete protections of personal liberty rather than as
reflections of an integrated theory, or several theories, about
equality. Further, the Article contends that the heavy emphasis
given to the equality principle under some of the criminal clauses
has repeatedly worked to subvert the substantive ideals that they
embody. The Court's focus on equality has produced not merely unfounded adjuncts to Bill of Rights guarantees, but also unfortunate
distortions of them.
The elusive nature of prescriptive equality lies at the core of
the problem. The Court has pursued equality15 under the criminal
clauses as if it were self-defining, when it is not. The mandate to
treat like persons alike and unalike persons differently requires an
external standard of appropriate treatment of persons as a prerequisite to judgment about likeness or difference. Further, once the
substantive standard is determined, prescriptive equality makes
sense as a general precept only if understood as a directive to follow
the substantive standard. Thus, the work involved in pursuing
equality lies in constructing the external, substantive standard.
Pursuit of equality as if it were self-defining is a confused endeavor.
The Article does not argue against the implementation under
the Constitution of efforts to restrict race and caste discrimination.
16
Race and caste bias in the criminal process are serious concerns,
often warranting constitutional action. However, the Article contends that supplemental protections to combat odious prejudices
should be grounded in the open-ended clauses, not the criminal
clauses. 17 Reliance on the open-ended clauses will avoid the tempta14. For another area in which equality has influenced doctrine under a criminal clause, see
infra note 173, discussing the Court's construction of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury as applied to jury selection.
15. For the definition of equality, see supra note 3 and accompanying text
16. See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE (1999) (detailing evidence of racial and
economic discrimination as a pervasive phenomenon in the criminal-procedure context);
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) (demonstrating that racial discrimination has long been pervasive in the criminal-justice system).

17. By the "open-ended" clauses, I mean the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses, along with the Ninth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court
largely drained the privileges and immunities clause of meaning in the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Justices recently breathed new life into that provision by using
it to strike down a California law that denied full welfare benefits to newcomers during their
first year of state residency. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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tion to subvert the criminal clauses and will encourage doctrine
that more forthrightly addresses claims of improper discrimination.
The story of the Court's use of the equality idea under the
criminal clauses is complex and varies from one doctrinal area to
another. In some areas, the concern with equality played an obscured role in influencing doctrine. In other areas, the equality concern was used explicitly to describe the constitutional goal. Likewise, in some areas, liberal Justices introduced the equality precept, over wide objection within the Court. In other areas, conservative Justices supported or even proffered the equality principle. In
each context, however, the Court's reliance on prescriptive equality
was unwarranted, and it distorted constitutional doctrine.
The Article seeks to be reconstructive rather than merely
critical. It returns to each of the doctrinal areas under focus and
describes how they could have developed if the Court had not been
so heavily distracted with equality. This effort proceeds on an approach to constitutional construction that is grounded on conventional authorities-textual language, history as it bears on purpose,
the structure of the larger Constitution, and earlier political decisions, particularly those by the Court. 18 However, my goal in each
area is simply to show an alternative uninfluenced by equality,
rather than to defend a particular construction against every objection that could be launched against it.
The project proceeds in five stages. Part I briefly discusses
the derivative nature of the equality idea, one that assumes an external standard of appropriate treatment by which to judge likeness
and difference. This discussion reveals that equality is never selfdefining. Part II focuses on the Court's pursuit of equality in criminal procedure through the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. Here, the Article demonstrates how the Court began to
pursue equality as if it were self-defining but then reversed course

18. This approach does not build on a view that there is a coherent, integrated theory, with
consistent analytical bite, by which to view the Bill of Rights and Civil War amendments. A
variety of prominent scholars have also claimed to eschew the effort to interpret the constitution
according to such integrated theories. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW 7-12 (1996)

(advocating a moral reading of those provisions that are drafted in the language of moral princi.
ples, limited by textual language, history, the structure of the constitution and prior decisions of
the judiciary); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 207 (1995) (arguing for a pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation that "includes but also transcends considerations of fidelity to a text and a tradition" and that recognizes the interpretive question as "ultimately a political, economic, or social one"); LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 2 (1985) ('[The very
idea of 'method,' with its illusory suggestion of the precise and the systematic, is mostly an out.

growth of technocratic thought and practice and is thus the antithesis of humane struggle with
those commitments and visions that are the stuff of genuine constitutionalism.").
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based on the recognition that prescriptive equality is derivative.
Part III documents the Court's tendency to focus on equality under
various criminal clauses in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments. This description underscores that the Court has often
found equality to be an important idea embodied in these clauses
and that this view has continued to affect major aspects of criminalprocedure doctrine. Part IV discusses whether constitutional theory
can justify understanding the criminal clauses as mandating
equality. I contend that the criminal clauses are better understood
as discrete protections of individual liberty than as reflecting an
integrated vision or discrete notions about equality. Part V then
sets out approaches for rethinking the construction of these criminal clauses and their relationships with the open-ended clauses. My
thesis is that the criminal clauses, as well as the open-ended
clauses, should be used to construct substantive rights, not to pursue equality.
I. THE NATURE OF PRESCRIPTIVE EQUALITY
As a social goal, equality is controversial. Certainly, it is the
most debated among the grand social ideals.19 The controversy concerns the meaning and the significance of the equality command.
Pursuit of identical life outcomes for all people is impractical and
undesirable. A vast array of factors affects humans, and we could
not possibly enforce an average of them.20 We also do not believe
that persons should have the same life outcomes. We want people
who are gifted and industrious to realize more rewards than people
who are talentless and lazy. We want people born to wealthy families to have the benefit of their family riches and do not want government to try to provide the same financial advantages to persons
born to poverty. For a variety of reasons, we think that some people
should enjoy better circumstances than others. Given our accep-

19. See generally Thomas Nagel, Equality, in THE OXFORD CO.MPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 248
(Ted Honderich ed., 1995) (describing "equality" as "[currently] the most controversial of the
great social ideals").
20. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 308-17 (1998) (describing
a variety of conceptual and practical problems with the notion of equality as a social ideal);
RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, SnIPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 57 (1995) CNVhat is quite impossible
to do is to develop any system of rectification for the unending series of social wrongs attributable to inferior talents, unwelcome social circumstances, and bad luck"); F. A. HAIEM, II, LW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 82 (1976) ("Since people will differ in many attributes which government cannot alter, to secure for them the same material position would require that government
treat them very differently."); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 232-38 (1974)
(discussing the problems with altering social institutions to produce increased equality of material circumstances).
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tance of these disparities, what does prescriptive equality command?
It is at least non-controversial that government should treat
persons who are equally positioned equally and should treat persons who are differently positioned unequally.2 1 Differential treatment by government of persons identically situated seems wrong,
as does identical treatment of persons who are not identically posi22
tioned.
This definition of the equality goal is non-controversial, however, precisely because it is contingent. An external standard is
necessary before we can know the relevant factors to be used to decide which persons warrant a particular treatment and, ultimately,
their equivalence or non-equivalence to one another in a given context. 23 Likewise, once we have such a standard, the equality mandate makes sense only as a command to follow the standard. 2 4 This
means that equality as a normative principle is derivative and unhelpful by itself.
A. HistoricalSignificance
Despite its contingent character, the equality principle as a
social ideal has a long and distinguished pedigree. Some scholars
argue that no value is more embedded in Western culture. 25 Among
the ancients of Greece and Rome, equality was at least as important
as liberty. 26 For example, both Socrates and Aristotle asserted that
27
equality was among the most important of social ideals.

21. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 319 (1973) (asserting that the idea of
equality is so basic as to amount to "a principle of reason").
22. See, e.g., JURGEN HAABERMAS, BETwEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 414 (1998) (asserting that the "principle of substantive legal equality" holds that "what is equal in all relevant respects should be treated
equally, and what is unequal should be treated unequally").
23. See id. (But what counts in each case as the 'relevant respects' requires justification.");

Nagel, supra note 19, at 248 (stating that "everything depends on what kinds of similarity count
as relevant, and what constitutes similar treatment).

24. In rare cases, the external standard might not tell us all that we need to know about
how to treat people, but some other standard external to equality would have to help explain why
not. See infra text at notes 53-55.
25. See, e.g.,. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81
MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983) ("No value is more thoroughly entrenched in Western culture than is
the notion of equality.").
26. See, e.g., ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS,
AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1960) (noting that equality was a more important concept than

liberty "among the Greek and Roman Stoics and the Christian Fathers").
27. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V., at iii (J.A.K Thompson trans., 1976) (defining
equality and advocating it as essential to justice); PLATO, GORGIAS 489 (W.C. Helmbold trans.,
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Equality also holds a strong position among the social values

of the founders and of early Americans. The importance of the
equality idea is demonstrated by the proclamation in the Declara-

tion of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal." Of course, that some of the drafters
owned slaves and did not believe in women's suffrage 28 underscores
that equality is malleable. Nonetheless, the commitment to some
notion of egalitarianism, at least among Caucasian, Protestant
males, was stronger than in Europe.2 The very notion of rights of
mankind that were at the heart of the Anglo-American controversy
connoted a social equivalence that was directed to the discrimina-

tions thought to have occurred between the English and the Americans but that carried a broader applicability. 30 Indeed, by the early

1830s, the commitment to egalitarianism was such that Alexis de
Tocqueville identified it as a distinguishing feature of the Anglo31
American social condition
Equality rhetoric also has continued to occupy an important
position in our history. A mandate of equality was embodied in the

Fourteenth Amendment's declaration that no state shall deprive

1952) (detailing Socrates' conclusion that it is not merely by "convention" but also by "nature"
that"to do wrong is uglier than to be wronged and that justice is sharing equally").
28. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
88 (1993) (concluding that, when we look back from our current perspective, "[w]e se a republic
created, on the whole, by and for white Protestant men; behind the flag-waving and the Fourth of
July parades, we see the hideous grinning faces of inequality, oppression, biases overt and covert, cruelty, lack of understanding, intolerance"); PAULINE MAYER, AMERICAN SCRIPTUR 191-208
(1997) (discussing the conception of equality held by the founders and early Americans); GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIC 1776-1787, at 70-75 (1969) (discussing the
ambivalence of attitude of the founders and early Americans towards equality).
29. The idea of equality was also significant in promoting social change in the late 18th century in France. The Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen, approved by the French National
Assembly in 1789, in the midst of the French Revolution, asserted in the opening line of Article 1
that, "men are born and remain free and equal in rights." JERE2,1Y D. POPKIN, A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 39 (2d. ed. 1998) (quoting the declaration). However, prominent
French historians have doubted whether the revolutionary period in France did more to advance
or to set back the commitment to individual liberty. See, e.g., id. at 142-43 & 146 (discussing the
views of Alexis de Tocqueville and Francois Furet).
30. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEALOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 307
(1967) (noting the idea of social equivalence that was embodied in the views of American revolutionary leaders); see also JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVETIoN OF
1787, at 184 (A. Koch, ed. 1966) (quoting Charles Pinkney) (C(Ejqualityis ... the leading feature
of the [United] States").
31. He observed, for example:
America, then, exhibits in her social state an extraordinary phenomenon. Men
are there seen on a greater equality in point of fortune and intellect, or, in
other words, more equal in their strength, than in any other country of the
world, or in any age of which history has preserved the remembrance.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEiOCRACY IN AMERICA 44 (1945).
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any citizen of the equal protection of the laws, 3 2 and the notion of
equality played an animating role in the various reconstruction
amendments.3 3 The rhetoric of equality has defined important civil
rights struggles. 34 It has been espoused in Supreme Court decisions.3 5 Jurisprudential philosophers also continue to assert the
idea of equality as a primary social ideal.3 6 Equality is something
we believe in even if-or perhaps because-it has no inherent sub37
stance.
B. Scholarly Challenge

The idea of equality, however, has come under attack in recent decades, particularly in the legal academy. In 1982, Professor
Peter Westen published a scintillating article, arguing that the

rhetoric of equality should be abandoned.3 8 Professor Westen first
contended that equality is derivative in that it depends for its
meaning on external standards.3 9 He also asserted that the equality
mandate always remains, at best, "superfluous," because the exter-

32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no State shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
In 1863, Lincoln quoted the equality language from the Declaration of Independence in his
famous Gettysburg Address. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1969).
33. See J. R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 203-10 (1978) (discussing the key role played by the idea of equality in the reconstruction amendments).
34. Equality has been a rallying idea in the movements to secure civil rights both for African Americans and for women, as well as many other groups. In the case of African Americans,
this point is made by the title of the most prominent book documenting the struggle leading to
the decision of the Supreme Court to invalidate segregated public schools. RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROwN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975). In the case of women, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
provides an example. See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and
Morals"A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 657 (1983) ("[IThe framers and supporters of the Equal
Rights Amendment chose to express themselves through the rhetoric of equality.") The provision
was stated in terms of equality: "Equality of Rights under the'law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex." Id.
35. See infra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY (2000) (defending equality as the sovereign ideal that should guide government pol.
icy); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 3-46 (1996) (developing Rawls' conception of justice as
fairness, presented as a comprehensive philosophical doctrine in his prior book, A Theory of Jus.
tice, into a political conception that recognizes each citizen as a free and equal person).
37. See George P. Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under
Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1609 (1999) (asserting that, putting aside the "difficult problem"
of affirmative action, "unity prevails in contemporary Western democracies that equal treatment
is an indispensible premise of the rule of law, as we now understand it").
38. See Westen, supra note 3, at 537. In 1990, Professor Westen reiterated his general
views about equality. See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (1990).
39. See Westen, supra note 3, at 543-47.
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nal standards tell us all that we need to know about how to treat
people. 40 On this basis, Professor Westen concluded that the equality idea is "tautological," a redundant mandate that people entitled
to equal treatment are entitled to equal treatment. 41 He also contended that dangers of analytical confusion surround the use of the
equality idea.42 Concluding that these dangers outweigh any rhetorical benefits, he advocated abandonment of the equality idea
from moral and legal discourse. 43
In response to Professor Westen's article, several scholars
argued that the equality idea has independent, moral force in a
fairly wide array of circumstances, 44 but their arguments are problematic. Scholars have contended, for example, that, where persons
are in competition for a finite amount of treatment, equality, rather
than any non-egalitarian principle, is what should guide the government's distribution of treatment.45 For example, assume two
people live in separate houses with each having an equal need and
entitlement to 100 kilowatts of electricity every month. Due to an
unexpected catastrophe, only 120 kilowatts are available each
month for them to share. Most of us would conclude that the only
proper way to treat them is equally. Each should receive 60 kilowatts of electricity. This might suggest that prescriptive equality
carries independent moral force in these cases. However, Professor
Christopher Peters has demonstrated that prescriptive equality is
not what guides us to prefer equal treatment; non-egalitarian justice is what controls.4 Justice would not require that both people
receive the full 100 kilowatts, because justice cannot demand the
impossible. At the same time, the hypothetical assumes that each
person has an equal entitlement to electricity. If they were entitled
respectively to 125 kilowatts and 75 kilowatts per month, but only
120 kilowatts were available, we would not say that they should
each receive 60 kilowatts. Likewise, in the original hypothetical, it
40. Id. at 547.
41. Id.

42. See id. at 577-92; see also Peter Westen, On 'Confusing Idcas. A Reply, 91 YALE LJ.
1153 (1982) (responding to Steven J. Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas: Logical Positivist
Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982), by emphasizing that the equality idea
is not simply empty, but confusing).
43. See Westen, supranote 3, at 542 ("Equality ...is an idea that should be banished from
moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm.").
44. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 575; Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally
Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L REv. 600 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality,
83 COLUJ. L. REV. 1167, 1169-73 (1983).
45. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM,, 222-25 (1986); Larry Alexander, Con-

strainedby Precedent,63 S.CAL. L REV. 1, 11 (1989); D'Amato, supranote 44, at 600-01.
46. See Christopher J. Peters, EqualityRevisited, 110 HARV.L REV. 1210, 1232-54 (1997).
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is not the equality principle that produces the equal outcome, but
the assumption that the two people had an equal entitlement. To
weigh each person's allocation according to her proportional entitlement is to follow a principle of non-egalitarian justice, not pre47
scriptive equality.

While prescriptive equality is derivative, scholars have convincingly demonstrated that it should not be understood as "tautological." Professor Westen curiously excluded the possibility that
prescriptive equality would operate where a person has been
treated wrongly under an external standard. He asserted that if
equality were thought to be a reason that other equals in such a
case ought also to be treated wrongly, "no one would give [the
equality idea] a moment's thought."4 8 Yet, some scholars believe
that this result is precisely what prescriptive equality means.
"Treating likes alike" implies that "giving a form of treatment to
one equal is a reason to give the same treatment to another
equal."49 Understood in this way, prescriptive equality is not a re-

dundancy. Whether sensible or not, equality would sometimes call
for a person to be treated wrongly merely because an identically
situated person already has been treated wrongly. 50 The equality
mandate would have meaning in this context independent of the
external treatment rule.

47. Professor Peters divides into two general categories the possible situations in which
equality might be thought to operate-conditions of "competition" and conditions of "infinite
supply." Id. at 1232, 1245. Within the first general category, he identifies several subcategories,
including conditions of scarcity, conditions of exact sufficiency, and conditions of finite surplus.
Id. at 1232. Within each area, he uses hypothetical problems to support his assertions that
equality is a derivative idea and lacks independent normative force. Id. at 1232-54. Professor
Peters also separately discusses a category of cases that he calls "conditions of distinction." Id. at
1231. These cases involve "conditions in which one person (or class of people) is treated in a certain way based wholly or partially on an ex ante decision to distinguish between that person (or
class) and another person (or class), who (or which) is treated in a different way." Id. These cases
will all fall within the first two general categories, but Professor Peters concludes that they are
sufficiently important to warrant separate discussion. Id. at 1254-56.
In a response, Professor Kent Greenawalt has sought to show that in a few situations fallin;
within each of the two general categories of cases identified by Professor Peters, prescriptive
equality may still carry normative force. See Kent Greenawalt, "PrescriptiveEquality": Two
Steps Forward,110 HARV. L. R v. 1265, 1274-89 (1997).
48. Westen, supranote 3, at 546.
49. Greenawalt, supra note 47, at 1268; see also Peters, supra note 46, at 1223 (asserting
that "true prescriptive equality is the principle that the bare fact that a person has been treated
in a certainway is a reason in itself for treatinganother,identically situated person in the same
way.") (emphasis in original); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a ComparativeRight, 65 B. U. L.
REV.387, 389 (1985) CA right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive a particular
treatment just because another person or class receives it.").
50. Peters, supra note 46, at 1227.
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Scholarly commentary has underscored, however, that prescriptive equality is highly problematic, even self-contradictory, if
understood so as to be non-tautological.5 1 If Smith is denied a
driver's license when he warrants it, the equality mandate could
mean that another person, call him Jones, identical in all important
respects to Smith, should also be denied a driver's license, although
Jones warrants it. Yet, such a principle treats Jones improperly
according to the substantive, external standard and unequally relative to other persons who previously have been treated correctly
under the external standard. In search of a more palatable effect for
the equality rule, one might posit, instead, the erroneous conferral
of a benefit on an equal, but the outcome will also be troublesome.
To demonstrate, suppose that Smith is given a driver's license when
he does not warrant the benefit according to the substantive standard. Prescriptive equality would call for Jones, equal to Smith in
all important respects, also to receive a license, although Jones
clearly does not warrant the license. We might initially believe that
prescriptive equality carries more force here because it is only conferring on Jones an unwarranted benefit rather than an unwarranted penalty. However, if drivers' licenses are to be issued according to the substantive standard, Jones' receipt of the license is
wrong. Further, Jones' treatment here would not equal the treatment given in the past to other persons who are his equal. This conclusion means that the equality principle, to the extent that it is
non-tautological, calls for action that is both wrong according to the
52
treatment rule and unequal.
Scholarly debate has continued over whether there are some
circumstances where prescriptive equality is non-tautological and
has normative force, but the possibilities seem to constitute a small
category. Professor Kent Greenawalt has explained that equality
might have normative force where 1) the pool of relevant candidates
who should be viewed as equal is small, 2) the candidates have a
significant relationship to one another, and 3) the candidates are
likely to be aware of the treatment afforded their equals in the
pool. 53 An example could include siblings for whom their parents

must make decisions about appropriate treatment.54 After the erroneous conferral of an unwarranted benefit on one child, the equality

51.

See, e.g., id. at 1231-57.

52. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 10 (CI'ireatingsomeone equally with another who
was treated immorally is to deny that person equality with those who have been treated morally
correctly.").
53. Greenawalt, supranote 47, at 1289.
54. See id. at 1265-66, 1279-80.
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principle may carry more force than in cases concerning the treatment of equals in a much larger pool who have little relationship
with each other. Assuming Professor Greenawalt is correct, debate
then arises over whether the force of any such limited use of the
equality principle represents only consequentialist factors related
to non-egalitarian justice or, instead, a deontological norm. 55 Regardless of the answer, however, the problems with prescriptive
equality as a generalized rule would remain. At best, prescriptive
equality would carry non-tautological, normative force in only exceptional situations. Moreover, these extraordinary circumstances
would themselves be defined by some standards outside of the no56
tion of equality rather than by equality itself.
C. Application as a General Mandate
The central point about prescriptive equality relevant to this
Article is that the mandate assumes an external rule about nonegalitarian justice. For example, suppose that H, an Hispanic male,
claims that he was treated unequally because he was charged with
soliciting a prostitute; whereas, C, a Caucasian male who was arrested shortly after H in the same location and for the same offense,
was not charged. An apparent difference between the two cases is
the race of the arrestees. H claims that this difference should not
matter in the charging decision and, therefore, that he is being
treated unequally. Yet, it is impossible to know what is a relevant
difference without a substantive rule in mind that reveals what factors bear on likeness and difference in the context.57 H's claim cannot be evaluated unless we have a rule about non-egalitarian justice that clarifies either what factors bear on the charging decision

55. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 46, at 1212 (contending that even nontautological equality
"inescapably becomes merely an aspect of some wholly nonegalitarian norm" or else "collapses
into incoherence"). But see Greenawalt, supra note 47, at 1266, 1285 (contending that "the deep
feelings that underlie the principle in the exceptional cases may support a deontological norm").
56. Can equal treatment become a "default rule when we are insufficiently certain of the
morality or correctness of our decisional criteria [?]" Joshua Sarnoff, EqualityAs Uncertainty,84
IOvA L. REv. 377, 392 (1999).

Typically the refinement of an external, substantive standard

rather than prescriptive equality must occur even in cases where the contours of a previously
articulated substantive standard are imprecise or where doubts arise about the correctness of
the standard. In such cases, the question for the decision maker focuses on whether to apply or
amend the substantive rule or standard. A decision to apply the existing standard becomes a
default rule favoring that existing standard. The equality principle, uninformed by a substantive, external standard, would not reveal how to resolve the problem.
57. HAABERMAS, supra note 22, at 414 (asserting that the reasons for defining certain factors as relevant in an equality claim "are either themselves normative or are based on normative
reasons").
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or what factors are irrelevant to it. H could be relying upon this
substantive rule: "A prosecutor should not consider the race of a
suspect as a factor, in itself, favoring charging the suspect with a
crime."58 We can see that the equality principle also becomes irrelevant once this rule controls. The substantive rule itself then becomes the basis for resolving H's claim. If H can prove that the
prosecutor charged him with the crime because he was Hispanic
rather than Caucasian, the prosecutor's actions were improper. One
could also then assert that H has been treated unequally, but the
claim would derive entirely from "a substantive idea of the kinds of
wrongs from which a person has a right to be free." 59
To criticize the analytic value of prescriptive equality is not
to attack the validity of conclusions that distinctions based on factors such as race, gender, and caste, or a myriad of other factors, in
particular contexts are condemnable. Substantive rules of appropriate treatment that can explain, for example, a decision like Batson v. Kentucky, carry their own moral force, which is unchanged by
reference to prescriptive equality. 60 In Batson, the Supreme Court
held that prosecutors may not use peremptory strikes against black
venire members on account of their race even if those venire members are of the same race as the criminal defendant.6 1 The Court
concluded that a prosecutor cannot assume "that black jurors as a
group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against
a black defendant. '62 This substantive rule underlies the Court's
conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause was implicated. The
need to find the underlying substantive rule, however, also reveals
why such a decision could as easily have been reached under any
open-ended provision in the Constitution that calls for the Court to
announce unenumerated rights. The equality mandate revealed
nothing more than that the Court should consider whether an unenumerated rule of non-egalitarian justice was involved. Likewise,

58. At first blush, one might suppose the applicable substantive rule to be that race or skin
color should never influence the government in its decisions about how to treat persons. However, such a broad rule may not reflect one's true position. See generallyWesten, supra note 3, at
581-84 (noting that the irrelevance of race or skin color to governmental decisions about how to
treat people in one context does not mean that race or skin color is irrelevant to such decisions in
all contexts).
59. Id. at 567.
60. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
61. Id. at 89.
62. Id.
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the substantive rule identified would retain whatever moral force it
63
carries even if prescriptive equality were abandoned.
Scholars have also shown that equality does not itself lead to
any particular method by which to decide what is acceptable treatment.64 In its Equal Protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has called for inquiry into whether a particular classification involves a "suspect" category or whether government action pushes
against certain "fundamental" rights. 65 For example, racial classifications are "suspect,"6 6 and First Amendment freedoms are "fundamental."6 7 The Court has concluded that governmental action that
falls within these spheres calls for heightened scrutiny in the determination of whether equality has been infringed. 68 Rhetorically,
a heavy presumption of inequality applies in these cases, while only
a mild presumption applies, through the "rational basis" test, to
pedestrian cases. 69 However, neither the stratifying ideas nor the
presumptions are derivable from anything in the notion of prescriptive equality. They derive from generalizations about rules of nonegalitarian justice. 70 Race is a suspect classification not because

63. For the view that the Justices are often aware that analysis of an equal protection argument "requires them to answer precisely the same question as in an alternative, substantive
ground" for the decision, see William Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality as a
Surrogatefor OtherRights, 59 TUL. L. REV. 884, 888 (1985).
64. See, e.g., Westen, supranote 3, at 559-77.
65. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 529 (1997);
NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232-33 (1999).
66. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
67. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
68. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (noting that, regarding Equal Protection Clause claims, tho
Court has said: 'Wemust decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to the disadvantage of
some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.")). Sometimes, the Court has applied
"intermediate" scrutiny to such cases. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 529; James A.
Hughes, Note, Equal Protection and Due Process: ContrastingMethods of Review Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 541-45 (1979).
69. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-21
(1972).
70. Professor Terrance Sandalow has succinctly described the problem:
Decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have always been heavily valueladen, and necessarily so, since value premises (other than values of "equality"
and "rationality") are necessary to the determination that the clause requires.
This is most obviously so under the so-called "new equal protection," which
subjects legislation to "strict scrutiny" if it touches "fundamental interests" or
employs "suspect" bases of classification. A determination of the interests that
are to be ranked as "fundamental" or classifications that are to be viewed as
"suspect" necessarily rests upon value premises drawn from a source other than
the Equal Protection Clause itself. The need for such premises is no less, how-
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people of all races are equal for purposes of every government action, but because it is thought to be wrong in a very large proportion of situations for government to consider race in its decisions
about how to treat people. First Amendment rights are "fundamental" not because classifications that prevent some persons from exercising those rights treat them unequally, but because the government is not supposed to prevent people from exercising their
First Amendment rights. The presumptions themselves should only
be seen as preliminary "rules of thumb" because the question ultimately is not so much over the proof of facts as over the existence of
a rule. Did the plaintiff have a right, which the state violated, not
to have his race considered against him in the context? Did the
plaintiff have a First-Amendment right that was infringed? The
presumption of inequality does not help answer such questions,
and, further, once those questions are answered, the presumption,
71
like the equality idea itself, gives no assistance.
Prescriptive equality also does not address the relevance or
irrelevance of a government actor's intent. Should we say that an
undesirably disparate impact resulting from government action is
enough to violate equal protection without regard to the government actors' intents? Pondering the notion that "equals should be
treated equally and unequals should be treated unequally" will not
help resolve the issue. The equality principle only turns us to the
question of whether the intent of government actors should be
thought to bear on the likeness of positions or treatments of affected persons. The Supreme Court generally has required an intent to discriminate to make out an equal protection violation, 72 a
position that commentators have frequently criticized.73 However,
both the Court's conclusions that intent matters and the views that
disparate impact should be sufficient derive from substantive rules
about non-egalitarian justice, not from prescriptive equality.

ever, under the traditional equal protection test of "rationality": a determination whether there is a "rational basis" for the differing treatment accorded two
classes requires the existence of an extrinsic standard-a value or values other
than equality and rationality--with reference to which the classification can be
measured.
Terrance Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1052-53 (1981).
71. See Westen, supra note 3, at 575.
72. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). Se generally REDLICH Er AL.,
supra note 65, at 284-85 (noting that the Courts discriminatory intent requirement, as applied
in McCleskey, prevents the state from having to rebut a showing of discriminatory impact alone).
73. For one of the more prominent critiques of the intent requirement, see Charles R. Lawrence I,The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 317, 327 (1987).
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In the final analysis, prescriptive equality is a contingent
idea that often leads to misunderstanding because of the erroneous
view that it is self-defining. Equality obtains meaning only through
reference to an external standard of appropriate treatment by
which to judge likeness and difference. Equality alone never tells us
how to treat people.7 4 Equality may have rhetorical value in legal
discourse. 75 Nonetheless, pursuit of equality, as if it were selfdefining, is an ill-fated effort.
II. THE SHORT-LIVED INFLUENCE OF EQUALITY UNDER THE
OPEN-ENDED CLAUSES
I turn now to the Court's decisions addressing inequality
claims in criminal procedure under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. These decisions provide both context and contrast
for evaluating the Court's pursuit of equality under the criminal
clauses. The early Warren Court decisions endorsing prescriptive
equality under the open-ended clauses shortly preceded the Court's
focus on equality under the criminal clauses. However, a divergence
later arose between the influence of the equality mandate under the
open-ended clauses and its influence under the criminal clauses.
Prescriptive equality soon receded as a normative idea under the
open-ended -clauses, while continuing to influence doctrine under
the criminal provisions.
A. The Rise of PrescriptiveEquality
In constructing Equal Protection and Due Process doctrines,
the Court now seemingly recognizes the problems with the equality
idea,7 6 but this recognition was not always apparent. After Brown v.
Board of Education,77 some of the Court's early and most expansive
endorsements of equality came through its application of the openended provisions, especially to the criminal process.7 8 This focus on
prescriptive equality reached its zenith in the mid-1960s, at the

74. As noted, prescriptive equality is not tautological, but this point does not contradict tho
conclusion that an equality mandate is unhelpful by itself. See supra text accompanying note 52.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 341-42.
76. See infra text accompanying note 173.
77. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

78. Regarding the Courts pre.Brown applications of the Equal Protection Clause, see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341
(1949).
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peak of the Warren Court's liberal activism in criminal procedure. 79
However, gradually, the Court retreated. By the mid-1980s, the
Court's decisions addressing claims of inequality brought under the
open-ended clauses downplayed prescriptive equality in favor of
substantive standards about non-egalitarian justice.80 The Court
seemed to signal that, at least under the open-ended clauses, its
work lay in identifying unenumerated, substantive protections
rather than in pursuing the vague and potentially misleading
rhetoric of equality. 81
1. Pre-Brown
Even before Brown, the Supreme Court had begun to regulate states' criminal processes under the open-ended clauses in
ways that disproportionately benefited poor and minority defendants, but without relying on the notion of equality. 82 In 1932, for
example, the Court held in Powell v. Alabama that due process required that states appoint counsel for indigent, capital defendants.8 3 And in 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi, the Court held that
due process prohibited the use of an "involuntary" confession.84
These holdings responded in part to the perception of discrimination against poor and African-American defendants,s but they were
explicitly based on substantive rules about non-egalitarian justice
rather than on the idea of equality.
The pre-Brown Court had also imposed restrictions on the
most blatant forms of race or caste discrimination, but on fairly

79. See eg., Jerold H. Israel, CriminalProcedure,the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, 75 MICa. L REV. 1320, 1324-25 (1977) (asserting that the "three major themes" of
the Warren Courts decisions were (1) "selective incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees" into
due process, (2) "equality," and (3) "expansive interpretations of constitutional rights that protect
the accused").
80. See David A. Harris, The Constitutionand Truth Se..ing: ANew Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 474-83 (1992) (describing the
Court's abandonment of the equality principle in favor of setting standards of minimum justice
in applying the open-ended provisions in the criminal-procedure context).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 172-73.
82. For a summary of the highlights of the Court's pre-Brown cases regulating state criminal procedure under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Walter V. Schaefer, Federalismand State
CriminalProcedure,70 HARV. L REV. 1, 2-4 (1956).
83. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71,73 (1932).
84. Brown v. ississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936).
85. Cf Francis A. Allen, Griffin v. Illinois.Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CIU. L, REV.
151, 153-54 (1957) (noting that cases beginning with Powell set the stage for the Court's later
decisions, particularly Griffin, concerning equality in criminal procedure).
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specific grounds. 86 For example, beginning in 1880 with Strauder V.
West Virginia, the Court had regulated under the Equal Protection
Clause the exclusion of African-American jurors from criminal cases

involving African-American defendants. 87 However, the Court had
emphasized that the right was that of African Americans to be free
from disparaging treatment by the states based on their color, not
simply the right to equality. 88 Likewise, in Cochrane v. Kansas and
Dowd v. Cook, the Court declared a convict's indigency to be an inappropriate basis, under the Equal Protection Clause, to prevent
his criminal appeals.8 9 State prisoners had challenged prison rules
that effectively barred any appeals from inmates who did not have

lawyers, but not from those who could retain counsel.90 Without
suggesting that convicts had a constitutional right to appeal, the
Justices found, under the Fourteenth Amendment, that the prison
rules improperly penalized impoverished prisoners. No good reason
existed for preventing an impoverished defendant from filing an
appeal pro se. Cochrane and Dowd, along with Strauder and its
progeny, show that the pre-Brown Court found criminal-procedure
practices to violate equal protection. 9 1 However, the Court identi-

86. See Kiarman, supra note 2, at 220 C'The Courts pre-Brown decisions generally adhered to the dominant intention of the Fourteenth Amendments drafters, which had boon to
protect blacks in the exercise of certain fundamental rights, rather than to proscribe all racial
classifications.").
87. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935) (finding a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose in jury selection where thero had
been a substantial population of African Americans in the community but almost a total exclusion of African Americans from jury service); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880), (holding that
administration of facially neutral jury-selection laws with racially discriminatory purpose violated Equal Protection Clause).
88. Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Court asserted:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the
black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand
equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose
protection the Amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall
be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the Amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,-oxemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
Strauder,100 U.S. at 307-08.
89. Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochrane v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
90. See Allen, supra note 85, at 156 (noting that the prison rules at issue in Cochrane and
Dowd appeared to forbid the prisoners themselves from filing court pleadings but did not forbid
those prisoners who could retain lawyers from having their lawyers do so).
91. Even pronouncements of a broad right against racial discriminationwere rather excep.
tional in the pre-Brown era. Evidence appears in the Court's decision in Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S.
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fled limited rights to be free in particular circumstances from race
or caste discrimination, not an unrefined right to equality.

2. From Brown to the Early 1970s
Only two years after the landmark Brown decision, the
Court began endorsing a much less refined notion of equality in
criminal procedure. In Griffin v. Illinois, convicted petitioners
challenged the Illinois practice of providing a free trial transcript
for direct appeal in criminal cases only in limited circumstances.
Griffin and a co-defendant were convicted of armed robbery and
sentenced to prison. Indigent and unable to pursue state appeals
without a trial transcript, they requested a transcript at state expense. The trial court denied their request because they did not
qualify under the relevant statute. Likewise, their subsequent efforts to secure a transcript for collateral review were denied. 93 Consequently, they were unable to obtain state appellate review of
their claims of trial error. The Supreme Court concluded that the
failure of the state to provide petitioners with a transcript at state
expense violated due process and equal protection.9 A broad equality rationale was offered to support the decision.95 In announcing the judgment, Justice Black asserted that
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."98 The Fourteenth
Amendment, he stated, called for "equal justice for poor and rich,

398 (1945), rendered only a few years before Brown. The Court found no equal protection violation in the practice of a Texas jury commission of allowing only one African American on each
grand jury panel Id. at 405-06. All members of the jury commission had testified that they "had
no intention of placing more than one" African American on each panel Id. at 406. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court declined to find discrimination that infringed equal protection. Id. at 406-07.
92. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
93. Id. at 15.
94. Id. at 13, 20.
95. The Court made clear that appeals were not themselves constitutionally required. Id. at
18 (plurality opinion) ("It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate review at all"); see also id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) C[]t is now settled
that due process of law does not require a State to afford review of criminal judgments.");
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) CA review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at
common law and is not now a necessary element of due process oflaw.").
The Court also did not find that trial transcripts were constitutionally mandated whenever
an appeal was allowed. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20 (plurality opinion) C(Ve do not hold.., that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it.L");
see also id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that it is permissible for States to "shap[e]
the mechanism by which alleged errors may be brought before the appellate tribunal).
96. Id. at 19.
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weak and powerful alike. '97 The vote was only five-to-four, and one
member of the majority, Justice Frankfurter, wrote a special concurrence, joining only in the judgment. 98 Still, the decision could
have been rationalized on the limited grounds of assuring some
meaningful access by criminal defendants to the appellate courts,
Instead, the basis for the decision, including the decision of Justice
Frankfurter, 99 was the failure of the state to use the public fisc to
ensure that the poor received litigative advantages similar to the
rich. 100 The decision implied that the state should alleviate the poverty of the poor, although it had not created that poverty, to ensure
equality in the litigation setting.'10
Griffin's equality principle potentially called for many reforms. It seemed to demand more than mere parity between rich
and poor regarding the availability of transcripts for criminal appeals. 10 2 It strongly implied, for example, that filing fees or other
financial requisites to appellate review could not prevent indigent,

97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter qualified his conclusion that
true equality between rich and poor was required in the treatment of criminal defendants, but
ultimately found that Illinois had to avoid the disparity that it had produced regarding criminal
appeals. Id. at 23-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He asserted, for example, that "[t]he equality
at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality." Id. at 21 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)). He also stated that the abil.
ity of a rich man to afford the ablest of counsel not within the poor man's means involved "con.
tingencies of life which are hardly within the power, let alone the duty, of a State to correct or
cushion." Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Yet, as for the discrimination over appeals
between rich and poor that resulted from Illinois' rule on transcripts, he concluded that "[t]ho
State is not free to produce such squalid discrimination." Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
99. See Bertram F. Willcox & Edward J. Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Povertyand the Four.
teenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 11 (1957) (asserting that "Frankfurter's concurring
opinion did not really differ on the theory of decision").
100. For efforts to define the holding, see Schaefer, supra note 82, at 10 (asserting that, under Griffin, "indigence is constitutionally an irrelevance" so that a "defendant by reason of his
poverty [cannot be] deprived of a right available to those who can afford to exercise it"), and
Allen, supra note 85, at 156 (asserting that, in Griffin, "poverty was a significant element in the
finding that equal protection had been withheld").
101. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 78 (9th ed. 1999) (asserting
that Griffin initiated the "equality" principle); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 564 (1992)C'Griffin ... is the seminal ruling on the state's general obligation to provide 'equal justice' in the criminal justice process.").
102. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 85, at 151 (stating in 1957, shortly after the decision, that
"[s]uch a principle, to say the least, contain[ed] the potentiality of growth"); Comment, The Effect
of Griffin v. Illinois on the Administration of the CriminalLaw, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 161 (1957)
(asserting that "the Coures rationale portends a greater significance for the decision than the
mere furnishing of transcripts for appeal").
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criminal defendants from pursuing appeals.103 It seemed also to
mean that indigents were entitled to appointed counsel on their
criminal appeals.10 4 Several prominent commentators argued that
Griffin undermined Betts v. Brady,10 5 which had held that appointed counsel were not required at trial for all indigent, felony
defendants requesting a lawyer. 108 Griffin also raised questions
about whether efforts would be required to disburse funds to and
eliminate costs for indigents in civil proceedings. 107
By the early 1960s, predictions about Griffin's effect in announcing a broad equality principle began ringing true. In 1959 and
again in 1961, the Court held that a state could not prevent indigent criminal defendants from pursuing appeals because of their
inability to pay minor fees.108 These decisions, like Griffin, required
the state to assume particular expenses for which other defendants
had to pay.109

103. See, e.g., Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 99, at 17 (asserting that Griffin means that
the state must "pay for [the indigent convict], or waive, appeal bond premium, filing fees for
appeal, and other such expenses").
104. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 102, at 170 (CThe Supreme Court's emphasis on the obligation of states to see that indigent defendants, as well as the more opulent, get 'adequate and
effective appellate review' portends a requirement that the indigent appellant be provided with
counsel.") (footnote omitted).
105. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
106. See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 82, at 10 ("The analogy to the right to counsel is close indeed. if a state allows one who can afford to retain a lawyer to be represented by counsel .... it
must furnish the same opportunity to those who are unable to hire a lawyer."); Wilcox &
Bloustein, supra note 99, at 23 ("There is a probability that the Griffin decision will eventually
be construed to require a state to furnish reasonably competent counsel to all indigent persons
accused of serious crimes."). But see Robert C. Casad, Comment, 55 MICH. L. RsV. 413, 420
(1957) (If any analogy to the right to counsel area is drawn, it should be limited to those cases
where access to the courts could be had only through an attorney.").
107. See Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 99, at 2 (asserting that the reasoning underlying
Griffin "is broad enough to apply to many other of the injustices arising from the poverty of litigants in our courts"); Casad, supra note 106, at 422 (noting that there was a question whether
the equality rationale underlying Griffin would carry "over into the area of civil review" but
arguing that "it should be applied only in criminal cases").
108. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (rejecting as a violation of equal protection an
Iowa statute requiring a four-dollar filing fee by an indigent prisoner before an application for a
writ of habeas corpus or for the allowance of an appeal would be docketed); Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252 (1959) (striking down under the due process and Equal Protection Clauses an Ohio
statute requiring a twenty-dollar filing fee by an indigent prisoner seeking discretionary review
in the Ohio Supreme Court).
109. In the 1959 decision, for example, the Court stated, "[t]he imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants
has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law." Burns, 360 U.S. at 258. In the 1961
decision, the Court reasserted that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has." Smith, 365 U.S. at 710 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
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In 1963, in Douglas v. California, the Court also held that
states were required to provide counsel to indigent, criminal defendants on their first appeal of right.110 Douglas was significant not
only because a six-member majority endorsed Griffin's broad
equality rationale,' but also because representation by counsel on
appeal was not essential for access to the appellate courts. If an indigent requested appellate counsel, California procedure allowed
the appellate court to review the record to determine whether appointed counsel could assist the defendant or the court. 12 All indigents received some review under this procedure, but the Supreme
Court focused on the comparative advantage of the wealthy convict.
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas noted that perfect equality was not required between rich and poor in the criminal process,
but that equality did require a lawyer for the appeal of right." 3 The
states were obligated to take affirmative steps to remedy the poverty of indigent defendants although the state had not caused that
poverty. 1 4 The conception of prescriptive equality that supported
15
this conclusion was not further clarified."
On the same day as the decision in Douglas, the Court also
overruled Betts v. Brady," 6 but without asserting an equality rationale." 7 In Gideon v. Wainwright, a unanimous Court concluded
that an indigent charged with a crime was automatically entitled to
have counsel at trial. 118 Writing for the Court, Justice Black
grounded the decision, not on the idea that the poor were entitled to
the same kind of defense as the rich, but on the notion that the es-

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Id. at 355.
See id.
Id. at 357.
See Archibald Cox, Foreword; ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotionof Human

Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 93 (1966) (noting that one of the distinct characteristics of the
Courts decisions expanding the concept of equal protection, including Griffin and Douglas, was
that they "impose affirmative obligations upon the states").
115. Justice Douglas stated:

There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where
the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his
behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination
that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58.
116. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
117. See Philip B. Kurland, Equal EducationalOpportunity: The Limits of ConstitutionalJu.
risprudence Undefined, 35 U. Ciu. L. REV. 583, 587 (1968) (noting that "the right to counsel at

trial.., was not rested on any notion of equal protection of the laws" but, instead, on "a notion of
the minimum decencies demanded by our ideals of a fair trial").
118. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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sentials of a fair trial demanded representation of the criminal defendant by counsel. 119 On this view, the Court incorporated the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel into due process, 120 making it
apply against the states as it already applied in federal court. 1
Justice Black's failure to mention Griffin or the equality principle
was "somewhat surprising."1 22 The omission may have been based
on his effort to demonstrate that his dissent in Betts, written long
before Griffin's equality principle was announced, had appropriately addressed why the accused indigent was entitled to counsel at
trial.1 2 In any event, articulation of a substantive Sixth Amendment rule about when counsel was required provided a more precise
rationale than a vague call for equality.1?A
However, after Gideon, the Justices continued to press the
equality principle, despite its uncertain limits. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court struck down a state voting tax
of a dollar and fifty cents because it treated indigent persons unequally.125 Harper extended Griffin's equality principle from the
criminal-procedure context to a broader world of citizen activities.
Harper conceivably meant only that equality was required outside
of the criminal context regarding "fundamental" rights, like the
right to vote. 126 However, as an effort to narrowly limit the equality
principle, this approach would only work if the notion of a "fundamental" right were defined quite arbitrarily; the benefits conferred
in Griffin, Douglas, and Harperwere not, except on a questionable
view, more "fundamental" than necessities like food, shelter, basic

119. Id. at 344.
120. Id. at 342.
121. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that the Sixth Amendments guarantee of counsel applies to a person charged with a crime in federal court).
122. KAMISAR ET AL, supranote 101, at 80.
123. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art"of Omrruling,1963 SUP. CT. REV.
211, 269-72 (questioning Justice Blacks failure in Gideon to employ the typical overruling rationale that subsequent decisions had undermined the prior authority).
124. See Kurland, supra note 117, at 594 (casting doubt on the plausibility of an effort by
courts to pursue equality in counsel services to all criminal defendants); cf Frank L Mlichelman,
Foreword.On Protectingthe Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L REV. 7, 18

(1969) (noting that, because the Court was not seriously pursuing equality, it may have been
rhetorically more comfortable in a single case to refer to the absence of equality rather than to a
seemingly less grounded rule about justice).
125. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Justice Douglas stated for the sixmember majority: "We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard." Id. at 666.

126. See Klarman supra note 2, at 266 (asserting that both Griffin and Harperinvolved "fundamental" rights).

384

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:2:359

medical care, and education. 127 For this reason, commentators argued that the Griffin-Douglas-Harperline could extend to require
12
state aid in a wide array of circumstances.
Through the early 1970s, the Court continued to reaffirm the
equality notion under the open-ended clauses. The Court extended
the equality principle to the civil litigation sphere, striking down a
state fee of $60 required to bring a divorce action because of its inequitable effects on indigents. 129 In the criminal context, the Court
held that convicted indigents could not be incarcerated simply because of their inability to pay a fine. 180 In addition, the Court ruled
that appellate counsel for indigent convicts must file a brief with
the court outlining the best arguments for the indigent, even if
18 1
counsel did not believe the arguments ultimately could prevail.
The Court also held repeatedly that indigent convicts were entitled
to free transcripts and, unlike earlier cases, in contexts in which
the transcript was not essential to gain access to the courts. 13 2 The
127. See id. at 267 ("Only a lawyer, after all, could argue with a straight face that legal assis.
tance in a criminal appeal is more important than, for example, food and shelter.').
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court arguably recognized that the equality principle logically applied to the provision of fundamental needs, like food and housing. The
Court struck down a one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits, relying on a vague
melding of equal protection and right-to-travel rationales. Subsequently, the Court read Shapiro
as relying solely on right-to-travel grounds, although that is a strained view. See Klarman, supra note 2, at 268 CYet even accepting the right-to-travel construction of Shapiro,the only challengeable government action was refusal to provide newcomers to the jurisdiction with welfare
benefits.").
128. See, e.g., Gary S. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Stan.
dards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223, 266 (1970)
C(While there are reasonable justifications for a limitation of expenditures by the states for liti.
gation-related costs of the poor, there is no satisfactory justification for denying the poor their
fundamental and instrumental right of access to the [civil] courts for the settlement of disputes."); Harold W. Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment
Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1168 (1966) (concluding that Griffin
implicitly required government to provide remedial education to socially disadvantaged groups);
Note, DiscriminationsAgainst the Poor and the FourteenthAmendment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 435,
446 (1967) ("rhe most obvious applications are within the criminal-law area, but the principles
might also be extended to civil litigation, education, medical care, or any area in which there is
an important state involvement."); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945,
1001 (1975) (asserting that Griffin-Douglas-Harperraised many constitutional questions about
"economic inequality").
129. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971).
130. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970).
131. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). But see Smith v. Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746
(2000) (holding that states are free to follow procedures other than those specified in Anders as
long as they adequately safeguard an accused's federal constitutional right to appellate counsel).
132. E.g., Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 368-71 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40, 41-43 (1967) (per curiam); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 193-94 (1966) (per
curiam).
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Court also clarified that an indigent convicted of violating a mere
city ordinance punishable only by a modest fine was entitled to a
free record for appeal. 133 The theme of these decisions was that the
state was obliged to reduce the inequitable position of indigents,
though in what circumstances remained unclear.134
B. UncertainLimits and JusticeHarlan'sConcerns
Despite the Court's repeated endorsements, the equality
principle of Griffin-Douglas-Harperproved troublesome as a constitutional norm. As a prescription, equality is meaningless by itself.
Equality does not reveal who is equal or unequal or what action
would render unequals alike. The Griffin-Douglas-Harperline also
did little to give the equality command a meaning that would confine it. The decisions did not suggest that the only focus was on financial differences. 13 5 They also did not indicate that prescriptive
equality was confined to the procedural treatment of criminal defendants or even of litigants in general. 13 6 The Court's opinions
could not plausibly have been understood to mean that the government should strive to ensure equal life outcomes for all citizens.
However, the meaning of the opinions was uncertain. Indeed, indeterminacy is a central problem with prescriptive equality. The
mandate has no inherent limits. 137
Even if applied only to the judicial treatment of criminal defendants, the assertion that the government must provide "equal

133. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-99 (1971).
134. The Court gave a particularly strong reaffirmation of the equality principle in the Mayer
opinion, where it rejected the state's argument that the Griffin transcript rule should not apply
where only non-jailable, ordinance violations were involved. After repeatedly endorsing the
equality language from Griffin and other opinions, the Court stated[The state's] argument misconceives the principle of Griffin... . Griffin does
not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the interests of

society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants
out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their
own way.
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196-97.
135. In Griffin, for example, Justice Black asserted that inequitable treatment by government based on poverty was as impermissible as inequitable treatment based on other factors: "In
criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color: Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
136. The application of the equality principle in Harper to the poll tax indicated that the
Griffin rationale was not limited to the procedural treatment of criminal defendants. The
Coures subsequent decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971), in which the
Court cited Griffin as the grounds for striking down a filing fee imposed on certain civil litigants,
confirmed that the Griffin rule was not confined to the criminal context.
137. See Cox, supra note 114, at 91 C'Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily
cabined.").
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justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike" 18 8 could not be
taken literally. First, the equality idea has no clear meaning even

in this limited context. Without rules or standards by which to
measure likenesses and differences among criminal litigants, we

could not know when a practice furthered or thwarted equality.
Even if we could agree on a standard to define a correct outcome in

a criminal case, 18 9 we could not possibly equalize the many factors
that affect each litigant's likelihood of receiving it. The effort would
require, for example, attempting to gauge and balance the relative
quality of every defense lawyer, numerous outcome-influencing factors about defendants, such as physical appearance, demeanor, intelligence, and criminal experience, and a plethora of outcomeaffecting factors related to prosecutor(s), judge(s), witnesses, and

jurors. The Court could not carry out this sort of undertaking. Unfortunately, what more narrow protections it intended to afford
140
were not clarified by its endorsement of prescriptive equality.
Further, equality, conceived in any general terms, typically
conflicts with particular liberties that we value. Consider, for example, the narrow question of the procedural treatment to be afforded criminal defendants in connection with the appointment of
counsel for their first appeal. Assume that we assert an equality
rule to cover that narrow situation: "All defendants should have

138. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16.
139. The correct outcome does not necessarily involve the conviction of the guilty. For centuries, it has been part of our legal tradition that a substantial margin of error should be imposed
in favor of the criminal defendant. Long before the founding, Blackstone noted the embodiment
of this principle in the common law: "IThe law holds that it is better that ten guilty escape, than
that one innocent suffer." WILLIAM BLACMSrONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: OF
PUBLIC WRONGS 358 (1962). This view still prevails. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970) (concluding that, in a criminal proceeding, the burden of persuading the fact-finder be.
yond a reasonable doubt should be placed on the prosecution to help assure against an erroneous
conviction). See generally Donald A. Dripps, The ConstitutionalStatus of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 75 CAL. L REv. 1665, 1715 (1987) ("The procedures incorporated by the due process clause
are not animated by a scientific preference for minimizing erroneous judgments, but by a politi.
cal preference for minimizing erroneous convictions."); Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and
Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346 (1957)
(asserting that one of the aims of due process is to ensure "the reliability of the guilt.determining
process- reducing to a minimum the possibility that any innocent individual will be punished");
John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process,20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (1968)
C'[O]ne of the fundamental feelings of our society is that it is far more serious to convict an inno.
cent man than to let a guilty man go free."); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal
Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990)
("In the Anglo-American tradition, the social cost of factual error against the (criminal] defen.
dant ...is deemed greater than the social cost of factual error against the government.").
140. See Wilkinson, supra note 128, at 1001 (CBy the end of Chief Justice Warren's tenure,
Griffin-Douglas-Harperhad opened a plethora of unsolved constitutional questions in the area of
economic inequality.").
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legal representation of equal quality on their criminal appeal." Assume further that we could gauge the effectiveness of every attorney handling criminal appeals and that an attorney's effectiveness
was the same for every kind of criminal appeal. In addition, suppose that the effectiveness ratings, if charted, would follow a bell
curve. With these unrealistic, but heuristically helpful conditions in
mind, consider the difficulty of implementing the equality mandate.
To follow it would require rather onerous restrictions on the freedoms of many defendants and many attorneys. To promote less inequality, we might, for example, choose to exclude the attorneys on
both ends of the array from taking criminal appeals. This action
would eliminate the wide disparity between the best qualified and
the least qualified attorneys, although it would not produce anything like true equality unless an adequate supply of attorneys had
ratings that clustered around the average point on the array. Alternatively, or in addition, we might establish a lottery system so
that all criminal appellants would have an equal chance of receiving an attorney with a rating at any position on the array. This
would promote equal opportunities for good representation if not
equal representation. Under any approach, however, major restrictions on the freedom of both clients and attorneys would be required. 4 1 This mental exercise underscores that, assuming we knew
how to measure equality, efforts to pursue it would run up against
42
liberties not easily sacrificed.
For these sorts of reasons, Justice Harlan decried the Court's
143
reliance on the equality principle in Griffin, Douglas, and Harper.
He emphasized the problems with striking down the financial exac-

1.41. Problems would also arise over how to decide the compensation level for attorneys and
how to fund any compensation scheme. To retain high quality attorneys for the indigent accused, states might have to provide much more funding than they currently provide. See, e.g.,

Stephen B.Bright, Counselfor the Poor. The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843-44 (1994) (attributing the poor quality of representation

of defendants in capital trials and appeals in part to the "wholly inadequate funding for the
defense of indigents").
142. The dual problems of definition and conflicts with liberty were noted long ago by Professor Kurland:
There are two primary problems that arise under the equal protection clause.
The first is the ambiguity inherent in the relevant term, whether it be "equality" or "equal protection of the laws." The second major difficulty results from
the possible conflict of the notion of equality with that of liberty or some other
fundamental constitutional value.
Philip B. Kurland, Foreword:-Equal in Origin and Equal in 7itle to the Legislatie and Executive
Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145 (1964).
143. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 29 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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tions that a state imposes equally on all citizens. What were the
limits of a mandate that required states to take affirmative steps to
alleviate pre-existing, financial disparities?'4 Because of his concerns about confining the equality notion, he urged that the Court
analyze governmental actions that did not involve actual classification of persons, as in Griffin, Douglas, and Harper, under the Due
Process Clause rather than under the Equal Protection Clause. 145 In
Griffin and Douglas, the Court had seemed to rely on both clauses
as the basis for its decision; 146 in Harper,the Court clearly relied on
the Equal Protection Clause, 147 but over Justice Harlan's objection.148
Justice Harlan's critique hit the mark in one respect, but
missed the most important point. He correctly noted that the potential for confusing references to the broad equality principle is greatest when the Equal Protection Clause is applied, because the language of that clause facially invokes the equality principle. Yet, the
potential for confusion in applying the Equal Protection Clause does
not reveal any rule regarding when the Due Process, rather than
the Equal Protection Clause, should control. The larger point is
that courts ultimately must perform work under the Equal Protection Clause with the same approach that they employ under the
Due Process Clause. 49 They must decide what substantive rule or
standard, outside of the notion of equality, defines constitutional
treatment of citizens by government in the relevant context.5 0
C. The Court's Retreat
Beginning in the early 1970s, the Court began to avoid endorsements of prescriptive equality under the open-ended clauses.
By 1970, the Court had already revealed its unwillingness to further extend the equality principle to basic needs, like food and

144.
145.
146.
147.
148

E.g., Douglas,372 U.S. at 361-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
E.g., Griffin, 351 U.S. at 35-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harris, supra note 80, at 474-75.
Harper,383 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 681 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

149. The Due Process Clause that appears in the Fifth Amendment and that is repeated in
the Fourteenth Amendment actually may be seen as more limited than the Equal Protection
Clause, but the Supreme Court has not given it a limited meaning. The word "process" may be
thought to guarantee only fundamentally fair procedure and authorize no substantive oversight
of legislation. Professor Ely, for example, has endorsed this purely procedural interpretation of
due process, while acknowledging that this view conflicts with modern judicial and scholarly
consensus. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 14-21 (1980).
150. The Court recognized this same point later in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-74
(1983). For a discussion of Bearden, see infra note 165.
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housing. 151 In the criminal-procedure sphere, the Court also signaled a sharp turn with decisions like Britt v. North Carolina and

Ross v. Moffitt. 52 In Britt, the Court rejected an indigent's contention that he was entitled in a second trial to a free transcript of his
first trial that had ended with a deadlocked jury. 153 In Ross, the

Court rejected an indigent's claim to the assistance of counsel at
state expense on a petition for discretionary review by the North
Carolina Supreme Court and on a certiorari petition to the United
54
States Supreme Court.
In each case, the Court attempted to distinguish Griffin or

Douglas. In Britt, the Court emphasized that the trials took place in
a small town with the same lawyers, judge, and court reporter, and

that the reporter would have been willing, on request, to read back
his notes to the defense lawyer before the second trial. 1 5 In Ross,
the Court emphasized that the defendant had previously been given
free counsel on his appeal of right to the state intermediate court,
so that he already had been provided the benefit of a lawyer's brief
on the trial errors. 5 6 However, these distinctions were unpersuasive if the rationale for Griffin and Douglas is equality of procedural advantage between the poor and the wealthy. A transcript of
a previous trial was much more useful than access to a court reporter's verbal report of his notes, 5 7 and a lawyer for discretionary
stages of appellate review was more valuable than no lawyer, re-

gardless of whether lawyers had been involved earlier. 18 Indeed,
the Court in Britt and Ross did not rely on the equality principle,

151. The Court had earlier hinted that it would extend the equality holding to the provision
for basic needs. See supranote 127 (discussing the Shapiro decision). However, the Court manifested a rather clear intention to avoid such an extension in 1970. See Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) (upholding, on a rational basis analysis, state decision to impose
"maximum grant limitation on welfare benefits to poor families, regardless of the number of
children); Goodpaster, supra note 128, at 224 (concluding that, in Dandridge,"the Court, seemingly an oracle without memory, neglected its famous sympathy for the indigent, so exquisitely
carved in rights to counsel in criminal cases and the provision of transcripts of criminal trials");
Wilkinson, supra note 128, at 1002 (asserting that Dandridgeappeared to be a "crucial blow to
affirmative duty doctrine" by holding that "welfare was not a fundamental right").
152. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
153. Britt, 404 U.S. at 231 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. Ross, 417 U.S. at 614.
155. Britt, 404 U.S. at 230-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156. Ross, 417 U.S. at 615-16.
157. See Harris,supra note 80, at 480 n.69 (raising doubts about the efficacy of the arrangement as compared with the provision of a transcript).
158. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the indigent defendant proceeding without counsel is at a substantial disadvantage relative to vealthy defendants
represented by counsel when he is forced to fend for himself in seeking discretionary review from
the State Supreme Court or from this Court").
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and redefined the rationale of Griffin and Douglas as having been
something other than equality. 15 9 In Britt, the mandate of the earlier cases became merely that states "provide indigent prisoners
with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal."'160 In Ross,
their mandate became that "indigents have an opportunity to pres16
ent their claims fairly within the adversary system."'
During the subsequent decade, the Court continued to limit
the import of Griffin-Douglas-Harper.In United States v. MacColloin, the Court rejected an indigent's claim to a free trial transcript
for use in attacking his federal conviction in habeas proceedings,
although the petitioner had not previously filed a regular appeal
and, therefore, had not secured a free transcript. 162 The Court conceded that its decision "place[d] an indigent in a somewhat less advantageous position than a person of means." 63 However, citing
Ross, the Court reiterated that "[i]n the context of a criminal proceeding [, the open-ended clauses] require only 'an adequate opportunity to present [one's] claims fairly.' "164 The accused indigent was
guaranteed only the minimum of fair treatment rather than an
equivalence of litigative advantage with wealthy defendants.
In the 1980s, the Justices reconfirmed this turn from reliance on the equality principle under the open-ended clauses. When
overturning a state practice, they were careful to ground the decision on a substantive rule or standard rather than on the equality
notion. Perhaps most telling was the decision in Ake v. Okla.
homa. 65 There, the Court addressed a state's duty to provide an

159. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 101, at 88 ('[What Ross] really seems to be asking, and
deciding, is whether an indigent in respondent's circumstances has a fair chance, a fighting

chance (or the requisite minimum chance), to get the attention of the state supreme court.")
(quoting YALE KAMISAR, Poverty, Equality, and CriminalProcedure, in NATIONAL COLLEGE OF

DIsricr ATTORNEYS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 1-101 to 1.108 (1977)). But see Israel,
supra note 79, at 1334-35 ('[The Ross ruling hardly placed a major limitation on the extension of
the Griffin-Douglasdoctrine.").
160. Britt, 404 U.S. at 227.
161. Ross, 417 U.S. at 612.
162. United States v. MacCollon, 426 U.S. 317, 325.26 (1976).
163. Id. at 324.
164. Id. (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 616).
165. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
The Courts opinion in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), provides another example. A
state trial judge had revoked Bearden's probation and imprisoned him because he had not, after

losing his job, been able to pay off the fine that the judge previously had imposed along with the
probation. Id. at 663. The Supreme Court found that the revocation of probation in favor of
imprisonment, without a finding that Bearden had failed to make bona fide efforts to pay or that

adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist, violated equal protection. Id. at 674.
However, the Court did not rely on the equality notion. Justice O'Connor, for the majority, asserted that "[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis in [the
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indigent accused with assistance from a psychiatrist in evaluating,
preparing, and presenting a mental-disorder defense. The Justices
concluded that Oklahoma had erred in rejecting Ake's claim for
such assistance. 166 The rationale was not that Ake was entitled to
the same kind of assistance as a defendant with substantial means
but that he was entitled to "the 'basic tools of an adequate defense
or appeal.' "167 On this view, the Court substantially qualified the
indigent's right to a psychiatrist's help. The defendant first had to
show that his mental condition would likely be a significant factor
in his defense.1i Upon such a showing, the defendant also was not
entitled "to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive
funds to hire his own," but only to have "access to a competent psychiatrist" to assist the defense. 169 The Court reiterated that the defendant was guaranteed not an opportunity to present a strong defense, but only that he be "fairly able to present at least enough information to the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit it to
make a sensible determination." 17 0 While Griffin was cited,1 7' the
172
equality notion of Griffin-Douglas-Harperwas never mentioned.
This history reveals a rise and fall in the importance of the
formal equality principle in the Court's post-Brown work under the
open-ended clauses. Between Brown and the early 1970s, the Court
often relied on the rationale of prescriptive equality, with little effort to define limits, when it struck down state criminal procedures.
At least by 1974, with the opinion in Ross v. Moffitt, and certainly
by the mid-1980s, with the decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, the Court's
majority was no longer impressed with prescriptive equality as an
analytic or explanatory tool. The Court's previous decisions under
the open-ended clauses that had been rationalized on equality
grounds, including Griffin, Douglas, and Harper, were allowed to
stand because the decisions themselves imposed only limited de-

Griffin line of] cases." Id. at 665. She then asserted that, under either equal protection or due
process, the question was "when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for the State to revoke
probation when an indigent is unable to pay the fine." Id. at 666. The Court concluded that it
was fundamentally unfair to revoke probation except upon the findings noted above. Id. at 67374. This amounted to reliance on a rule or standard external to the precept that equals should
be treated equally.

166. Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87.
167. Id. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
168. Id. at 82-83.
169. Id. at 83.

170. Id. at 82.
171. Id. at 76.

172. For an argument that the Court should treat defense requests for expert assistance under a "truth seeking" standard rather than under a 'basic tools" approach, see Harris, supra note
80, at 491-525.
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mands on states. The Court could recast them as resting on narrow
substantive grounds and foreclose their value as precedents for interpreting the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to mandate broad and burdensome obligations on government.
III. THE ENDURING INFLUENCE OF EQUALITY UNDER
VARIOUS CRIMINAL CLAUSES
While abandoned as a normative principle under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, equality retains a central
place in the explanation of much of modern criminal procedure. Its
impact has come through doctrines articulated by the Supreme
Court under the criminal clauses. Equality rhetoric has not played
prominently in the construction of all of the criminal clauses. However, it has been important in the Court's work under several of
them. The following discussion provides three examples from each
of the four criminal amendments. 173 For the sake of following historical progression, I discuss the doctrines in the order in which the
equality notion began to manifest itself clearly in their construction
by the Justices.

173. The Courts construction of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury provides
another example. In this area, the Court has held that procedures that result in the exclusion or
failure to include cognizable segments of the community in the selection process may render the
resulting jury biased as a whole, although all of those selected as jurors are individually impartial. See, e.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 41-49 (1980) (finding violative of the impartial jury
clause the Texas practice in capital cases of excluding venire members who could not take oath
promising that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would not "affect [their]
deliberations on any issue of fact"); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979) (holding system under which women could opt out of service by written request violative of the impartial jury
clause). Nonetheless, a conservative majority on the Court has sometimes declined to find certain groups to be cognizable by viewing the impartial-jury requirement as designed to ensure
equitable treatment of prospective jurors rather than to ensure a fair jury for the criminal defen.
dant. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175-76 (1986) (allowing exclusion on the guiltor-innocence question in a capital case of jurors with significant opposition to the death penalty
on grounds, in part, that this group has never been subject to the same need for protection to
allow their participation on juries as blacks, women, and Mexican Americans). The Court has
given meaning to the notion of equality in this area by imposing substantive standards derived
from equal protection doctrine. However, the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is not
supposed to ensure equality of treatment for prospective jurors. See generally Scott W. Howe,
JurorNeutrality Or An ImpartialityArray? A Structural Theory Of The ImpartialJury Man.
date, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1207 (1995) (rejecting the view that the impartiality man.
date "exists for the protection of the excluded venire persons rather than for the protection of
affected litigants"); infra note 341 (further discussing the meaning and function of the impartial
jury mandate).
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A. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments and Interrogation
The Warren Court's enthusiasm for prescriptive equality
greatly influenced the holdings that form the basis of modern interrogation and confessions doctrine. 174 The Court constructed this
doctrine under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Under
these clauses, the Justices concluded that the poor and ignorant
should be made the equal of the rich and well-informed in their
dealings with police interrogators. The Justices also concluded that
the uncharged suspect who had not yet been to court should be
treated as equal to the accused against whom adversary judicial
proceedings had commenced. These notions of equality were crucial
to the evolution of modern doctrine regulating interrogation and
confessions practice.
Before the 1960s, the Court's efforts to impose constitutional
regulation on police interrogation focused on the Due Process
Clauses. The Court held that confessions were admissible under
due process if given "voluntarily."175 Between 1936, when the Court
first held a confession inadmissible in state court,17 and the early
1960s, the Court issued some 30 different opinions applying this
voluntariness standard, attempting in part to provide guidance to

174. On the role of equality arguments in doctrine and commentary concerning police interrogation and confessions, see GRANO, supranote 12, at 32-38 (1996).
175. Initially, the Court equated voluntariness with trustworthiness, the English standard
for admitting confessions. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). While the early cases
seemed to focus on whether a promise or a threat had been made, the Court subsequently clarifled that various kinds of police inducements could amount to improper coercion, thus making
all of the circumstances of the detention and interrogation relevant. See Ziang Sung Wan v.
United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) ([A] confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded
whatever may have been the character of the compulsion.").
In the early case of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1897), the Court hinted that
voluntariness was not to be equated precisely with trustworthiness, grounding the voluntariness
test on the Fifth Amendment privilege rather than on due process (a view that would go largely
ignored by the Court for the next sixty years). In Brain, the Court found a statement made during a short custodial interrogation to be involuntary and, thus, "compelled" within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 565. The Court also found that use of the statement at
Brain's criminal trial amounted to making Brain "awitness against himself" Id. at 542. The
Courts application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to the investigatory context and its claim of
only effectuating the common law notion of voluntariness were denounced by Wigmore and others. See 3 WIGmiORE, EVIDENCE § 823 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970); Charles T. McCormick, The
Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TLX. L. REV. 447, 453 (1938). Not until Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), did a majority of the Court again state that the Fifth Amendment
privilege provided the basis for excluding a confession. Further, not until the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), decision in 1966 did the Court hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege provided a more demanding regulatory rule than that imposed by the due process clauses.
See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
176. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
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lower courts and to the police. 177 Despite these enforcement efforts,
the voluntariness standard was always quite vague, so that lower

courts could manipulate it to admit statements despite evidence of
questionable tactics by the police. 178 Also, the requirement that a

court consider a confession's voluntariness in light of all of the circumstances meant that a Supreme Court opinion applying the
standard carried only minor prescriptive force for future cases. 119
By the late 1950s, several of the Justices were looking for a new
constitutional basis to curb what they saw as oppressive interroga0
tion practices. 18
A majority initially coalesced behind the right-to-counsel

provision in the Sixth Amendment. In Massiah v. United States, a
six-Justice majority applied the counsel clause to foreclose the use
of a statement elicited from Massiah by a co-defendant at the behest of the police.' 8 ' On pre-trial release after indictment, Massiah
was unaware that his co-defendant was cooperating with the police

and that the conversation was being monitored electronically. On
those facts, it was a stretch to conclude that Massiah's right to

counsel was violated when the statements were elicited. 182 The

177. For a summary of some of these decisions, see KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 101, at 45255. The decisions implied that both the vulnerabilities of the particular defendant and the level
of offensiveness in the police tactics employed were relevant. Yale Kamisar, On the 'Fruits"of
Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 93839 (1995) (noting that the Court was employing both a "'police methods' test and a 'trustworthi
ness test' ).
178. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal
to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1832-35 (1987) (discussing the many problems
with the due process voluntariness standard as a means of limiting coercive police intqrrogation);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869-70 (1981) (noting
that the due process voluntariness test, because of "its subtle mixture of factual and legal ele.
ments," enabled lower courts to admit statements elicited under questionable circumstances).
179. See Ogletree, supra note 178, at 1834 ("ecause each case turned on its facts, the Court
was unable to develop broad guidelines for acceptable, noncoercive conduct.").
180. The search by several Justices for an alternative doctrinal basis was revealed by their
dissenting opinions in the late 1950s in which they found confessions to have been secured in
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See generally KAMISAR ST AL., supra note
101, at 459-60.
The Court also had used its supervisory power over federal courts to exclude from federal
prosecutions all suspect statements elicited during delayed pre-presentment detention. See
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454-56 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
340-41 (1943). This McNabb-Mallory rule, as it was known, was not helpful in regulating interrogation practices used in state proceedings, because it was not constitutionally grounded.
181. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
182. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel in criminal cases was "a right traditionally
associated with hearings before judicial officers." Note, An HistoricalArgument for the Right to
Counsel During PoliceInterrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1002 (1964). However, the Court could
point to White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam), to indicate that an indicted
defendant was entitled to counsel in some pre-trial settings. The defendant in White had entered
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Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in all criminal
"prosecutions," and since Massiah had been indicted, the Justices
plausibly could say that his "prosecution" had commenced. However, the clause had never before been held to apply in non-judicial,
pre-trial settings. Also, as Justice White's dissent emphasized, it
was not easy to see how Massiah's right to counsel, assuming it existed, was infringedlR3 Massiah was not deterred from seeking the
assistance of counsel, and his private communications with counsel
were not prevented or invaded. 184 Nonetheless, the majority concluded that Massiah's right to counsel not only had attached but
that the state violated the right by "deliberately elicit[ing]" statements from Massiah without his counsel present.185
In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court extended the Massiah
holding'86 to the pre-prosecution context, by using equality reasoning that ignored the language of the Sixth Amendment. 18 7 Upon his
arrest, Escobedo was interrogated by police and a state attorney,
and made incriminating statements.RI These events occurred after
he had asked for and been denied an opportunity to speak with his
retained lawyer, and after his lawyer had been told he would have
to wait to see Escobedo. 189 This scenario was difficult to view as
covered by the Sixth Amendment, however, because Escobedo had
not yet been formally charged and had not yet been presented in
court on any complaint. For there to be a "prosecution," as required
by the language of the right-to-counsel clause, the adversary judicial process would have to have begun. 190 Yet, the Court in Escobedo

a guilty plea at his preliminary hearing but had not been represented by counsel. Id. at 59.
Later, after counsel was appointed, the defendant changed his plea to not guilty. Id. at 60. The
defendant was convicted at trial following the state's introduction of his original guilty plea. Id.
The Supreme Court later reversed on grounds that White had been denied his right to counsel at
the preliminary hearing. Id.
183. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 209 (White, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White questioned how Messiah presented an unconstitutional interference with Massiah's right to counsel, stating that "[it is only a sterile syllo-

gism ... to say that because lassiah had a right to counsers aid before and during the trial, his
out-of-court conversations and admissions must be excluded if obtained without counsel's consent
or presence." Id. (White, J., dissenting).

185. Id. at 205-06.
186. Id. at 206 (nVehold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of [the right to
counsel] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.") (emphasis
added).
187. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
188. Id. at 481-83.
189. Id. at 480-81.
190. See JOSHUADRESSLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, PoLIciEs AND PERSPEcTIVES
597 (1999) ("The contrary argument is textually difficult, ... because the Amendment begins, 'In
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extended the right-to-counsel holding of Massiah to the preprosecution period, on grounds that Escobedo and Massiah were
equally positioned regarding their need for a lawyer.191 The holding
seemed to be qualified by the particular facts, such as that Escobedo had already retained counsel and asked to see him and that
the lawyer had come to the police station and asked to see Escobedo. 192 Still, nothing had occurred which easily supported the view
that a "prosecution," as opposed to a police investigation, had begun. The failure of the majority to concern itself with the clause's
triggering condition was not lost on Justice Stewart, the author of
the Massiah opinion. In a vigorous dissent, he explained that the
absence of adversary judicial proceedings was precisely why Escobedo's circumstances were not like Massiah's. 193 However, the notion that the defendants in the two cases faced equal situations
propelled the Escobedo majority to find a violation, despite the
194
Sixth Amendment language distinguishing between their cases.
The Escobedo decision stemmed from the Court's desire to
promote equality not only between indicted and unindicted defendants, but between the affluent and the indigent. Extension of the
right to counsel to investigatory stages manifested a concern not so
much with protecting innocent indigents from conviction as with
ensuring that guilty indigents received the same chances to escape
conviction as guilty non-indigents. 195 The Escobedo Court did not
suggest that the incriminating statements that were being admitted were unreliable. Concern grew instead from the recognition that
police deception and interrogation of uncounseled suspects was

all criminal prosecutions' "); cf. Israel, supra note 79, at 1368 n.224 C(The Sixth Amendment, it

can be argued, does not provide for counsel at every stage in which counsel's assistance is help.
ful. Rather, by its history, language, and function, the amendment sought to draw a starting
point after which counsel's assistance is generally required as an element of our adversary sys.

tem.").
191. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486 (asserting that, as in Massiah, the statements were made at a

stage when counsel's assistance was "most critical" to Escobedo and that "[i]t
would exalt form
over substance to make the right to counsel... depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment').
192. Id. at 490-91.
193. Id. at 493-94 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only upon the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings, which had not
occurred when Escobedo made his statement, unlike in Massiah).
194. The majority focused on the fact that there was "no meaningful distinction" drawn between interrogation of the accused before and after informal indictment. Id. at 486; see also

Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictionson Police Interrogation,25 OHIO ST. L.J.
449, 491 (1964) (questioning whether the emphasis in Massiah on the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings was based on an overly "formalistic reading" of the Sixth Amendment).
195. Klarman, supra note 2, at 267 n.255.
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more likely to extract incriminating comments from indigent and
uneducated "street crime" defendants than from relatively affluent
and informed "white-collar" defendants.' 9s Yet, apart from its lack
of any tether in the Sixth Amendment language, this effort to pursue equality had no practical end: "Even a ban on uncounseled interrogation [could] not solve the problem, for class and education
disparities must be to some extent inherent in law enforcement, if
only because more sophisticated criminals have a better chance of
19 7
avoiding detection than less sophisticated criminals."'
The error that underlies Escobedo, which the Court conceded
in later decades, 198 was soon compounded when the Justices transmogrified Escobedo into a Fifth Amendment privilege case and then
extended its meaning again through the equality notion. The result
was Miranda v. Arizona.9 9 The Court's central holding was that the
Fifth Amendment privilege requires the police to provide certain
warnings to an arrestee before interrogating him.200 However, the

196. See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in CriminalProcedure,75 VA. L. REV. 761, 838
(1989).
197. Id.
198. The Court has subsequently made clear that the Sixth Amendment clause cannot apply
before the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings, as Justice Stewart had maintained
in his Escobedo dissent. The Court seemed to implicitly repudiate the Escobcdo view in /rby u.

Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972), holding that the Sixth Amendment did not require defense
counsel at a pre-indictment line-up involving the accused. Then, in Moran v. Burbine 475 U.S.
412, 430.32 (1986), the Court held explicitly that the interrogation of a suspect before the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings does not implicate the Sixth Amendment.
199. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
200. Since the 1970s, some commentators have asserted that Miranda may have announced
only "constitutional common law." E.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 TermForework Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 & 20-23 (1975). Miranda's
promulgators, however, surely thought that it was constitutional law that was not subject to
overruling by Congress. See Charles D.Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L REV. 109,
125 (1998) (asserting that "the principal authors of Mranda [Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan] considered its procedures the minimum required by the Fifth Amendment").
Although the Court itself has provided mixed messages over the years about whether
Miranda is capable of being overruled by Congress, it recently clarified that Congress cannot
overrule it. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). The Miranda opinion
provided that states could implement procedures other than those set out by the Court as long as
they were at least equally protective of a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 467, 490. Beginning in the early 1970s, conservative majorities of the Court pointed to
this language to support the contention that the Miranda safeguards set forth only prophylactic
measures designed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege but not actually required by that
clause. See generally Weisselberg, supra, at 126-29 and authorities cited therein. The Court
repeatedly reaffirmed Miranda'svalidity against the states, however, suggesting that the decision would be enforced as constitutional law. See, eg., Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 69092 (1993) (holding that the Mirandasafeguards, even if prophylactic, are enforceable against the
states on federal habeas corpus); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that
where a suspect has asked for counsel, the police may not reinitiate communications with the
suspect to secure a Miranda waiver without counsel present regardless of whether the accused

398

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:2:359

Miranda opinion actually represents a series of related holdings.
Among them was the recognition of a new right to counsel emanating from the Fifth Amendment privilege. Through several rulings
about warnings and waivers, the Court extended this right to counsel-on an equality rationale-to every person subjected to custodial interrogation by the police, regardless of whether a "prosecution" had commenced, the person could retain counsel, or the person
had requested counsel. 201 As might have been expected in light of
these dramatic and legislative-like changes, Miranda became the
most controversial of all of the Warren Court's criminal-procedure
decisions.202

The forces that moved five Justices to endorse the Miranda
opinion cannot be understood without an appreciation of the influence of the equality notion on the Court. 20 3 The period between Escobedo and Miranda was the high point of the Warren Court's concern with prescriptive equality in criminal procedure. Douglas v.
California, which used the equality principle to find a right to
counsel in criminal appeals, had been decided in 1963.204 Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, extending the Griffin-Douglas equality
principle beyond criminal procedure to invalidate a poll tax, was
decided in early 1966, only a few weeks before Miranda.205 It was
apparent that the Court held a "specific apparent receptivity ...

to

egalitarian argumentation" during that period. 20 6
The idea of reinterpreting Escobedo as a Fifth Amendment
privilege case and then employing the Griffin-Douglas equality rationale to extend it to mere arrestees, even those who were uncoun-

has consulted with his attorney). Nevertheless, when a 1968 statute purporting to eviscerate
Miranda in the federal courts came before the Court, a seven-Justice majority expressly hold
that it could not be overruled by legislation. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
201. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-77.
202. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 158 (Levinson rev. 2d ed.
1994); see also A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and CriminalProcedure, 67 MICH. L. REV,
249, 262 (1968) CThe case which seemed to galvanize opposition into a potent political force was
the Miranda decision.").
203. See BIcKEL, supranote 2, at 13 (asserting that the "goal" of the "Justices of the Warren
Coure' was "the Egalitarian Society"); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 202, at 161 (noting that
"[w]hether because of the pressure of the race-relations cases, including Brown v. Board of Edu.
cation, or because of a more general cultural interest in egalitarianism, the Court in the 1960's
would engage in the most systematic exploration in American history of the meaning of equality").
204. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
205. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). As the Court concluded in Harper,
"a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes
the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard." Id. at 666.
206. McCLOsKEY, supranote 202, at 179.
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seled, indigent, and uninformed, was revealed in a "classic" article
published in 1965, after the decision in Escobedo.207 In Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to ... , Professor Yale
Kamisar provided what was, at the most general level, an argument
for applying the Fifth Amendment privilege beyond the formal judicial setting to the police interrogation context. 203 His theme was
that an incongruity existed in providing grand protections against
self-incrimination at the trial (the mansion) while largely nullifying
those protections by allowing the police to use psychological coercion to extract incriminating statements from the accused at the
police station (the gatehouse). 2 9 Kamisar went much further, however, in suggesting how the Court might next move to regulate police interrogation after Escobedo. He explained that the right to
counsel, recognized in Escobedo as emanating from the Sixth
Amendment, could be seen as emanating from the Fifth Amendment privilege on the view that counsels advice would assist in ensuring that the accused understood the right to silence and the
benefits of exercising it.210 He then explained how the equality principle of Griffin and Douglas supported two further points about this
207. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering iranda, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 435, 437 n.5 (1987)
(describing Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure:From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to .... in CRwIINAL JUsTIcE INOUR TzME (A.
E. Dick Howard ed., 1965)).
208. Kamisar, supra note 207, at 1. For an overview of this central argument, see id. at 2538.
209. Kamisar's powerful prose presented the analogy vividly:.
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys bellow and strut and
prosecuting attorneys are hemmed in at many turns. But what happens before
an accused reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort of this veritable mansion? Ab, there's the rub. Typically he must first pass through a much less pretentious edifice, a police station with bare back rooms and locked doors. In this
"gatehouse" of American criminal procedure-through which most defendants
journey and beyond which many never get-the enemy of the state is a depersonalized "subject" to be "sized up" and subjected to "interrogation tactics and
techniques most appropriate for the occasion"; he is "game" to be stalked and
cornered. Here ideals are checked at the door, "realities" faced, and the pres-

tige of law enforcement vindicated. Once he leaves the "gatehouse" and enters
the "mansion"-if he ever gets there-the enemy of the state is repersonalized,
even dignified, the public invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor of individual freedom from law enforcement celebrated.
Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
210. See id. at 9, 35-36; see also id. at 62-64 (discussing an alternative ground for the Escobedo decision in the Fifth Amendment privilege). Implying that Escobedo was primarily based
on the Fifth Amendment, Professor Kamisar states:
Danny Escobedo only claimed a right to consult with counsel, not a right to his
continued presence during police interrogation. But the Supreme Court opinion
assigned more weight to the privilege against self-incrimination-and may have
given it a more expansive reading, to boot-than did the Escobedo briefs.
Id. at 63.
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right to counsel. 2 11 First, the equality principle of those prior cases

demanded that all suspects have the right, even if they could not
afford counsel. 2 12 Second, the Griffin-Douglas principle demanded

that all suspects have the same knowledge of their rights to counsel
and to remain silent, thus requiring that suspects be advised of
those protections so that they could make an informed decision
about whether to exercise them. 218
This Fifth Amendment approach departed from conventional
wisdom about the Court's direction on interrogation doctrine.
Miranda and the three companion cases had generally been
thought only to raise a dispute over the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment. 2 14 Among the briefs filed in the case, only an amicus
curiae brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, prepared by
Professors Anthony Amsterdam and Paul Mishkin, relied primarily
on Kamisar's contention that the Fifth Amendment privilege was
the proper ground for decision. 2 15 The ingenuity of the argument
was this: Once moved out of the Sixth Amendment and made an
outgrowth of an expanded Fifth Amendment privilege, the right to
counsel was not limited to stages of "criminal prosecution," and, on

211. See id. at 6-9; see also id. at 65, 66 n.195, 68, 93 (referencing Griffin or Douglas). See
generally id. at 10-11, 68-81 (focusing on the application of the equality principle of Griffin and
Douglas to the extension of the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of police interrogation).
212. See id. at 11; see also id. at 62 CI do deny that modulation should be achieved at the expense of the poor and the ignorant, e.g., . .. by heeding requests for the assistance of counsel only
if the suspect can afford to hire a lawyer, but not providing any at state expense."); id. at 73
(stating that "the inability of a suspect to retain counsel cannot constitute sufficient grounds for
limiting the impact of Escobedo"); id. at 91 C"hy should the 'necessity' slogan no longer loom
impenetrable when-and only when-[retained] counsel is pounding on the door or ringing the
phone?"); id. at 93 (In the wake of Escobedo.... the 'equality norm' exerts pressure to provide
all suspects with the rights a Danny Escobedo may enjoy.").
213. See id. at 10; see also id. at 73 (contending that "inadequate formal education or insufficient native intelligence cannot be good enough reasons for failing to bring the right to counsel
into play").
214. Miranda's lawyers in the Supreme Court viewed the case as presenting a right-tocounsel claim under the Sixth Amendment. As one of Miranda's lawyers in the Supreme Court
later noted, "we agreed that the briefs should be written with the entire focus on the Sixth
Amendment... because that is where the [Court was headed after Escobedo." John J. Flynn,
The ExclusionaryRule, 61 F.R.D. 259, 278 (1972) (panel discussion). This approach was consistent with the view taken by prominent commentators on the police interrogation-confessions
issue in the months before Miranda. See Yale Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, the Man, and the
Players, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1074, 1080 n. 26 (1984) (citing the authorities who had taken this view
of the problem on the eve of Miranda).
The oral arguments in the cases, however, revealed that several of the Justices were thinking
of addressing the police interrogation-confessions issues under the Fifth Amendment privilege,
LUVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAWAND POLITICS 136-39 (1983).

215. See Weisselberg, supra note 200, at 118 & n.45 (discussing the various briefs that were
filed urging reversal).
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the equality rationale, could also be seen as extending to all suspects who could benefit as much from counsel's assistance as Escobedo could have benefitted from it, despite their ignorance or indi2 16

gency.

17
The majority in Miranda adopted Kamisar's approach. 2
With only passing mention of the Sixth Amendment, the Court held
that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a person subject to
non-judicial, police interrogation. 218 The majority also declared that
the counsel right recognized in Escobedo had been justified on Fifth
Amendment privilege grounds, in addition to Sixth Amendment
grounds, without acknowledging that this view diverged from what
the Escobedo opinion concluded. 219 Further, through code-like rules
about police warnings to be given to suspects and about the need for
clear waivers of rights before interrogation, the majority aimed to
extend the new Fifth Amendment rights to silence and to counsel
beyond the wealthy and well-educated to the indigent and illinformed. 220 Indeed, finding no basis in the equality rationale to
stop with suspects under full-blown arrest, the Court implied that
these far-reaching mandates applied even to suspects who were

216. DRESSLER, supranote 190, at 580.
217. Professor Kamisars article was cited twice in the majority opinion. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 440 n.2, 472 n.42 (1966). The majority also relied on some of the principal authorities used in the article to support its conclusion. E.g., id. at 469 n.38 (citing Yale Kamisar, Betts
v. Brady Tiventy Years Later: Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219
(1962)); id. at 472 n.42 (quoting excerpts from the Report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice 9 (1963)).
Notably, two members of the Miranda majority, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan,
had heard Kamisar speak on interrogation issues at a panel discussion at the annual conference
of the Third Circuit in the late summer of 1965. BAKER, supranote 214, at 88.

218. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
219. Id. at 442. As the majority asserted, Escobedo "was but an explication of basic rights
that are enshrined in our Constitution--that 'No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself' and that 'the accused shall... have the Assistance of
Counse--rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. Id.
220. The majority summarized the warnings and waiver rules as follows:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Id. at 479.

On the role of the equality idea in influencing the approach followed by the Court in
Miranda,see Gerald M. Caplan, QuestioningMiranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1456 (1985).
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questioned in mere temporary field stops, 221 a position that even
Kamisar had not advocated. 222 The Court viewed all interrogated
detainees as equal regarding their ability to benefit from legal
counsel.
Although the Court limited the potential effects of Miranda
in'subsequent decades, 223 the central holding was repeatedly reaffirmed and even extended. 224 The most ironic development was the
predominance given in subsequent cases to the right to counsel over
the right to silence. Miranda had created the new right to counsel
under the Fifth Amendment privilege ostensibly as a protection for
the central guarantee embodied in the privilege-the right to silence. However, in subsequent decisions, the Court accorded more
protections to the accused who asserted the right to an attorney
than to those who asserted the right to silence. 225 The protection

221. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 477.
222. See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, in YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROoATION
AND CONFESSIONS 41, 42 n.2 (1980) (criticizing this aspect of the Miranda opinion).
223. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990) (holding that warnings are not required where the suspect is unaware that he is speaking with a law enforcement agent); Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-09 (1985) (concluding that the only inadmissible fruit of a violation
of Mirandds warning requirement is the statement made by the suspect before the warning was
given); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430-32 (1984) (ruling that roadside questioning of a
motorist detained in a traffic stop does not amount to custody for Miranda purposes); New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (finding a "public safety" exception to Miranda's require.
ment that warnings be given before custodial interrogation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
226 (1971) (holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes).
224. See, e.g., Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-92 (1993) (holding that the Miranda
safeguards, even if prophylactic, are enforce able against the states on federal habeas corpus);
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (reaffirming and extending Miranda and Ed.
wards by holding that where a suspect has asked for counsel, the police may not reinitiate communications with the suspect to secure a Miranda waiver even after the suspect has been provided with counsel); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (reaffirming and extending
Miranda by creating a new bright-line rule that the authorities may not secure a waiver from a
suspect who has asserted the right to counsel, unless the suspect, rather than the police, initiates
further conversation regarding the investigation); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300.01
(1980) (holding that "interrogation" for purposes of Mirandaincludes not only express questions
but also their functional equivalent).
225. Assertion of the right to counsel was held to trigger a prophylactic rule-that no waiver
was possible unless the accused, rather than the police, initiated further communications concerning the investigation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85; see also Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153 (hold.
ing that the Edwards protection does not cease merely because the suspect has consulted an
attorney).
Assertion of the core right to silence was held not to prevent the police from simply waiting a
short period before trying again to secure a waiver. Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 104-07
(1975); see also Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger
Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?),and Police Investigatory Practices,in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62, 83 & n.133 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (con.
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that had been grafted onto the Fifth Amendment privilege, due to
the Court's concern with equality, attained a more elevated status
226
than the central protection embodied in the provision.
B. The Eighth Amendment and CapitalSentencing
The Court has incorporated prescriptive equality explicitly in
the regulation of capital sentencing under the Eighth Amendment.
Since the early 1970s, the Justices have repeatedly declared equality to be the central goal of this doctrine. The Court has not promulgated a substantive standard under the Eighth Amendment by
which to judge when capital offenders have been correctly sentenced to death. 227 Without such a standard, the Court's pursuit of
consistency is bound to be confused. 228 However, the larger point for
present purposes is simply that an equality mandate has been read
into the Eighth Amendment.
The Court's use of the Eighth Amendment to require equality in capital sentencing is juxtaposed against its continuing rejection of arguments that the open-ended clauses require such equality. Propelled by a group of lawyers connected with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund led by Professor Anthony Amsterdam, the argument for equality was first presented to the Court as a due process
claim in Maxwell v. Bishop.229 The Court skirted the issue by ruling
for the condemned defendant on other, narrow grounds.3 0 However,

tending that Mosely might well allow a waiver where the later questioning concerns the same
offenses for which the defendant was arrested). But see Geoffrey Stone, The Miranda Doctrinein
the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. Or. REV. 99, 134 (asserting that the interrogation would probably
have to concern a crime unrelated to the one for which the defendant was arrested).
226. Cf. Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on CriminalProcedure and ConstitutionalLaw" 'HereI
Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1560-61 & n.6 (1996) (describing the
competing rules as an example of"unprincipled and inconsistente laws).
227. On a few occasions, a majority has asserted that the substantive measure is offender
"culpability." McKoy v. North CArolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989)). The Court has not conformed its capital.sentencing doctrine to this
view, however. See, eg., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1993) (upholding Texas statute
that made a defendant's probable future dangerousness a dispositive factor in the capitalsentencing decision and that failed to advise the capital sentencer to assess the defendant's "culpability').
228. The Courts work in this area has appropriately been described as "a confusing array of
ill-defined concepts, conflicting pronouncements, ipse dixits and short-lived precedents". Shelley
Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas!s Capital Sentencing Statute After
Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L. REV. 407,416-18 (1990).
229. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264-66 (1970) (per curiam).
230. Id. at 262 (ruling for the condemned defendant on grounds of improper jury selection).
For a discussion of the arguments presented to the Justices in the briefs and oral presentations
in Maxwell, see MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 149-67, 199-213 (1973).
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the Court rejected the due process claim for equality in McGautha
v. California, declining to require capital-sentencing standards to
promote consistency in the treatment of capital offenders.2 31 The
Court has not retreated from this view of due process. Moreover,
fifteen years after McGautha, the Court held that equal protection
also does not demand consistency in the distribution of capital sentences, except in forbidding purposeful discrimination by relevant
decision makers based on such improper grounds as the race of the
32
2
defendant or of the victim.

The mandate of consistency under the Eighth Amendment
began with the landmark 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia.233 As
counsel for Furman, Professor Amsterdam again proposed that
death sentences should be imposed equally and that this mandate
was not met through the standardless capital sentencing then prevailing in Georgia and across the country. 28 4 Professor Amsterdam
tied the claim to the Eighth Amendment by asserting that, if the
death penalty were "evenhandedly applied," it would be "unacceptable to contemporary standards of decency," and, thus, should
qualify as cruel and unusual. 235 While the Court in Furman did not
declare the death penalty altogether improper, Amsterdam's argument swayed several Justices to find a less categorical rationale for
reversal. A five-member majority concluded that the practice of conferring standardless discretion on the capital sentencer violated the
Eighth Amendment. The decision turned on inequality, 2 6 though

231. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971). McGautha had been convicted of a
capital murder and then sentenced to die after a separate hearing in which no substantive stan-

dards governed the jury's choice between death and imprisonment. Id. at 189-90.
Although the Court had become more liberal when Marshall replaced Clark in 1968, it soon
became more conservative when Burger replaed Warren and Blackmun replaced Fortas, This
conservative shift was reflected in McGautha. The majority opinion was written by Harlan and

joined by Burger, Stewart, White, and Blackmun; id. at 184; Black concurred; id. at 225 (Black,
J., concurring); and the dissenters were Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall; id. at 226 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
232. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that establishing equal.
protection claim required the defendant to prove "that the decisionmakers in his case acted with
discriminatory purpose").
233. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). This decision was surprising, because the Court had not been expected to become more liberal despite changes in its membership
after McGautha. Powell and Rehnquist had replaced Black and Harlan, respectively. Both new
Justices were expected to be conservative, Rehnquist particularly so. MELTSNER, supra note 230,
at 257-65.
234. Id. at 246-52 (describing Amsterdam's preparation of written pleadings).
235. Id. at 269 (drawing on Amsterdam's oral argument before the Justices).
236. See Stephen P. Garvey, 'As the Gentle RainFrom Heaven:"Mercy In Capital Sentencing,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 997 (1996) (asserting that Furman required "some appreciable sense of
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the holding was not easy to define, because each of the majority
Justices confined his views to a separate opinion.237 Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional, in part based on its inevitably unequal application.2 38 Justices Douglas, Stewart and White each found fault with

the standardless sentencing approach, because it led to discriminatory or arbitrary death sentences.2 9 What alternative approach
might satisfy these three Justices remained unclear. However, the
decision implied that the Eighth Amendment demanded reasonable
20
equality in the distribution of capital sentences.
In 1976, the Court returned to the question of Furman's
meaning. Soon after the Furman decision, many states enacted new
capital-sentencing systems.24 1 Most opted for schemes that man-

consistency, predictability, and even-handedness when the state applies its coercive power, especially its ultimate power").
237. The four dissenters were Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. They rejected the
view that the Eighth Amendment proscribed the death penalty altogether or that it regulated
the process by which the death penalty was imposed. While each wrote a separate opinion, Burger's opinion was also joined by the other three dissenting Justices. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 375
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
238. See id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (declaring that "[t]he probability of arbitrariness
is sufficiently substantial that it can be relied upon, in combination with other principles, in
reaching a judgment on the constitutionality of this punishment); id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment and that "the States
may no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes"); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (finding that "capital punishment is imposed discriminatorily against certain identifiable classes of
people"); id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that the death penalty is "excessive"
punishment and "therefore violates the Eighth Amendmente).
239. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that the discretionary statutes
were "pregnant with discrimination" against minorities and the underprivileged and that "discrimination ... is not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in
[the Eighth Amendment]"); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding that the discretionary
statutes allowed the capital sanction to be "wantonly and... freakishly imposed'); id. at 313
(White, J., concurring) (concluding that the statutes permitted the death penalty to be used with
"great infrequency" while offering "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
it [was] imposed from the many in which it [was] not").
While Justice White emphasized the rare imposition of the death penalty and the resulting
failure of the penalty to serve a valid penological purpose, the lack of consistency in the distribution of capital sanctions was key to his argument. If a small number of death sentences were
imposed regularly within "an identifiable subclass of all capital defendants," the penalty could
serve a legitimate penological purpose within the subclass. Note, Discretion and the Constitutionalityof the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L REV. 1690, 1693 n.15 (1974).
240. The dissenting Justices identified the common objection of the majority Justices as
grounded on inequality concerns: "The decisive grievance of the opinions... is that the present
system of discretionary systems.., has failed to produce even handed justice." Furman, 408
U.S. at 398-99 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
241. Between Furman and the 1976 decisions, thirty-five states passed new capital sentencing statutes. John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARz. L REV. 143, 226
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dated the death penalty upon conviction. A minority created
tems involving a separate sentencing hearing after conviction,
with some standards designed ostensibly to confine sentencer
cretion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in five cases,

sysbut
distwo

from states with mandatory statutes-North Carolina and Louisiana-and three from states providing for sentencing hearings with
standards-Georgia, Florida, and Texas. Ultimately, the Court
struck down the two mandatory systems but upheld the three sys42
tems with sentencing hearings and standards.
In these 1976 cases, equality was again asserted to be the
goal of Eighth Amendment regulation. For example, in approving
the Georgia system in Gregg v. Georgia, Justice White, writing for
himself and three others, asserted that the Eighth Amendment required "reasonable consistency" in the distribution of death sentences. 243 Similarly, in endorsing the Georgia statute, Justice Stewart, joined by Powell and Stevens, asserted that the Eighth
Amendment outlawed sentencing schemes that involved a "substantial risk" that the capital sanction would be imposed "in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 244 Likewise, in striking down the

(1986). While the definition of capital crimes varied among them, twenty-two of these states
created systems in which the death penalty was mandatory upon conviction. Id. at 220-27.
242. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the Georgia system); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding the Florida scheme); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(upholding the Texas system); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (rejecting the
North Carolina system); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (rejecting the Louisiana statute).
The Court was divided in a consistent pattern in the five cases. Four Justices-Burger,
White, Rehnquist and Blackmun--concluded that all five statutes passed constitutional muster.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207-26 (White, J., concurring); id. at 226-27 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at
227 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 277 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 277-79
(White, J., concurring); id. at 279 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Woodson, 428 U.S., at 306-07
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 307-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 308.24 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 337 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 338-63 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 363 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall maintained their
position from Furmanthat the death penalty was altogether unconstitutional and voted to strike
down all five statutes. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 336-37 (Marshall,
J., concurring). Therefore, the disposition in each case turned on the views of a plurality made
up of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens. These three Justices filed a joint opinion in each
case, striking down the mandatory schemes but upholding those with sentencing hearings and
standards. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154-207 (plurality opinion); Proffitt, 428 U.S., at 244-60 (plurality
opinion); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 264-77 (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 282-305 (plurality
opinion); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 327-36 (plurality opinion).
243. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222 (White, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 188 (plurality opinion).
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245 Justice Stewmandatory statute in Woodson v. North Carolina,
art, for a plurality, claimed that Furman required death-penalty
states to abandon "arbitrary and wanton jury discretion" for "objective standards to guide, regularize and make rationally reviewable
the process for imposing a sentence of death."246 Such language implied that the function of the Eighth Amendment, as applied to
capital sentencing, was to promote equality in the treatment of
capital defendants.
At first blush, the Court's holdings in the 1976 cases also
seemed to coincide with the equality rationale. The three statutes
providing for sentencing hearings with guidelines seemed to promote at least formal consistency in the distribution of death sentences. They were characterized as "channel[ing]" the sentencer to a
decision. 247 However, while the Texas statute channeled the sentencer's consideration to a final decision through three dispositive
questions, those questions did not seem to correspond to any substantive standard derived from the Eighth Amendment. 248 Likewise, the Georgia and Florida statutes did not actually guide sentencer discretion. These two systems only required the sentencer to
identify one of many statutory "aggravating factors" before exercising unbridled discretion. 249 Since an aggravating factor was almost always applied, 250 unbridled discretion almost always operated. Nonetheless, the complexity of the statutes gave an appear-

245. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

246. Id. at 303 (plurality opinion).
247. Gregg,428 U.S. at 206.
248. The Texas statute presented the sentencing jury with the following questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death

of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the de-

ceased.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(b) (West 1981).

249. For the list of aggravating factors contained in the original post-Furman statute, see
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165-66 & n.9 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J.). For
the lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the original post-Furman legislation in

Florida, see Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-49 n.6 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J., Powell, J.,
and Stevens, J.).

These systems built on a "model" statute prepared by the drafters of the Model Penal Code.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
250. See DAVID G. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990) (noting

that in the vast majority of capital murder cases prosecuted in Georgia for several years after the
legislative reform, at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances was present).
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ance of "enormous regulatory effort," 25 1 and so, of substantial regu25 2
latory effect.
On the surface, the decisions striking down the mandatory

statutes also seemed to promote equality. The mandatory death
statutes treated all convicted capital offenders alike when there

could be relevant differences among them. If pertinent differences
existed, the mandatory statutes would produce inequality. Partly
on this basis, the plurality concluded that a sentencing hearing was
required in every capital case to consider the character and record
of-the offender and the facts of the capital crime. 2 53 Yet, the plurality did not clarify what substantive issue was to be resolved by considering this information, and the Court has never clarified what
substantive standard or standards define any constitutionally relevant distinctions to be drawn among capital offenders. 254 The conclusion that an unguided inquiry into the defense's mitigating evidence would tend to produce more equal results depended on the
unlikely assumption that all capital sentencers would intuitively
know and apply an unarticulated substantive standard.
Whether they promoted equality or not, the 1976 opinions
were generally understood to confirm Furman's call for equality,
and the Court's subsequent holdings on capital sentencing have reaffirmed those early decisions. The Court has invalidated systems
that significantly restrict sentencer discretion, underscoring that

251. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulationof CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 357, 436 (1995).
252. In upholding the Georgia scheme, the Court noted that the Georgia statute called for review for consistency by the Georgia appellate court. See Gregg, 428 U.S at 204 (plurality opinion). However, a few years later, in Pulley v. Harris,465 U.S. 37, 44-57 (1984), the Court rejected the notion that a review for consistency was required for a sentencing scheme like Georgia's to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. Harrisconcerned the absence of appellate consistency
review in the California capital-punishment system. The Court asserted that consistency review
could be required if other protections against arbitrariness appeared inadequate. Id. at 51.
However, the California system was the same as the Georgia system in all significant respects.
Consequently, it became clear after Harristhat the Court would not invalidate the Georgia system even if the Georgia Supreme Court abandoned consistency review. By rejecting the need for
consistency review in Harris,the Court avoided the need to define a substantive standard constructed from the Eighth Amendment by which to measure equality.
253. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion).
254 It was not apparent whether the inquiry concerned offender deserts or some utilitarian
question. If the inquiry was about offender deserts, it was unclear how the sentencer should
measure deserts. Was the sentencer to consider all of the good and bad things that the offender
had accomplished in his life? Or was the sentencer to focus on the more narrow deserts question
of the level of the offender's culpability for the capital offense? If the inquiry was about utilitarian considerations, other ambiguities existed. Was the sentencer to decide something relatively
narrow, such as whether the offender posed a future danger if not executed? Or, was the inquiry
much more general, such as whether a death sentence served the interests of the community?
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the sentencer should be free to consider some (unspecified) facets of
character, record, and crime. 255 The Court has also clarified that,
while meeting the requirement of individualized consideration, a
system need only slightly "narrow" the group of persons subject to a
death sentence rather than channel the sentencer to a specific decision. 256 The kinds of systems that will pass muster are those, like
the general sort maintained in Georgia and Florida, that require
essentially standardless capital sentencing. These systems allow
the capital offender and the prosecution to present almost any evi255. The Court concluded in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion),
that the defendant was entitled to mitigating consideration of any evidence that he proffered
concerning his character, record or crime. Ohio's capital-sentencing scheme provided for a sentencing hearing with three "special issue" questions similar to the Texas approach that had been
upheld in 1976. Id. at 606-08 (plurality opinion). However, the Court found the Ohio questions
to be too narrowly focused because they did not allow mitigating effect to be given to evidence
bearing on character, record or crime, such as the offender's youth and minor role in the offense.
Id. at 604-05 (plurality opinion); id. at 620-21 (Marshall, J., concurring). A capital sentencing
system had to allow a capital sentencer to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of a
defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation
creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a
less severe penalty." Id. at 605 (plurality opinion).
During the next decade, the Court subsequently struck down several other death sentences
from different states based on violations of the Lockett rule. See, eg., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393, 397-99 (1987) (rejecting trial court's interpretation of list of mitigating factors in Florida scheme as exclusive so as to preclude consideration of evidence of drug use and turbulent
upbringing); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 113-14 (1982) (declaring unconstitutional
the Oklahoma statute's failure to permit mitigating consideration of evidence of emotional disturbance and turbulent and violent upbringing). These cases culminated with Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 320-28 (1989), where the Court found the Texas system that it had upheld in 1976
to contravene Lockett when applied to the case of a retarded defendant.
256. The narrowing presumably must occur within the group otherwise subject to the death
penalty. Today, capital punishment is constitutionally permissible only for murder and perhaps
for a tiny number of other exceptionally serious crimes, such as some acts of treason. See Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (plurality opinion) (implying that the death penalty was per
se inapplicable to most serious crimes that do not involve the taking of human life); etz id. at 600
(Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). Narrowing within the murder category
can be accomplished by requiring the finding of an aggravating factor at either the guilt-orinnocence or sentencing trials. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (stating that
the narrowing function can be satisfied at the sentencing trial or at the guilt-or-innocence phase
through the legislature's implementation of a narrow definition of the capital offense). The Supreme Court has not required significant narrowing and has not suggested that the narrowing
must build on any particular substantive theory. A state can provide a lengthy list of aggravating factors and the system apparently will meet the "narrowing" requirement, as long as each
factor is not so vague as to cover virtually all capital offenders. The Court's decisions striking
down systems for failing to narrow adequately have been grounded on the extreme vagueness of
particular statutory aggravators. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartvright, 486 U.S. 356, 363- 65 (1988)
(striking down death sentence based on a statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder
was especially "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" because the language was unduly vague); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980) (plurality opinion) (striking down a death sentence based on
a statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was " 'outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that [they] involved ... depravity of mind,'" because this language was
unduly vague); id. at 434-35 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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dence about the defendant and his crime that the parties desire.
The systems do little more, except to require a trier to find one of
many statutory aggravating factors as a prerequisite to imposing a
death sentence. 257 At least one of the statutory factors will apply to
almost every murder.258 Consequently, as two prominent commentators on the Court's capital-sentencing doctrine have observed, the
Court's post-Furman decisions have essentially only reproduced the
25 9
pre-Furmanworld of standardless capital sentencing.
Despite these problems, the Court has rationalized its regulation of capital sentencing under the Eighth Amendment as an effort to promote equality. 260 Of course, an equality mandate cannot

257. In Florida, the sentencer is instructed to balance aggravators against mitigators and to
only impose the death sentence if the aggravators are weightier, but there is no limit at this
stage on what the sentencer may view as aggravating or mitigating and no method suggesting
how to weigh the factors identified. See FLA. STA. ANN. ch. 921.141(3) (West 1996). In Georgia,
the applicable statute does not even call for such balancing of factors. See GA. CODE ANN. § 1710-30 (1997). As a result, the sentencer basically has "unbridled" discretion once a single aggravating factor has been identified. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983) (describing the
functioning of the Georgia system).
258. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 250, at 102 (concluding that ninety percent of the
pre-Furmandeath-penalty cases in Georgia would have implicated one of the aggravating factors
in the post-FurmanGeorgia statute).
259. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 251, at 436 ("The Supreme Court's death penalty law,
by creating an impression of enormous regulatory effort while achieving negligible regulatory
effects, effectively obscures the nature of our capital sentencing system, in which the pro.
Furmanworld of unreviewable sentencer discretion lives on.").
260. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)) (A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.").
While Eighth-Amendment doctrine on capital sentencing does little to promote equality, the
Court has also turned a deaf ear to claims of racial discrimination. Most importantly, in
McCleskey v.Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-97 (1987), the Court rejected powerful statistical evidence
of race-based sentencing in the post-Furman Georgia system. Professor David Baldus, of the
University of Iowa Law School, led a study employing regression analysis of dozens of variables
identified in hundreds of Georgia murder cases prosecuted in the decade after Furman. BALDUS
Er AL., supra note 250. The study revealed strong bias against killers of white victims, and,
within white-victim cases, significant bias against black defendants. Id. at 316. The researchers
concluded that, because of the racial factor, a killer of a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to
receive a death sentence than a killer of a black victim. Id. The study revealed no evidence of
discrimination against black defendants across all cases. Id. However, within the white victim
cases, the study concluded that a black defendant was 2.4 times more likely to receive a death
sentence than a white defendant simply because of the race of the defendant. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in McCleskey's case on his Eighth Amendment claim
that the Baldus study demonstrated that his death sentence was arbitrary and capricious given
that he was black and his victim was white, McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 290-01. A five-to-four majority rejected his claim, however, while purporting to assume the methodological validity of the
study. Id. at 319. The majority's central rationale was simply that the Eighth Amendment
required no more consistency than that which would result from the individualized consideration
and narrowing functions supplied by the Georgia statute. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 250, at 308,
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be sensibly pursued or enforced where there is no standard by
which to judge which capital offenders are alike and which are different. 26 ' The Supreme Court's opinions in the capital sentencing
context fail to acknowledge this point. Yet, the Court's unwillingness to articulate a significant substantive role for the Eighth
Amendment in limiting the use of the death penalty may explain
why the Court has continued to assert, instead, the vague goal of
equality.
C. The FourthAmendment and Administrative Searches
In evaluating government searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court has also often implied that inequality is a vice against which the Amendment protects. The Court has
carried this view furthest in its doctrine governing what are commonly called "administrative" or "regulatory" searches. In this area,
the Court frequently has implied that inequality is the predominant
vice against which the Amendment operates. As in the capitalsentencing sphere, the Justices have not provided the substantive
standards by which to judge when inequality exists or when equality has been achieved. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court's efforts
have produced prosecution-oriented results.
Administrative searches are those deemed to have an important purpose other. than to investigate for crime or to arrest a
criminal suspect. 2 62 The field of administrative searches, as opposed

to criminal searches, is now extensive because of the possibility of

On this basis, the majority avoided addressing whether its Eighth Amendment doctrine had
allowed racially-biased sentencing.
The Court also granted certiorari on McCleskey's contention that the statistical evidence revealed an equal protection violation. A majority of the Court rejected this claim as well, finding
that McCleskey had not established purposeful discrimination by the particular prosecutor or
jury in his case. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292.
In the end, however, the majority declined to concede that the study even established that
racial bias infected the Georgia capital-sentencing system. See id. at 312-13 C'At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race... [Wle decline to assume
that what is unexplained is invidious."). These protestations appeared disingenuous; since the
majority Justices assumed the methodological validity of the study, they could not claim that the
study failed to reveal racial bias unless they did not believe that such a study, based as it was on

regression analysis, could ever indicate racial bias. The view that regression analysis could not
provide strong evidence of racial bias, however, would be difficult to defend.
261. The methodology of regression analysis of dozens of variables over many cases, which
was employed in the Baldus study, is not a feasible approach for capital sentencers to use to
determine individual sentences. The approach is time-consuming, highly complex, and depends
on much information from many cases not before the sentencer.
262. See KAMIsAR LT AL, supra note 101, at 339 (noting that in these cases, "the Court typi-

cally has emphasized certain 'special needs' beyond those present in the more typical law enforcement context").
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viewing many intrusions as having primarily a regulatory, rather
than a criminal-prosecution function. 263 A sobriety checkpoint on a
roadway, for example, is deemed an administrative search on the
notion that it aims to help rid the roads of intoxicated drivers and
only incidentally to prosecute and punish the violators. 264 Searches
by school officials of a student's personal effects for contraband can
be characterized as aimed primarily at pursuing orderly school environments rather than prosecuting the contraband possessor. 26 5
These examples suggest the potentially broad ambit of the administrative-search category.
While subject to different constitutional regulation than
criminal searches, administrative searches are governed by the
Fourth Amendment. 266 Under the first clause in the amendment,
which requires that searches and seizures of protected interests be
"reasonable," the government must at least demonstrate a valid,
non-criminal purpose for pursuing the category of intrusions alleged to be administrative. For example, searches by state agents of
impounded automobiles, to be administrative, must be justified by a
purpose other than ferreting out crime. 267 The Court has also
deemed administrative searches, in some circumstances, to be covered by the amendment's second clause, requiring a warrant with
descriptive specificity, but the Court has not enforced the accompanying mandate that the magistrate find probable cause. Because
individual administrative searches are generally conducted without
an expectation that they will reveal evidence of crime, the Court
has deemed a showing of probable cause inappropriate.
These requirements of a valid purpose for the general category of search and, occasionally, of an antecedent review, provide
only minor limits on the use of the administrative search power.
The Court has rarely found a category of administrative search to

263. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 269 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that federal and state governments

"have devised a vast array of 'administrative' schemes designed to monitor the activities of their
constituents, ranging from highway license checks and safety inspections of residential and
commercial buildings to border patrols and school disciplinary rules").
264. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding such a
program after noting "the State's interest in preventing drunken driving").
265. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985) (upholding a Vice Principal's war.
rantless search of a fourteen year old's purse on reasonable suspicion that she possessed cigarettes, resulting in the discovery of rolling papers, marijuana, and evidence of drug dealing).
266. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 263, at 269 ('The Supreme Court has recognized that many of these regulatory efforts can result in significant intrusions on personal pri.
vacy or autonomy, and thus has usually held that they implicate the Fourth Amendment.").
267. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987).
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lack a sufficient governmental purpose. Also, neither the requirement of an administrative purpose for the category nor the occasionally imposed warrant requirement reveals a basis to judge the
validity of individual searches. Consequently, the Court has sought
to articulate a rationale by which to judge when particular administrative searches are "reasonable," as the Amendment requires.
The Court has tended to use equality as the predominant
measure for judging reasonableness in this area. 26 The Justices
frequently have concluded that because a government agency has
promulgated policies to limit the discretion of its agents to search
and seize, concerns about arbitrariness are satisfied when the policies are followed. Largely for this reason, the Court has found
searches conducted under such policies to satisfy the Fourth
269
Amendment.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, an early decision authorizing
administrative searches, the Court promoted the Fourth Amendment as more concerned with limiting official discretion, to promote
formal equality, than with supplying substantive limits governing
particular searches and seizures. 270 Camara concerned routine, annual inspections of San Francisco residences for possible violations
of the city housing code. The majority employed a balancing test to
conclude that the category of searches involved could be reasonable
without probable cause to believe a code violation existed in each
residence to be inspected. 271 The Court required the inspector to
obtain a warrant before searching the residence of a non-consenting
person, and on this basis held the particular search invalid. However, the Court required only that the inspector make a iinimal
showing of need, such as that the "conditions in the area as a
whole"272 were poor or that "a certain period [had passed] without
inspection." 273 This kind of warrant did not provide a judicial assessment of the justifications for a search of an individual building

268. See Robert I Mfisner, Justifying Searches on the Basis of Equality of Treatment, 82 J.
CRIL L & CPIMINOLOGY 547, 549 (1991) ('The growing tendency in Supreme Court decisions is
to permit searches if the searches invade equally the privacy interests of all those necessarily

affected.").
269. Id.
270. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
271. Id. at 534-36. The majority was overwhelmingly comprised of liberal Justices. Justice

White, as the author of the opinion, was joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas. Id. at 525. The dissenting Justices vere Clark, Harlan, and
Stewart. Id. at 546 (Clark, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 536.
273. Id. at 538.
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but rather the justifications for searches of an urban area. 274 Although the Court's view of the Fourth Amendment's function in this
context was unclear, its actions seemed to be aimed at promoting
formal equality. The holding worked to ensure that the inspectors
applied the same standard to all residence owners more than to ensure that they acted according to a substantive justificatory standard derived from the Fourth Amendment. 275
In an influential article published after Camara, Professor
Anthony Amsterdam-the same scholar who had influenced the
Court on interrogations and on capital sentencing-theorized that
the Supreme Court should use the Fourth Amendment to prevent
inequality. 276 He asserted: "A paramount purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well
as unjustified searches and seizures. ' 277 Amsterdam meant that
equality and substantive justification were independent concerns
under the Amendment. 278 He found support for this view in the
Camara opinion.27 9 Emphasizing formal equality over substantive

274. See Wayne R. LaFave, ControllingDiscretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use,
Misuse, and Nonuse of PoliceRules and Policies in FourthAmendment Adjudication, 89 MICH.L.
REV. 442, 466 (1990) (criticizing the Camara majority's failure to clarify the need for judicial
assessment of the basic question whether the administrative program is itself reasonable).
275. As the Court stated, "[tihe ltasic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials." Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. Although the term "arbitrary"
here is best understood from the perspective of the Court's earlier decisions as simply a substi.
tute for "unjustified," in the context of the Camara decision, its meaning is more susceptible to
an interpretation of "inequitable."
The Court's earlier decisions only required that intrusions be substantively justified. Unjusti.
fiable decisions do not accord with the substantive, justificatory standard that should control.
Arbitrary decisions do not accord with any identifiable standard. The identification and application of a correct justificatory standard can be thought to make subsequent decisions both justi.
fied and non-arbitrary.
The nature of the warrant mandated by the Court in Camarasuggested that the Court was
actually more interested in achieving equality than a substantive justificatory standard. Tho
Court did not clarify what substantive standards should control the decision to conduct individ.
ual inspections, suggesting only that official discretion should be controlled by some agency pol.
icy. See id. at 532. The inspections would not necessarily be justified under the Fourth Amend.
ment, however, because the standard articulated in the local policy might not be the correct
justificatory standard.
276. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974).
277. Id. at 417.
278. See id. at 366 (asserting that the Fourth Amendment may protect against improper discrimination in the decisions of which allowable searches should be pursued).
279. See id. at 452 & n.194 (citing Camaraas supporting the view that the amendment proscribes improper selectivity in pursuing otherwise permissible searches); id. at 472 & n.549 (doscribing Camara as supporting the view that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with pro-
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Fourth Amendment construction,28 0 Amsterdam proposed that government agencies be required to engage in rule-making to govern
their search-and-seizure practices and that their agents be held to
those agency rules.2 1 Agency rule-making as a means of controlling
discretion was not a new idea,2 2 but Professor Amsterdam gave
prominence to the notion of incorporating it into Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Amsterdam article has been criticized for focusing too heavily on the view that the Fourth Amendment promotes formal equality.2 3 However, other prominent commentators
have endorsed Amsterdam's view that the Fourth Amendment limits inequality even beyond requiring searches and seizures to be
substantively justified.2 4 Amsterdam's ideas have also been noticed
by members of the Supreme Court as demonstrated by the fact that
the article has been cited, although on other points, in many Su5
preme Court opinions.2
The Supreme Court has pursued the notion that the Fourth
Amendment addresses inequality, but in ways that do not comport
with Professor Amsterdam's intentions. Largely conservative majorities of the Court have used the purported concern with equality
not to limit government searches and seizures but rather to provide
expanded authority for them. The method for achieving this result
has been twofold. First, the Court has promoted formal equality as
a replacement for, rather than a supplement to, a requirement that

scribing arbitrariness in addition to requiring that each search or seizure be substantively justified).
280. See, e.g., id. at 425 ("Rulemaking tends to ensure the fair and equal treatment of citizens.") (italics in original).
281. See, e.g., id. at 417 ('The emergence of modem professional police forces and our knowledge of the vast discretion that they exercise demonstrate both the need and the capability to

provide an effective safeguard against arbitrariness in these kinds of searches and seizures; and
the manifestly serviceable instrument to do it is ... administrative rulemaking.").
282. See id. (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRErTIONARY JUSTICE (1969)); Carl McGowan,
Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L REV. 659, 676-81 (1972). Professor Amsterdam himself
had previously proposed that the Supreme Court use the Due Process Clause to spur the promulgation of local rules regulating police practices. Anthony Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and
the Rights of Suspects in CriminalCases,45 N.Y.U. L REV. 785, 810-15 (1970).
283. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, "FirstPrinciples"of Constitutional Criminal Procedure:A
Mistake?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 680, 684 & n.10 (1999) (asserting that the article is "flawed by its

single-minded focus on police discretion as the policy problem to be managed by the Fourth
Amendment").
284. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 149, at 97 CMhe Fourth Amendment can be seen as another
harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in
treatment."); LaFave, supra note 274, at 449 (concurring that the Fourth Amendment is concerned both with unjustified searches and seizures and with inequitable searches and seizures).
285. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 261 n.15 (1984) (White, J., concurring); United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755 n.23 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 n.6
(1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.32 (1976).
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individual searches meet a substantive, justificatory standard constructed by the Justices under the Fourth Amendment. 286 For example, a local policy that calls for stops of many autos and questioning of many drivers passing a particular point may be upheld as
reasonable because it reduces police discretion, although a more
discretionary policy could produce fewer invasions of privacy. At the
same time, the Court has often declined to require local rules that
foreclose all or even substantial discretion. 28 7 Local policies therefore may allow discretionary judgments that incorporate biases
based on factors like race. Ironically, the best that a civil libertarian can say about the Court's concern with formal equality in
search and seizure is that it has focused on the administrative288
search decisions.
Colorado v. Bertine exemplifies the Court's use of the equality notion in constructing Fourth Amendment doctrine. 289 Boulder
police had relied on city police regulations to impound Bertine's
auto and search its contents after arresting Bertine for drunk
driving.290 As a result of these intrusions, the police found drugs
and other contraband in the auto. 291 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority that included all but Justices Marshall and Brennan, found the seizure and the search to be administrative actions,
within categories serving legitimate governmental ends. 292 As for

the particular intrusions involved, the Court found that they were
carried out according to "reasonable police regulations" 293 and "on
the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity."294 The opinion posited that the intrusion was reasonable,
seemingly on the assumption that the regulations applied even-

286. See Misner, supra note 268, at 549.
287. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 274, at 460-61 (discussing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367 (1987)).
288. See William J. Mertens, The FourthAmendment and the Control of PoliceDiscretion, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551, 563 (1984).
289. Bertine,479 U.S. at 374.
290. Id. at 368-69
291. Id. at 369.
292. Id. at 373. The Court found the "inventory search" of the car to serve three purposes:
By securing the property, the police protected the property from unauthorized
interference. Knowledge of the precise nature of the property helped guard
against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence. Such knowledge also helped
to avert any danger to police or others that may have been posed by the prop.
erty.
Id. The Court did not address precisely what interests were served by impounding the automobile, but, presumably, thought they were similar.
293. Id. at 374.
294. Id. at 375.
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handedly, but the Court failed to reveal any substantive standard
to support this assumption. Nor did the impoundment regulations
meaningfully confine police discretion. The impoundment regulations only limited the officers' discretion to leave a vehicle near the
scene of the arrest, not their authority to impound it. Impoundment
would never violate the regulations. 295 Thus, Boulder police officers
could impound the car of an arrested driver based on their personal
prejudices. 296 Likewise, the search regulations provided little guidance as to the breadth of the search to be conducted, leaving the
scope of the inventory largely up to the individual officer.2 7 Again,
however, the majority concluded that the search of the car was reasonable because it was carried out under standardized criteria.2 3 In
the end, the Court upheld policies that allowed expansive authority
to seize and search without ever articulating a substantive measure
by which they were judged "reasonable." 299
The Court's decision concerning police roadblocks, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, also exemplifies the Court's
incorporation of equality thinking into Fourth Amendment doctrine,
with similar results.300 Motorists challenged a highway sobriety
checkpoint instituted by the Michigan state police under guidelines
created by an advisory committee. Michigan courts struck down the
action on grounds that even an initial stop of all motorists passing
through the checkpoint was an unreasonable invasion of privacy. In

295. See id. at 376 & n.7 (noting only that the regulations imposed restrictions on the 'park.
and-lock" alternative, not on the decision to impound and, thus, allowed impoundment even
when the "park-and-lock' requirements were met).
296. See id. at 379-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also LaFave, supra note 274, at 461 (asserting that "the challenged Boulder police regulation which passed muster in that case falls
significantly short of perfirming its Fourth Amendment function of limiting police discretion").
297. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 379, 381 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall noted,
the officers failed to proceed as if they were conducting an administrative search. They omitted
from the administrative search form hundreds of dollars in cash and other expensive items found
in the automobile, although listing these items was essential to serve the administrative purposes of their purported inventory. Id. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
298. See id. at 374 & n.6 (asserting that the inventory was authorized by standard procedures of the Boulder Police Department).
299. Three members of the seven-Justice majority-Blackrmun, Powell, and O'Connoragreed that the search itself was permissible only because they accepted the trial courts
conclusion that the regulations mandated the opening of closed containers. Id. at 376-77
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Why these Justices required such discretion.limiting rules at the
stage of opening containers but not at the stage when the officer had to decide whether to seize
the vehicle is unclear. Further, in a subsequent decision, a five-Justice majority (including
Justice O'Connor, who had relied on the mandatory nature of the policy in BertLine), indicated
that no greater restriction on police discretion would be required for the opening of closed
containers in a car than for other stages of the automobile impoundment and inventorying
process. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990).
300. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court reversed, upholding the police action as a valid administrative search.3 0 1 To jus-

tify this decision, the Court did little more than assert that the
state had a valid interest in reducing drunk driving, which the

checkpoint served slightly, and that the intrusion posed by the initial stop of motorists was minor.3 02 The Court also noted that "the
guidelines governing checkpoint operation minimize the discretion
of the officers on the scene."3 03 However, the Court failed to discuss

the reasonableness of the guidelines, declining to subject them "to
meaningful judicial review." 30 4 The Court substituted an empty
equality idea for a substantive standard as the measure of reason05
ableness.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST USING EQUALITY To CONSTRUCT THE
CRIMINAL CLAUSES
Having established that equality thinking has influenced the
Supreme Court's constructions of doctrine under several of the
criminal clauses, I now address why these constructions are illfounded. First, I examine possible theories for understanding the
role of prescriptive equality in constitutional adjudication. I contend that there is a way to understand such a mandate which ex-

301. Id. at 455. Joining Justice Rehnquist in the majority were Justices White, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy, with Justice Blackmun concurring in the judgment. Id. at 447. The dissenters were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 460.
302. Id. at 451-52.
303. Id. at 452.
304. LaFave, supra note 274, at 475.
305. Additional examples of the Court's use of equality thinking in the administrative-search
context can be found in decisions concerning employee drug testing. In Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602, 606-08 (1989), the Court addressed the propriety of blood
and urine testing for drugs of certain railway employees. In National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 654-63 (1989), the Justices addressed drug testing of certain categories of Customs Service employees. In both cases, the majority, through Justice Kennedy, found
a governmental purpose for drug testing that was deemed to weigh heavily against employee
privacy expectations. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630-33; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677. In both cases,
the Court also found that applicable federal regulations would reduce the potential for arbitrariness in the administration of the tests. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667.
In Skinner, the Court upheld the testing. Id. at 601. In Von Raab, the Court remanded merely
for an inquiry into whether the purposes of the testing could be fulfilled without extending coverage to all persons within the Customs Service who applied for positions that would enable
them to "handle classified material." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 678. In these situations, as in many
other administrative search cases, the Court evinced no concern with identifying a substantivo
standard of proper treatment of citizens derived from the Fourth Amendment. The Court
avoided this task by instead purporting to pursue equality. See Misner, supra note 268, at 569
(asserting that the Court "elevated its concern regarding equality of treatment above the legitimate expectations of privacy of its citizens").
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plains how the Court can function under the textual mandate of
equality in the Fourteenth Amendment. However, I conclude that
this view of equality fails to justify the Court's use of equality in
constructing the criminal clauses.
A. Finding a Function for PrescriptiveEquality
In this Section, I evaluate three theories about the meaning
and function of equality as it is used in constitutional construction.
These theories are stated at a level of generality such that any
plausible argument for using equality in constitutional construction
would fall within one of them. They are 1) equality is an explanatory end in itself; 2) equality is a means to produce other substantive ends; and 3) equality is a rhetorical device facilitating the
piecemeal announcement of substantive rights. I conclude that the
first two theories are internally flawed, and, therefore, could not
legitimate the use of equality rationales in constitutional adjudication. By contrast, the third theory--equality as a rhetorical device
through which the Court can announce substantive rights-is plausible. However, I later show why this theory cannot justify the
Court's use of prescriptive equality under the criminal clauses.
1. Equality Cannot Be an Explanatory End
The Supreme Court sometimes has mandated equality as if
it were an explanatory end. For example, the Court's repeated calls
in the 1960s for equality in criminal procedure under the openended clauses assumed that equality itself was a coherent goal.306
The Court gave no hint in those cases that it was trying to achieve
some goal beyond equality, and it often failed to identify in its
opinions any clear substantive rules or standards regarding the
treatment of persons by government. In constructing the Miranda
doctrine in the mid-1960s, the Court also seemed to pursue equality
as if it were a self-defining end. The Court eschewed the relevant
language and history of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in pursuit
of a notion of equality in the elicitation of statements from suspects
by the government. 07 The Court's efforts during the 1970s to form
an Eighth Amendment theory for regulating capital sentencing also
seemed to assume that equality was an explanatory end. The Court
offered no theory to explain the consistency that it concluded the

306. See supra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
307. See supranotes 174-226 and accompanying text.
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause required.308 The need for
equality was endorsed as if it carried independent moral force.
Part I established that equality cannot be an explanatory
end in constitutional adjudication. As we saw, equality attains
meaning only in relation to one or more external standards defining
the appropriate treatment of persons.30 9 Without the external, substantive standards, two persons cannot be determined to be equal
or unequal. Likewise, once the external standards of appropriate
treatment have been defined, a mandate of equality will still never
itself reveal what is appropriate treatment.310 Thus, pursuit of prescriptive equality as if it were self-defining is an ill-fated endeavor.
Rejecting equality as an end in constitutional adjudication
does not require adherence to a particular ideology about how we
should make sense of the document. Whether one believes, for example, in giving meaning to the Constitution according to some
form of originalism, 31 1 or accepts, instead, the legitimacy of a continuous construction not confined by the original understanding or
intention, 312 equality as an explanatory end could never make
sense. Even in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which uses
the language of equality, the Court could not sensibly conclude that
prescriptive equality alone is a coherent end. Equality is too vacuous to be a constitutional ideal.
2. Equality Cannot Be an Intermediate Goal
Some advocates have contended that pursuing equality will
tend to produce substantively correct rules regarding how the gov-

308. See supra notes 227-621 and accompanying text.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 38-48.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.
311. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1997) ("What I look for in
the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not

what the original draftsmen intended.") with RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 421
(2d ed. 1997) (arguing for a constitutional jurisprudence based on the original intention of tho
drafters).
312. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 7-12 (arguing for a "moral reading" of the Constitution, but one constrained in some degree by the language and historical meaning of a constitutional provision, its place within the structure of the larger document and "the dominant lines of
past constitutional interpretation by other judges") with Sandalow, supra note 70, at 1034 (pro-

posing that constitutional law should be understood "not as an expression of values written into
the Constitution by the framers, but as the product of a continuing process of valuation carried
on by those to whom the task of constitutional interpretation has been entrusted"), and Thomas
Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710 (1975) (advocating that
courts declare and enforce unwritten constitutional principles by discerning and enforcing the
"society's most basic contemporary values").
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eminent treats persons. This position often starts with a call to reduce the discretion of governmental actors. This action supposedly
will, in turn, reduce the potential for arbitrariness, or, in other
words, increase the potential for equality. The argument proceeds
that equality in the application of legal rules will create a pressure
to adopt rules that the politically influential will accept when applied to them and, thus, rules that are substantively appropriate.
As Philip Kurland once described, before rejecting, the contention:
"[I]t could be argued that by putting everyone in the same boat, we
force the influential members of our society to see to the improve313
ment of their own lot by improving the lot of all."

This view of equality, as an intermediate ideal to be pursued
for its spin-off consequences, finds support in the writings of several adherents of Warren-era liberalism. For example, "Professor
John Hart Ely has argued that pursuing equality in capital sentencing under the Eighth Amendment, by reducing sentencer discretion, can produce sentencing rules that are substantively appropriate for all capital offenders. 314 Likewise, Professor Anthony Amsterdam has argued that requiring local regulations that reduce
police discretion on search-and-seizure issues can produce practices
that are substantively acceptable under the Fourth Amendment. 315
Other commentators have proffered a similar view of the function of
pursuing equality as an intermediate goal in constitutional con16
struction.3
The Court also seems to have sometimes adopted this view of
equality as an intermediate ideal. Particularly in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Justices have at times implied that the
purpose of requiring the adoption of and adherence to local regulations that limit government discretion is to ensure equality, which
will, in turn, promote, through the political process, substantively
reasonable search-and-seizure policies. For example, in Camara,

313. KURLAND, supra note 2, at 591.
314. ELY, supra note 149, at 174.

315. Amsterdam, supra note 276, at 425.
316. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
ConstitutionalTheory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 94-95 (1988) ('According to this approach, the purpose of
that intervention is not to assign a substantive value to individual security and privacy, but,
rather, to assure that the tradeoff between privacy and law enforcement is that which a hypothetical political system would strike if everyone's interests were equally represented.");

cf. Dan

lv. Kahan & Tracey L Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153,
1175-76 (1998) (arguing that constitutional vagueness issues should be addressed by focusing not
on the clarity of the law but on whether the law's impact falls as much upon citizens with a political voice as upon the disenfranchised and that a law against loitering targeted at gang members, because it imposes a burden on average citizens, is not too vague).
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the Court upheld annual inspections of residences to discover possible violations of a city housing code.3 17 Although requiring a warrant to search the residence of any non-consenting owner, the Court
mandated only that there be some showing that would effectively
restrain governmental discretion, rather than a showing of probable
cause to believe that a violation existed within the targeted residence. A showing by the inspector establishing that the housing
conditions in the surrounding area were poor, 318 or that inspections
had not occurred for some time 319 would suffice. The Court focused
not on whether the particular search was substantively justified,
but on whether the search authority was applied to all or most residences in the area. The Court implicitly concluded that, if the
search authority were applied to all residences, there would be
pressure for policies that were substantively appropriate.
This view of equality as an intermediate goal is also incoherent. Reducing the discretion of government officials in a certain
context cannot appropriately be thought to treat the influential and
the disenfranchised equally. Only by reference to a substantive
stdndard that defines how persons should be treated in the context
can one decide whether equality has been furthered. The substantive standard would itself define the appropriate distinctions to be
drawn, and, unless the discretion-reducing regulations conformed
with that standard, they would not promote equality. Further,
without the substantive standard and the concomitant ability to
determine whether equality existed, courts could not intelligently
decide when to uphold or overturn local policies.
This discretion-reduction approach to formal equality and, in
turn, to substantive correctness also cannot be salvaged on the argument that it is really the similarapplication of laws to the politically influential and the powerless rather than true equality that
matters. Even the question of similarity cannot be determined in
the abstract. For example, does a local policy on housing inspections
that authorizes inspections in an area where housing conditions "as
a whole" are poor impinge similarly on the influential and the powerless? Without a substantive reference point defining how people
should be treated, this question cannot be answered.
This theory also is unpersuasive in its assumption that
equality is a. position of natural stability. Influential persons may

317. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra text accompanying notes 270-75.
318. Id. at 536.
319. Id. at 538.
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not wish to share the plight of the powerless, even if a position of
equality between them initially could be established. If the influential perceive themselves as squeezed by a local policy, there is little
reason to believe they will try to improve their own lot by improving
the lot of everyone. They may use their influence merely to have the
policies changed in ways that further their own interests. As Professor Kurland once noted, "for the affluent, there is ...

no obliga-

320 Of
tion to remain in the same boat" with the downtrodden.
course, without reference to a substantive standard defining appropriate treatment, a court also could not sensibly decide whether a
changed local policy treated everyone similarly or differently.
The theory is also problematic in its assumption that government discretion can be tightly controlled-and thus "nonarbitrariness" promoted-through constitutional oversight. Local
policies concerning governmental action, even those seeming to
eliminate discretion, would not prevent government agents from
ignoring the policies to benefit some persons. For example, in the
search context, government agents could often decline to invade the
privacy of certain persons, no matter what the local policies or
regulations might seem to require. These decisions not to intrude go
largely unrecognized because they are generally not recorded, let
alone challenged.321 For this reason, the supposed pressure from the
influential toward substantively reasonable policies may be slight
even where regulations are discretionless and are proffered as nonarbitrary. Very intensive oversight of the government agency, accompanied by strong reporting requirements, could promote greater
adherence to the local policies. 322 However, as we have seen in the
Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has been unwilling
to require significant limits on governmental discretion in local
regulations or to closely monitor agency compliance. 323 Arguably,
this result only signifies a problem with the Court's level of oversight rather than with the theory of how reducing government discretion produces substantive reasonableness. However, if the theory

320. Kurland, supranote 117, at 591.
321. See COLE, supranote 16, at 54 (arguing for requiring "police officers to keep public records of the race of those whom they stop, question and subject to consent searches").
322. See id.

323. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (upholding an impoundment and
search of a car on an administrative-seizure-and-search theory although the local regulations

conferred reat discretion on the police and the officers failed to follow the prescribed procedure
in their "inventory" search of the car).
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depends, as I believe it does, on a level of supervision by the Court
324
that is implausible, the problem is with the theory.
3. Equality Can Only Be a Rhetorical Device
While equality lacks the substance to be an explanatory end
or intermediate goal, equality rhetoric must have a legitimate function in constitutional construction. The Fourteenth Amendment
itself mandates that "no State shall.., deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."3

25

Under this

clause, the Court is obligated to give meaning to the terminology of
equality. How should we view this unavoidable mandate of equality? I submit that we can only appropriately see it as a rhetorical
device through which the Court can articulate and enforce substantive rules regarding the appropriate treatment of persons by government. This view need not assume any particular notions about
the limits that should govern the Court's construction of equal protection doctrine.3 26 It does mean, however, that the construction of
the clause will necessarily involve substantive standards of treatment that are not revealed by the notion of equality.
The view of prescriptive equality, as a rhetorical device
authorizing the Court to construct substantive rights, comports
with the Court's approach to adjudicating equal protection claims in
criminal procedure, except for the period between Brown and the
early 1970s. In the pre-Brown era, the Court had decided cases in
favor of criminal defendants under the Equal Protection Clause by

324. Professor Ely seems to concede, for example, that it is impossible, as a practical matter,
for the Supreme Court to effectively limit discretion in the capital sentencing process. This concession comes after he asserts that the Eighth Amendment regulates capital sentencing by call-

ing for constraints on the discretion of official decision makers, which he contends will produce
less arbitrariness in the distribution of death penalties and, in turn, substantively reasonable

policies on the use of the death penalty. ELY, supra note 149, at 174.
325. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5.
326. The proper method for constructing equal protection doctrine, of course, has been disputed. Compare BERGER, supra note 311, at 198-220 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause
should be constructed according to the intent of the drafters to proscfibe only state legislation
that accords certain fundamental rights concerning personal and property security and the freedom to travel to whites but not to blacks), and ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 81
(1990) (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause was originally understood to ensure "black
equality" and that it should be so construed even to proscribe segregation, although equality and
segregation were originally understood as compatible), with ELY, supra note 149, at 32 (con.
tending that the meaning of the clause "will not be found anywhere in its terms or in the ruminations of its writers") and Sandalow, supra note 70, at 1053 (arguing that equal protection
provides "the means by which the Court may protect interests that have come to be viewed as
fundamental but that cannot easily be read into more specific constitutional provisions limiting
governmental power").
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delineating substantive rules about the treatment of persons by
government. During the two decades after Brown, the Court often
merely repeated the vacuous language of prescriptive equality.
However, beginning in the early 1970s, the Court again reverted to
a delineation of substantive rights when it decided cases in favor of
criminal defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.
This same general view of equality as a rhetorical device
would have to explain its use in constructing the criminal clauses.
As an ultimate or intermediate goal in itself, prescriptive equality
lacks substance. As a rhetorical device through which to articulate
substantive rights, prescriptive equality at least serves a coherent
function. 32 7 The Justices may not have viewed their use of prescriptive equality under the criminal clauses in this way. However, understanding equality as a rhetorical device facilitating the development of substantive rights is the only possibility by which to justify its use in constitutional construction.
B. The Problems With Using Equality as a Rhetorical Device Under
the Criminal Clauses
While equality rhetoric can serve a comprehensible function
in constitutional adjudication, whether it is appropriately used to
construct the criminal clauses raises questions about how we
should understand those clauses. Equality rhetoric is embodied explicitly in the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this rhetoric may
not be appropriately employed in the construction of specific criminal provisions. Understood as a rhetorical device, a command to
treat people equally is somewhat like a vague directive to treat persons "properly," or "fairly," or "reasonably;" all of the details must
still be worked out.32 Can the criminal clauses under focus be understood to carry such a command? I now turn to that question.
1. Equality Rhetoric Cannot Serve as a Unifying Gloss on the Bill
of Rights
We should ask at the outset why equality rhetoric could not
provide a unifying gloss for constructing all of the provisions in the
Bill of Rights. To say that equality provides a unifying gloss would
mean that the various clauses throughout the Bill of Rights should

327. Cf Cohen, supra note 63, at 888 (asserting that Justices often realize that an equality
rationale is simply a surrogate for announcing a substantive ground for decision).
328. However, the equality command is potentially more misleading because of the tendency
to think that equality is more self-defining. See Westen, supra note 3, at 577-92.
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be understood to command government simply to "treat persons
equally" or "treat persons equally in this context." Yet, this approach is untenable under any view of construction that concerns
itself with the language and history of constitutional clauses and
their roles in the larger structure of the Constitution.
Giving meaning to Bill of Rights clauses must often be an act
of creation, because their mandates are often uncertain. Structural
considerations can help in this process of construction. 29 Indeed,
the Court has long taken into account structural factors in arriving

at the meaning of constitutional provisions. 330 Based partly on a
belief in the importance of structural factors, constitutional scholars have also sought to identify unifying theories for understanding
the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.8 8 1 The danger for efforts to
find unifying theories, however, is that they will either ignore the
language and history of certain clauses or that the theories will be
stated at such a high level of generality as to be of little analytical
value in deciding most constitutional controversies. 83 2 Any effort to

329. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Toward a StructuralApproach to ConstitutionalInterpre
tation, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 141,

148 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995) (advocating that courts approach "interpretive problems by attending to the overall design of the Constitution and mutually conditioning relationships among
its provisions"); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and StructureSeriously: Reflections on the FreeForm Method in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1995) ("Read in
isolation, most of the Constitution's provisions make only a highly limited kind of sense.").
330. For example, the Court has concluded that most Bill of Rights provisions assumed new
applications against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which created broad now
protections for individuals in their relations with the states.
331. John Hart Ely proposed a process-perfecting theory for understanding the constitution,
arguing that the document should be viewed throughout as ensuring a procedural structuro for
democracy and as guaranteeing procedural liberties, not substantive liberties. See ELY, supra
note 149, at 87 (arguing that "the document is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with
procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes (process writ small), and on the other,
with what might capaciously be designated process writ large-with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government"). For a trenchant critique of Ely's argu.
ment, see James E. Fleming, A Critiqueof John Hart Ely's Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpretivism of Representative Democracy, 80 MICH. L. REV. 634 (1982). For a better liberal
republican theory, one which aims to secure both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, on the view that both are basic preconditions for self-government, see James E. Fleming,
SecuringDeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995).
332. Judge Posner has noted a related ground for suspicion:
The arguments against the holistic approach are familiar. The basic one is that
it gives judges too much power. When you think of all those constitutional theories jostling against one another-Epstein's that would repeal the New Deal,
Ackerman's and Sunstein's that would constitutionalize it, Michelman's that
would constitutionalize the welfare state, Mark Tushnet's that would make the
Constitution a charter of socialism, Ely's that would resurrect Earl Warren, and
some that would mold constitutional law to the Thomists' version of natural law
you see the range of choice that the approach legitimizes, the instability of constitutional doctrine that it portends.
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see prescriptive equality as providing a unifying gloss throughout
the Bill of Rights would run afoul of these kinds of problems.
The language and history of many of the criminal clauses fail
to support an argument for reinventing them as a group through
the rhetoric of prescriptive equality. Most of the criminal clauses
are far too specific to bear such a construction. Consider the provisions in the Sixth Amendment that no person shall be "subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"333 or the
requirement in the Sixth Amendment that "the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial."33 4 While not without ambiguities, these clauses say nothing that would suggest that they
were understood to speak in the vague terms of equality. Substituting an "equality" command would likely alter their meanings.
Their language guarantees relatively specific substantive rights.3 3 5
Indeed, the Court has not used equality rhetoric in constructing
these or several other criminal clauses. 33 6 That some of the criminal
clauses have never been thought to incorporate equality rhetoric
undermines the notion of any unifying theory based on equality for
constructing all of them.
Considerations of constitutional structure themselves weigh
against any unifying theory of the Bill of Rights based on equality
rhetoric. Structural considerations reveal the absence of any need
for such a construction. The Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment applies only against the states. Consequently,
no explicit equality mandate operates against the federal government. Yet, if an equality mandate against the federal government
were thought necessary, the source should be the broad language of

POSNER, supranote 18, at 186.
333. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
334. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
335. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 13, at 103 (discussing the historical understanding of the

speedy trial provision); WHTrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supranote 263, at 793 (discussing the historical understanding of the double jeopardy clause).
336. The Court has sometimes even rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment, under
which the Court has frequently employed equality rhetoric, incorporates an equality command.
For example, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), a unanimous Court held that the
Fourth Amendment permits a traffic stop, as long as the police officer had antecedent justification to believe that the detainee committed a traffic violation, even if the officer actually decided
to stop the car based on suspicion of a more serious offense fueled by inappropriate factors. The
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment's concern with reasonableness "allows certain
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whateer the subjective intent." Id. at 814 (emphasis in original). The Court was also explicit that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 813. The decision indicated that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with
whether there is a substantive basis for an intrusion, but not with whether a basis for intrusion
is pursued by the officers against all suspicious people.
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the Ninth Amendment or, perhaps, the Due Process Clause in the
Fifth Amendment, rather than all of the criminal clauses.337 By
reading equal protection into one of the broad provisions, 38 the
Court could augment rather than alter the specific criminal clauses.
Of course, in a companion case to Brown, the Court used the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to apply the equal protection
mandate of Brown against the federal government. 339 This decision
only proves the point. Given the availability of open-ended clauses
to construct rights against both the states and the federal government, 340 no need exists to view the criminal clauses through the unbounded rhetoric of equality.
2. Equality Rhetoric Cannot Serve as a Gloss on Specific Criminal
Clauses
Equality rhetoric also has been improperly used in constructing the particular criminal clauses under scrutiny in this Article. I have focused on three important areas of doctrine arising
under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. The language and history of the relevant clauses do not support their interpretation as vessels for an open-ended, equality mandate.3 41 Fur-

337. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
338. The proper method for constructing these two open-ended clauses, of course, has been
disputed. For the view that the Ninth Amendment provides the best ground for the Court to
enforce Equal Protection rulings against the federal government, see ELY, supra note 149, at 33;
cf. Grey, supra note 312, at 709 ('[The Ninth Amendment] is ... a license to constitutional deci.
sionmakers to look beyond the substantive commands of the constitutional text to protect fundamental rights not expressed therein.") But see BORK, supra note 326, at 183 C'Nothing could
be clearer, however, than that, whatever purpose the Ninth Amendment was intended to serve,
the creation of a mandate to invent constitutional rights was not one of them."). For the view
that the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment allows the Court to enforce equal protection rulings against the federal government, see AMAR, supra note 13, at 79-84. But see ELY,
supra note 149, at 32 (contending that the argument for applying the equal protection principles
through the Fifth Amendment is "gibberish both syntactically and historically").
339. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (outlawing segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia).
340. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 527 CIt is now well-settled that the requirements of equal protection are the same whether the challenge is to the federal governmoht
under the Fifth Amendment or to state and local actions under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
341. The Supreme Coures importation of equality thinking has also affected doctrine under
the impartial jury clause in the Sixth Amendment. The problem in this area is not that the
Justices have failed to give content to the notion of prescriptive equality; they have articulated a
substantive standard derived from equal protection doctrine regarding which potential jurors are
equal. The problem is that the Court has ignored that the Sixth Amendment aims not for equality for potential jurors but a fair jury for the criminal defendant. The impartial jury clause, by
its explicit terms, aims to protect the accused: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ther, the structural considerations that weigh against a broad use
of equality rhetoric throughout the Bill of Rights also weigh against
such an approach to the construction of these specific clauses.
Most of the criminal clauses that are the focus of this Article
cannot linguistically bear an equality gloss. The Fifth Amendment
privilege against self incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, and the Eighth Amendment protection against "cruel and
unusual punishments," while not entirely transparent, are fairly
specific. To view them as general mandates for "equal" treatment is
to inappropriately change the commands that they embody. 342
The Fourth Amendment is the only one of these provisions
that can accommodate an equality gloss without torturing its terms.
It essentially provides, in its first clause, that people are not subject
to searches and seizures that are "unreasonable," and, in its second
clause, that warrants shall not issue except on probable cause and
The impartial jury mandate in the Sixth Amendment also was not originally understood as
making the equal treatment of potential jurors, however their equality is defined, of paramount
concern. Professor Amar has made the strongest claim for an original understanding of the
Sixth Amendment as protecting potential jurors, but his arguments do not support the pursuit of
equality. Amar has contended that Article I created a right on the part of the people to participate on juries and that the Sixth Amendment did not make the right one only for the defendant.
AMAR, supra note 13, at 120. The relevant clause in Article III states: "The Trial of all Crimes
...shall be by Jury: U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. However, Amar's argument only implies
that a bench trial rather than a jury trial is improper and that a defendant has no right to a jury
pool with members of groups not "like" him excluded. (Amar notes that the Court has not enforced the first "requirement' of jury rather than bench trials.) Amar does not suggest that the
Sixth Amendment should be understood as guaranteeing equality for potential jurors. Indeed,
the Court has not found that potential jurors have an actionable claim for violation of the Sixth
Amendment when they are excluded from jury service. Because the impartial jury clause aims
to protect the accused, the rights of potential jurors under equal protection should not define the
outer limits of Sixth Amendment protection. Members of the Republican Party, for instance, are
not a cognizable group for purposes of equal-protection doctrine on jury selection, but their systematic exclusion from federal juries could violate the defendant's right to an impartial jury. Of
course, the notion of an impartial jury would have expanded as equal protection doctrine guaranteed more groups the right to serve on juries. For example, as African Americans and women
gained the right to serve under equal protection, the notion of an impartial jury also guaranteed
the accused that those groups would not be systematically excluded. Nonetheless, the number of
cognizable groups under the Sixth Amendment should exceed those cognizable under equal protection. See, e.g., Mitchell S. Zuklie, Note, Rethinking the FairCross-Section Requirement, 84
CAL. L. REv. 101, 132 (1996) (noting that, while the interests protected by the two provisions
may frequently overlap, they are certainly not identical); cf. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
363-64 (1979) (concluding that scheme allowing women to opt out of jury service on written request violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment).
342. In any event, the Court has not employed equality under these clauses as if it were a
mere rhetorical device. In the confessions context, the arguments that pushed the Court to its
famous Miranda decision treated equality as a coherent idea and simply misapprehended the
substantive standards in the Constitution for deciding how persons should be treated, and, thus,
how equality should be measured. See supra text accompanying note 203. In the Eighth
Amendment context, the Court has mandated equality as if it were self-defining. See supra Part
Im.B.
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with descriptive specificity. The term "unreasonable" in the first
clause is sufficiently vague that the rhetoric of equality could perhaps be substituted and rights of treatment announced without altering the substantive rules that would otherwise have been constructed.
Yet, as we have seen, this is not the way that the Justices
have used equality in the Fourth Amendment context. Instead, they
have promoted equality as if it were an explanatory end in itself or
an intermediate goal with beneficial consequences.3 43 We have seen
that this view of equality is inherently flawed and, therefore, can
never appropriately be used in constructing constitutional provisions, not even the Equal Protection Clause.3 44 Hence, while using
equality as a mere rhetorical device in the Fourth Amendment context could be inconsequential (but, therefore, unnecessary), the
Court has used equality in a way that could only derail the proper
construction of substantive Fourth Amendment protections.
The argument is also unpersuasive that these criminal
clauses were understood at the time of their promulgation to do, in
more limited contexts, the same thing as the Equal Protection
Clause. A dearth of support exists for such a view of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment clauses relied on by the Court in the confessions
context. As we have seen, the Warren Court tackled the confessions
problem by extending the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination outside of the formal, judicial setting.3 45 The
Court also was persuaded by equality arguments to require warnings to suspects in custodial interrogation contexts and to impose
prohibitions on police interrogation where the suspect asserted one
of the rights, the strongest prohibition arising upon assertion of the
right to counsel.3 46 Yet, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
not historically understood to apply outside of hearings before judicial officers. 347 Likewise, the Fifth Amendment privilege was not
originally understood to apply outside of the judicial setting, nor to
require the assistance of counsel. 348
Insufficient historical evidence also exists for an equality
gloss on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Actually, the
343. See supratext accompanying notes 262-305.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 306-24.
345. See supratext accompanying notes 217-19.
346. See supratext accompanying notes 220-22.
347. See Note, supra note 182, at 1002 (asserting that the right was only "traditionally associated with hearings before judicial officers").
348. See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 12, at 123-31 (contending that the privilege was not originally understood to apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers).
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Eighth Amendment clause may have been generally understood
when adopted to prohibit only barbarous methods of punishment.3 9
The same language had been understood in earlier decades in England as proscribing not barbarous methods but penalties deemed
excessive in relation to the crime. 350 The United States Supreme
Court began viewing the language as proscribing both barbarous
punishments and excessive punishments in the early 1900s.351
However, assuming the clause properly prohibits excessive punishments, an equality veneer confuses its command. The excessiveness
prohibition simply requires that no person receive a punishment
that is deemed too severe, without prohibiting unwarranted acts of
leniency.3 5 2 By contrast, an equality mandate would call for every
person to receive the same punishment under the same circum-

stances. But, what would this command mean? Would unwarranted
reprieves produce inequality? If so, the effect of the Eighth
Amendment changes. Indeed, until Furman v. Georgia, the Justices
353
had never ventured such a construction.
Historical support is also lacking for the notion that the

Fourth Amendment was generally understood to carry an equality
veneer. Professor Amsterdam has concluded that the aim of the
amendment was to proscribe arbitrary searches, and, from this conclusion, that it should proscribe both substantively unjustified
searches and substantively justified searches that are pursued unequally against certain groups of persons.3 14 Yet, this view finds no

349. See Anthony F. Granucci, WNor Cruel and UnusualPunishments Inflicted The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL L REV. 839, 840-42 (1969) (explaining that the clause was understood by its
framers and by early state and federal jurists as only prohibiting certain forms ofpunishment).
350. See id. at 860 (The English evidence shows that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was first, an objection to the imposition of punishments which
were unauthorized by statute and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and second, a
reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties.").
351. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910) (striking down certain penalties as too severe for the particular crime involved, and asserting that "[s]uch penalties for such
offenses amaze those who... believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense").
352. To determine what is excessive, a pattern of rare use of a penalty might be thought
relevant. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1977) (holding the death penalty to be
cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of rape based, in part, on the limited use of the
sanction for that offense).
353. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 398 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (C'(]tseemingly
follows that the flexible sentencing system... has yielded more mercy than the Eighth Amendment can stand.").
354. See Amsterdam, supra note 276, at 417 (asserting that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
"arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures"); id. at 366 (asserting that Fourth Amendment regulates the selective pursuit of searches that are otherwise
allowable).
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persuasive support in historical evidence. The Amendment seems to
have been understood to proscribe "arbitrary" governmental actions
only because it demanded that the regulated intrusions be substantively justified and that, in some if not all cases, a magistrate make

that determination in advance through issuance of a specific warrant.

55

An otherwise justified search was not understood to become

"unreasonable" because others who could also justifiably have been

searched were not pursued.
Structural considerations also disfavor reliance on equality
rhetoric to construct a limited group of the criminal clauses, just as
those considerations disfavor that view for the Bill of Rights more
generally. 356 Open-ended clauses are available to construct new protections against the state and federal governments.3 5 7 The criminal
clauses embody more specific mandates that are subverted when
overlaid with the confusing veneer of equality. Because the openended clauses could be used to construct unenumerated rights
against both the states and the federal government,3 58 no need ex-

ists to understand these criminal clauses through the misleading
rhetoric of equality. 359 Indeed, in the end, no compelling argument
arises for allowing equality, in any form, to alter the substantive
ideals that these clauses embody. 360

355. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS 163-168 (1995) (indicating that

the pre-adoption history revealed a motivating concern about searches conducted without just
cause); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHil. L. REV.
1707, 1726 (1996) C'[T]he historical record suggests that objections to general warrants and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy, property and liberty
from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions."); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 551-52 (2000) C'Tihe evidence indicates that the
Framers understood 'unreasonable searches and seizures' simply as a pejorative label for the
inherent illegality of any searches or seizures that might be made under general warrants, [and
they] expected that warrants would be used.").
356. See supra text accompanying notes 338-40.
357. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
358. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 527 (CItis now well-settled that the requirements of equal protection are the same whether the challenge is to the federal government
under the Fifth Amendment or to state and local actions under the Fourteenth Amendment."),
359. As a descriptive matter, constitutional construction may not be significantly confined by
the text and history of constitutional provisions or their place in the document's larger structure.
See, e.g., SANFORD LVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 191 (1988) C(There is nothing that is unsayable in the language of the Constitution."). Yet, from a normative standpoint, to ignore these
considerations is effectively to say that the constitution should mean whatever the Justices of
the Supreme Court want it to mean.
360. This premise does not imply that the Justices should never consider the potential for
improper discrimination in deciding how to construct rights under these clauses. The choice
between a malleable standard or a relatively bright-line rule can sometimes depend on the potential for race or caste discrimination by government officials. However, that sort of limited
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V. RECONSTRUCTING THE CRIMINAL CLAUSES AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OPEN-ENDED CLAUSES

I now turn to the question of how the criminal clauses under
scrutiny could have been developed if the Court had not been so distracted with equality in constructing them. The effort proceeds on
an approach that is grounded in conventional considerations. 6 1
However, my goal is not to defend in each instance a particular construction against all of the arguments that could be offered against
it. Instead, my aim is simply to show how the doctrines could have
developed if the Court had not been caught up in the demonstrably
erroneous effort to read notions of equality into these clauses.
A. An Alternative View of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as They
Apply to Police Interrogationof Suspects: Modifying the Warnings
and Waiver Rules
The Court's modern interrogation doctrine could reasonably
be reformed to serve the substantive values that the Fifth Amendment privilege actually embodies. 362 Dickerson v. United States, in
which the Court recently held that Congress could not overrule
Miranda through legislation, suggests that the Court is not itself
soon likely to overrule Miranda.363 Nonetheless, the Court could
reform parts of Miranda doctrine without abandoning Miranda entirely and without rejecting Miranda's core premise. Therefore, it
remains worthwhile to ask: Which parts of the doctrine are plausibly required by the Fifth Amendment privilege and which are not?
Some parts of Miranda doctrine arguably are mandated by the

effort to construct substantive rights in light of concerns over the interaction of race bias and
vague standards is a far cry from what the Court has done.
361. For what I mean by "conventional" approach to constitutional construction, see supra
text accompanying note 18.
362. Since the early 1970s, many of the Justices, at times a majority, have sought to under-

mine Miranda and its progeny by creating exceptions rationalized on the claim that the doctrine
is merely prophylaxis rather than constitutional mandate. See generally KAMISAR ET AL., supra
note 101, at 502-05, and authorities cited therein. This view of,5Miranda as mere prophylaxis
provided the central argument in Dickerson for allowing Congressional overruling.
The dispute within the Court about the jurisprudential basis for Miranda has always been

off the mark in an important sense. In questioning Mirandas constitutional grounding, the
Justices who have been critics of Miranda have implicitly supported a view of the Court's

authority that they themselves do not endorse, namely that the Court can properly announce
constitutionalcommon law. See supra note 200. Absent a concession that the Court is authorized to announce this sort of common law, the claim that Miranda authorized it is unconvincing.

. 363 Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct 2326, 2336 (2000) ([Tihe principles of store decisis weigh heavily against overruling [Miranda]now.").

VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:2:359

privilege. 6 4 However, other parts are more clearly unfounded, supported only by the Warren Court's preoccupation with egalitarianism.
The Court has retracted some of its erroneous interrogation
doctrine. The correction has come in the reconstruction of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. We saw that the Court initially used
the Sixth Amendment right in Massiah v. United States to exclude
a statement deliberately elicited from a suspect who had already
been indicted.36 5 That conclusion at least comported with the Sixth
Amendment language conditioning an accused's right to counsel on
the commencement of a "criminal prosecution." However, we saw
that, in Escobedo, the Court soon extended the Sixth Amendment
right to a suspect who had neither been formally charged nor presented in court but who had already retained and asked to consult
with counsel.3 66 The Court's conclusion lacked a grounding in the
Sixth Amendment, and, as we saw, the Court later retracted it.367
In overruling Escobedo, the Court correctly clarified that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel arises only with the commencement of
adversary judicial proceedings.
The Court has failed to retract unfounded portions of
Miranda doctrine. As we saw, Mirandabuilt on Massiah and on the
erroneous conclusion set forth in Escobedo.36 8 Under the Fifth
Amendment privilege, the Court aimed to give the poor and illinformed what the more wealthy and well-educated had secured
under the Sixth Amendment. The Court did so through the
Miranda warnings, including one regarding a new, Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and through rules requiring waivers of the
right to silence and the new right to counsel. However, the right-tocounsel aspects of Miranda doctrine are unfounded. A right to remain silent does not confer a right to a lawyer's help to decide
whether to waive it. The Court has never held that the Fourth
Amendment creates a right to counsel for the decision whether to
consent to a search. Moreover, if the Sixth Amendment clause,
which defines when the right to counsel arises, does not provide
counsel to detainees during interrogation, the Fifth Amendment
privilege should not guarantee it. The right-to-counsel aspects of

364. There is genuine dispute, however, about whether Miranda doctrine as a whole lacked
grounding in the Fifth Amendment privilege. See infra notes 378-81 and accompanying text.
365. See supratext accompanying notes 181-85.
366. See supratext accompanying notes 187-94.
367. See supranote 198.
368. See supratext accompanying notes 198-222.
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Miranda were explained by the Court's pursuit of equality rather
than by a plausible construction of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Yet, the equality explanation itself was ill-founded, as the Court
later made clear in retracting the explanation for Escobedo.369 Until
adversary judicial proceedings commence, the Sixth Amendment
does not require the police to grant even a wealthy arrestee's request to speak with retained counsel. Concomitantly, no disparate
treatment of detainees would arise from holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege does not confer a right to counsel.370
This conclusion indicates that two aspects of the Miranda
requirements were groundless. First, the Court should not have required that detainees be told that they have a right to counsel before and during police questioning. Secondly, the Court should not
have held that the Fifth Amendment requires the police to secure a
waiver of a right to counsel before custodial interrogation, because
such a right does not exist. The constitutional requirement should
be fufiled if the detainee simply waives the option to remain silent.
Many of the progeny of Miranda were also unfounded. The
second-level rules that have arisen around the assertion of the
Miranda right to counsel cannot survive if there is no Fifth
Amendment right to counsel.3 71 These second-level rules have imposed obstacles to police questioning after assertion of the right to
counsel that exceed those arising upon assertion of the right to remain silent. Such protections make little sense under any circumstances. The Miranda right to counsel, at best, was only a means to
protect the more central right to remain silent. For this reason
alone, assertion of the right to counsel should not call for more protection than assertion of the right to silence. In any event, because
the Miranda right to counsel should itself be retracted, so too
should the additional protection arising upon a request for counsel.3 72 Supplemental protections need only arise when a suspect as-

serts the right to silence.
Eliminating the right-to-counsel aspects of Miranda would
also go far towards avoiding the practical problems caused by the

369. See supranote 198 (discussing the Kirby and Burbinecases).
370 See GRANO, supra note 12, at 37 CInequality... cannot exist if no defendant, rich or
poor, sophisticated or unsophisticated, has a right to counsel's assistance in the police station.").
371. See supranotes 225-26 and accompanying text.

372. Under the Fifth Amendment, a request for counsel should invoke no more protection
than a request for a priest, a family member, or a probation officer. See, e.g., Fare v. Mchael C.,

442 U.S. 707 (1979) (holding that a suspect's request to speak with his probation officer triggered
no special protections under Mirandadoctrine).
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doctrine. 373 Studies suggest that the mandated statements regarding the right to counsel deter confessions more than any other part
of the Miranda warnings.3 74 The stringent rules that adhere upon
assertion of the right to counsel also go further to prevent the introduction of a subsequently secured confession than the rules that
apply when the accused asserts the right to silence.3 75 As supporters
of Miranda have emphasized, Miranda doctrine as a whole produces only a small effect on the overall conviction rate, both because the vast majority of suspects who are advised of their rights
waive them and because convictions can often be obtained without
the suspect's statements. 376 Nonetheless, to the extent that
Miranda does prevent convictions or force the expenditure of valuable investigative resources-and even Miranda's supporters must
concede that Miranda sometimes has such effects-a large share of
the problem appears attributable to the most constitutionally suspect aspects of the doctrine.
Concern over odious discriminations in police interrogation
could still find constitutional remedy. If a police officer or a police
department treated suspects differently in the interrogation context
based, for example, on race or caste, the police action could likely be
found to infringe the Constitution. However, the condemnation
should be grounded on one of the open-ended provisions, such as
the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment

373. An overriding concern raised by critics of Miranda doctrine is that it lacks a constitutional grounding. See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 12, at 199 ('Read as an interpretation of what the
[Fifth Amendment privilege], even broadly construed, actually requires, Miranda is seriously
flawed."); Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning:A Response to
"ReconsideringMiranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 948 (1987) ("The various restrictions imposed
by the Miranda rules were unheard of prior to the innovative decisions of the 1960s and have no
basis in the Constitution."). Another concern raised is that the doctrine significantly impedes the
use by the state of reliable evidence of an accused's guilt. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits,
No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996) (arguing,
based on reassessment of previous empirical studies, that Miranda has significant social costs in
terms of lost convictions and unduly favorable plea bargains for defendants); Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (1996) (same) [hereinafter Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs]; Markman, supra, at 945 ("[A] number of studies ...
found immediate, dramatic reductions in statements and admissions obtained in custodial ques.
tioning following the implementation of the Miranda rules.").
374. See, e.g., Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra note 373, at 496, n.630, and authorities
cited therein.
375. See supratext accompanying note 225.
376. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 562 (1996) ("Miranda'sdetectable social
costs are vanishingly small."); Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 456.57 ("[Sluspects agree to talk
without the need for pressure or deception. .. , and convictions are still obtained without confessions.").
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privilege against self-incrimination. By addressing pernicious biases under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court could avoid obscuring or subverting the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Likewise, the Court could avoid the need to create antidiscrimination rules that are distorted by the specific language in
the privilege. Under this approach, the Court would not likely find,
as it did in Miranda, a right to counsel for all interrogated detainees. The Court has required the equal-protection claimant to demonstrate a purpose to discriminate on odious grounds in his particular case to make out a violation.377 The Court has not created
bright-line rules that assume that purposeful improper discrimination is rampant among police or prosecuting authorities throughout
the country.
Eliminating the right-to-counsel aspects of Miranda would
not avoid all dispute about the doctrine's grounding in the Fifth
Amendment privilege, but much of the controversy would disappear. Some critics would question whether the privilege was originally understood to apply to informal, police interrogation. 378 They
would also note that the clause purports to give its beneficiaries not
a right to silence but a right not to be "compelled" to incriminate
themselves. 3 79 This point makes Miranda's waiver requirement
suspect, because, while the idea of waiving a right to silence is
comprehensible, the notion of waiving a right to be free from compelled self-incrimination makes no sense. 380 These additional challenges to Miranda build on substantial arguments, but they are
31
also not without plausible responses by proponents of Miranda. 8

377. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (declaring that death-row inmate
using statistical study to challenge death sentence under equal protection on grounds of racial
discrimination must prove "that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose").
378. See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 12, at 131 (arguing that Afiranda incorrectly held the

privilege applicable to the informal setting of police interrogation).
379. See, e.g., id., at 141-42 (arguing that even if the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to
informal, police interrogation of suspects, it "confers a right not to be compelled to answer questions; it does not confer a substantive or formal right of silence").
380. See, e.g., id. at 142 ("[W]hile the notion of waiving a right of silence is intelligible, the
notion of waiving a right not to be compelled, especially when compelled is a synonym for coerce,
is not.").
381. For example, police interrogation did not exist at the time of the founding in the way it
exists today, so that the original understanding may not be thought very helpful in deciding
whether the privilege applies. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 438 ('[l]t seems clear that
the privilege was intended to bar pretrial examination by magistrates, the only form of pretrial

interrogation known at the time."). Likewise, a warning regarding one's option to remain silent
and the requirement of a waiver might plausibly be thought to reduce a "compulsion" to cooperate created by the station house environment. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966) ("[S]uch a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the
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By contrast, arguments for the right-to-counsel aspects of Miranda
are unpersuasive if only because they call for ignoring the Sixth
Amendment provision that defines when a right to counsel arises.
The Fifth Amendment privilege might support a right to silence as
well as warning and waiver requirements. It might even call for
better warnings regarding the right to silence than the Court articulated in Miranda.382 However, the privilege does not support a
right to counsel. The Mirandaright to counsel was grounded only in
a misguided pursuit of equality.
B. Rethinking the Eighth Amendment and Capital Sentencing: A
Substantive Measure of Justice in the Use of the Death Penalty
The Court could also reorient its regulation of capital sentencing so that the doctrine would have a plausible grounding in
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court has rationalized its capital sentencing rules as an
effort to achieve equality, but it has not provided the substantive
content that would give the equality mandate any meaning.3 83 If the
Eighth Amendment regulates the use of the death penalty, it mandates a substantive standard about when the capital sanction is
appropriate, not a command that capital sentences be equal. The
Court must focus on what, if any, substantive standard regarding
the use of the death penalty the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause imposes.
The Eighth Amendment can be understood to establish a
substantive standard about when the death penalty is just. For the
Eighth Amendment to regulate who receives the death penalty, but
not abolish capital punishment altogether, it must proscribe punishments that are excessive in particular contexts but not prohibited per se. The Court has long concluded that the Amendment pro-

interrogation atmosphere."). Unlike with the right-to-counsel warning and waiver, such a view
does not conflict with another provision of the Constitution.

382. The warnings articulated in Miranda omitted two important cautions connected with
the right to silence: (1) the Court did not require police to advise a suspect of his right to cut off
questioning after a prior waiver of the privilege, and (2) the Court did not require authorities to
advise a suspect that his silence could not be used against him in court. The first of these additional protections was established in Miranda itself. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 ("Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him through out the interrogation."). The second
was established in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Knowledge of these protections would
seem helpful to a detained suspect in deciding how to respond to police pressure to answer questions.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 227-61. For discussion focusing specifically on the

Coures limited assertions regarding the substantive measure justifying Eighth.Amendmont
regulation of capital sentencing, see supratext accompanying notes 227-61.
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hibits excessive punishments, along with punishments deemed inherently inhumane. 84 Some Justices have dissented from this
view,38 5 but it is plausible. A ten-year prison term for a minor offense can reasonably be described as "cruel and unusual," even
though the same sentence would be permitted for a serious crime.
The original understanding also is not sufficiently clear to foreclose
the conclusion that the clause disallows excessive punishments as
well as those deemed inhumane per se. 386
The measure of excessiveness is only sensibly grounded in
retributive ideals, which means that the propriety of each death
sentence should turn on whether the offender deserves that pun-

384. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court held that the clause proscribes a sanction that is excessive as applied. For falsifying a public document, Weems had
been sentenced to cadena temporal, which, in addition to twelve years of hard labor, involved a
loss of civil rights and perpetual supervision. The Court alluded to the extreme and unusual
'character of the forfeitures as well as the long term of incarceration. See id. at 366. Some have
doubted that Weens supported excessiveness analysis under the Eighth Amendment. See, eg.,
Herbert L. Packer, Making the PunishmentFit the Crimne 77 HARV. L REV. 1071, 1075-76 (1964)
(contending that the combination of the long prison sentence and "a good deal of laid-on unpleasantness" caused the Coures conclusion). However, the Weems Court at one point implied rather
clearly that it found the sanctions excessive in relation to Weems's particular offense, not improper per se: "Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who... believe that it is a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense. Weens, 217
U.S. at 366-67; see also O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 364 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ("It is
against the excessive severity of the punishment, as applied to the offenses for which it is inflicted, that the inhibition is directed."). The Court has more recently reiterated that excessiveness analysis is appropriate under the Eighth Amendment in the death-penalty context. See
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (finding the death penalty excessive for "rape not
involving the taking of life"). On a more limited basis, the Court has also reaffirmed its appropriateness in the non-death-penalty context. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor & Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(supporting a "narrow proportionality principle"); id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting) (contending
that it violates the clause "to impose any punishment that is grossly disproportionate" to the
defendants offense).
385. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding
that "the better view" is that the clause "was intended to place only substantive limitations on
punishments"); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976 (asserting that the clause only "disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or 'modes' of punishment").
386. See e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 575, 575 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) ("The history of the clause provides
no conclusive answer to the recurring question of whether its American authors meant only to
bar certain barbarous punishments altogether or whether they also meant to ban penalties, not
unlawful per se, that are disproportionate to the crime."). Compare RAOUL BERGER, DEATH
PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 44-49 (1982) (concluding that the Framers
intended only to prohibit certain forms of punishment, not including capital punishment in general), with Granucci, supra note 349, at 839-42 (contending that the clause was probably understood by its drafters and by early jurists as prohibiting only certain modes of punishment, but
noting that the clause as used in the English Bill of Rights, from which it derived, was understood only to prohibit excessive punishments).
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ishment and not on utilitarian considerations. 87 Why? The proposition that a person should not suffer a punishment that he does not
deserve corresponds with basic and widely shared views of justice.3 88 Indeed, the Supreme Court adopted this view in Coker v.

Georgia, declaring the death penalty categorically excessive punishment for rape.3 89 Although the execution of some rapists might
greatly serve utilitarian ends, the majority concluded that the
death penalty for such a crime was too severe, at least when the
victim was an adult and no life was taken.390 The decision under-

387. See NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 38-40 (1980) (contending that the "retributive theory" of punishment in its most general
form focuses on offender deserts and not on utilitarian issues); Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and
Deterrence" Assessing the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1177, 1177 (1981) (noting that advocates of the retributive ground for capital punishment believe
that persons who commit the most serious offenses "deserve" to die).
388. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45 (1976)
("Ask the person on the street why a wrongdoer should be punished, and he is likely to say that
he 'deserves' it."); John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL 181, 183 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) C' 'mreatment in accord with
desert' is probably the most frequently encountered definition of the term 'justice' itself.").
389. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. Justice White wrote for a four-Justice plurality, and Justices
Marshall and Brennan individually concurred in the judgment on the broader ground that the
death penalty always violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 600 (Marshall, J., concurring); id.
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell concurred in the judgment on the narrow rationale
that, on the particular facts of Coker's crime, the death penalty was excessive. Id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring).
390. Id. at 592. After looking for objective proof that society had found the death penalty an
inappropriate punishment for rape, the Coker Court cited some rather unconvincing evidence
and concluded that the question of excessiveness was for the Court's own judgment. Id. at 597.
In later cases, the Court has been less clear about the extent to which the objective evidence
should be decisive in resolving questions of categorical excessiveness, and the tendency to weigh
such considerations too heavily has been criticized. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death Evolving Standardsfor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 989, 1036 (1978) (asserting that an analysis that turns heavily on what legislatures have
done is "circular" because it allows constitutional doctiine to be governed by the acts of institutions the constitution is supposed to check); Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Defending Categorical Exemptions to the Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA's Resolutions Concerning The Execution of Juveniles and Persons With Mental Retardation,61 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 89, 97-98
(1998) (noting that cases after Coker underscore the difficulty the Court has faced in attempting
to discern from the actions of legislatures and juries a societal consensus about the appropriate
uses of the death penalty).
In reaching its own judgment about excessiveness in Coker, the retributive basis for the docision was clearly implied. The Court did not try to deny the utilitarian argument that executing
rapists would deter future rapes as much as executing murderer would deter future murders.
See, e.g., Packer, supra note 384, at 1079-80 (contending that, if general deterrence justifies
capital punishment, the capital sanction for rape is as efficacious as the death penalty for murder). Because Coker had a horrendous record of convictions, including other rapes and a capital
murder, and had committed the charged rape while on escape from prison, the Court also did not
try to deny the utilitarian benefits of permanently incapacitating him. Justice White focused,
instead, on the the absence of a death. He concluded that, while rape infringed serious personal
interests, they were not equal to the personal interest in life itself. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598. His
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scored that the substantive measure the Eighth Amendment imposes on the use of the capital sanction is grounded in retributive
theory-that persons cannot be sentenced to death who do not de391
serve that punishment.
This deserts-limitation theory carries important implications
for the job of the capital sentencer but is ultimately too vague to
justify a constitutional doctrine regulating the capital sentencing
process. 3 9 2 The deserts-limitation theory, more than an equality

theory, explains the Supreme Court's mandate of a broad, individualized inquiry in capital sentencing. 393 Still, the Court's efforts to

regulate capital sentencing also depart in important ways from
what a deserts-limitation theory implies. 394 Reforms in the capitalsentencing process possibly could help promote a deserts justification for each death sentence. However, prudential considerations
weigh against the Supreme Court attempting to pursue these reforms. The deserts-limitation is itself based on a theory of a widelyshared consensus about justice, 395 and the Court has repeatedly indicated that the consensus notion helps explain its effort under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 395 The problem is that no
consensus exists about how to refine the deserts-limitation. Consensus is not apparent even over whether deserts should be assessed based on all of the offender's works or only on his culpability
for the capital crime. 397 Even if the Court were to declare culpability
for the capital crime to control, no apparent consensus exists about

reasoning assumed that the application of the death penalty was to be judged by the moral deserts of the offender, without consideration of the utilitarian benefits of his execution.
391. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 45 (2d ed. 1995) (observing

that, "[i]n effect, Justice White rin Coker] applied a strictly retributive conception of proportionalty").
392. Many offenders may be deemed undeserving of the death penalty, but their execution
might also be thought beneficial to society. For example, a mentally retarded offender with a
history of being sexually and physically abused could be thought less morally culpable for a mur-

der than a person without such an excuse. Yet, for that same reason, the offender could be
thought more dangerous. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318-19 (1989) (noting the poten-

tial for jurors to reach such a conclusion). Under a deserts-limitation approach, such an offender
should not be sentenced to death unless he is deemed by the sentencer to deserve that sanction.

393. See Howe, supra note 12, at 831-34 (detailing how the deserts theory, more than an
equality theory, can explain the Coures capital sentencing doctrine).
394. See id. at 834-35 (discussing how the Court's capital.sentencing doctrine fails to fulfill a
desert-oriented theory of regulation).
395. See supratext accompanying note 388.
396. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)) ("[Tihe Amendment ... recognizes ... the 'evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'").
397. See generally Howe, supra note 12, at 836-38 (discussing the evident lack of consensus
over how to refine the deserts measure).
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how to measure culpability. 98 Hence, while the deserts-limitation
gives a plausible meaning to the notion of Eighth Amendment excessiveness, it remains unclear how the Court should use it to
regulate the capital-sentencing proceeding. Indeed, the inability to
refine the deserts-limitation idea casts serious doubt on the function and value of the Court's mandate that an individualized399
sentencing inquiry precede any death sentence.
The deserts-limitation theory does imply, however, that the
Court should draw categorical lines to separate death-eligible
crimes and offenders from crimes and offenders for which the death
penalty is per se improper. 40 In Coker, the Court held that rape is
not a death-eligible crime, but the Court has declared the death
penalty categorically inapplicable in few other circumstances. 1
The Court should expand these categorical prohibitions while
eliminating the requirement of individualized inquiry at the sentencing stage. For example, the Court could declare the death penalty per se improper for offenders under age eighteen at the time of
their crimes and those suffering from mental retardation. 40 2 Although some capital offenders from these groups have the culpability to warrant the death penalty, the Court could plausibly conclude
that the vast majority do not. 40 3 On this view, drawing the categorical proscription in favor of all such offenders would serve the
Eighth Amendment's substantive purpose, with only limited intru40 4
sion on states' legitimate use of the capital sanction.

398. See Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing;
Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1012-36 (1994) (discussing dis.
agreement among philosophers and criminal-law theorists about how to measure culpability for

crime).
399. See Howe, supra note 12, at 840-43.

400. Of course, legislatures could continue to provide for sentencing hearings regarding the
factual issues they deem important to the sentencing decision. See id. at 853 ("In articulating
proportionality rules, the Court only sets low eligibility requirements above which state legisla.

tures may govern the process for selecting those who should die.").
401. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 390, at 97-98 (noting that, after Coker, the Court has
exempted only one additional class of offenders; "persons convicted via the felony-murder rule
who did not themselves kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill").
402. But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (allowing the imposition of the death

penalty on offenders who are at least sixteen when the crime occurred); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989) (allowing the imposition of the death penalty on a retarded offender).

403. See Steiker & Steiker supra note 390, at 101 C'[J]uveniles and persons with mental re.
tardation are ...groups about whom, when their members are aggregated, there is a substantial

risk that an individual sentencer might err in concluding that an individual member of the group
is appropriately subject to the death penalty.").
404. See id. at 101-02 (noting that an exemption is particularly important for these groups
because the grounds for their reduced culpability are also grounds for their enhanced
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While enforcing the Eighth Amendment's substantive mandate, the Court can also use the open-ended clauses to reduce improper discrimination in the distribution of death sentences. 405 The
Court's recent application of the Equal Protection Clause to the use
of peremptory strikes in jury selection provides minor protection
against racial discrimination, 406 although only by juries and only in
states that employ juries as capital sentencers. However, under
equal protection, the courts also can address purposeful discrimination in death-penalty cases based on factors such as race. 407 The
Justices are unlikely to go much further under equal protection in
the near future. The Court has rejected the notion that equal protection proscribes capital-sentencing schemes that produce disparities correlating with race. 408 This view has drawn substantial criticism. 4 °9 However, the resolution of what equal protection means

must also come from the substantive construction that the Justices
give the clause rather than from anything inherent in the idea of
410
equality.

dangerousness so that individual sentencers will be tempted to sentence them to death rather
than life imprisonment for consequentialist reasons).
405. Other provisions in the Bill of Rights might be used to protect against undesirable disparities in the use of the death penalty. For example, the Court has invalidated a death sentence under the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where an African-American defendant charged with an interracial murder was denied an opportunity to query potential jurors
about their racial prejudices. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986). The Court could
also use the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to remedy the great disparity in the quality of
counsel afforded capital defendants. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 390, at 421 (noting
the substantial unevenness in the quality of counsel in capital cases).
406. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (allowing white criminal defendant to
challenge prosecutor's peremptory dismissals of African Americans); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that equal protection enabled African-American criminal defendant to
challenge a prosecutor's use of preemptories to dismiss African Americans from venire).
407. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (declaring that the equal-protection
violation is established with proof "that the decision-makers in (the defendant's] case acted with
discriminatory purpose").
408. See id. at 297.
409. See, e.g., Shari Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORrMLL
IL REV. 1016 (1988); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L
REV. 1472, 1603-28 (1988).
410. Studies suggest that the racial disparities in capital sentencing may, on the whole, favor
minority defendants over majority defendants, because the race of the victim seems to exert a
predominant influence on the selection process, and most capital murders are committed by
blacks offenders on black victims. See, e.g., BALDUS Er AL, supra note 250, at 315 tbl.50. This
reality means that pursuing a racially proportionate distribution of death sentences according to
the race of the victim could substantially increase the number of minority offenders receiving the
death penalty. Many of those who favor invalidating current schemes under equal protection
would surely prefer to achieve the balance by abolishing capital punishment. However, a proportionate distribution according to the race of the victim can be achieved through increasing the
use of the death penalty in black victim cases as well as through abolition. See Randall L Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishmentand the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L REV.
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C. ReconsideringAdministrative Searches Under the Fourth
Amendment: Substantive Measures of Reasonablenessfor Judging
Governmental Action
Regarding administrative searches, the Court also should
give substantive content to its regulatory efforts. In this area, the
Court could not feasibly rely on a single formula, because administrative-search cases are so factually varied. The Court should articulate a variety of contextual rules. This approach would require
the Court to invest increased resources in controlling administrative searches, but the results could be worth the effort. The Justices
cannot appropriately continue to substitute the mandate of equality
for substantive measures.
We saw that the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine on administrative searches has had the ironic effect of expanding governmental authority to search while providing little protection
against improper discrimination. 41 1 Two features of the Court's approach have produced this outcome. First, the Court has substituted equality for substantive reasonableness by focusing on
whether there are facially non-discriminatory, local policies governing the questioned invasion. Second, the Court generally has not
required that the local regulations significantly restrict authorities'
discretion to search. The Court's approach sanctions local regulations that allow for expansive authority to search based on criteria
that, while facially non-discriminatory, allow great discretion in
their application. The result will often be an expanded number of
invasions of privacy characterized by largely unchecked racial and
caste disparities.
The Court should recognize that a substantive judgment is
essential to evaluating the Fourth Amendment propriety of administrative searches. The politics surrounding the promulgation of
local policies or regulations will likely mean that the results will
not be substantively correct under the Fourth Amendment. 412 Instead, the kinds of administrative-search policies that will often
appear will mirror those that the Court has all too often upheldbroadly worded authorizations to search that also confer
substantial discretion on government officials.4 13 In addressing
these kinds of policies, the Court cannot appropriately uphold
1388, 1436-37 (1988) (noting that this "level-up" solution, rather than abolition, would likely be
the option of many states if put to the choice).
411. See supratext accompanying notes 262-305.
412. See supratext accompanying notes 320-23.
413. See supratext accompanying notes 286-305.
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them on the proposition that they appear even-handed.
A reconsideration of the problem presented in Colorado v.
Bertine, involving automobile impoundments and inventories, can
demonstrate the alternative approach that the Court should employ. 414 After Bertine was arrested for driving under the influence,
drugs were found when his automobile was impounded and inventoried. 4 15 The Supreme Court endorsed the police actions upon
finding that the officers followed local policies. 41 6 However, the
Court should have focused on the substantive justification for the
intrusions. Why did the police seize Bertine's automobile? The record implied that the police could have parked and locked the van in
a safe location nearby, and Bertine would likely have been quickly
released to retrieve it.417 The officers involved offered no substantive justification for impoundment, admitting that they thought the
decision was within their discretion. 4 8 Their view accurately described the effect of the local regulations, which, as even the majority implicitly conceded, only placed limits on a decision to park and
lock an automobile, not on the decision to impound it.419 The Court
should have recognized that those regulations, although not facially
discriminatory, could not define what was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. The Court should also have acknowledged that
there was no apparent substantive basis for the impoundment in
Bertine's case.
The inventory search in Bertine was also unreasonable apart
from the impropriety of the impoundment. The intruding officers
acted like they were searching Bertine's van for contraband, not
like they were conducting an inventory.420 An administrative inventory is designed principally to catalog the contents of a seized car to
protect the arrestee against theft and to protect the police against
false claims of theft. 421 However, in Bertine's case, the officers failed

414. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
415. Id. at 368-69.
416. Id. at 374.

417. See id. at 378-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting, without contradiction by the majority, that there was ample appropriate parking adjacent to the point where Bertine was stopped

and that Bertine would likely have been released quickly).
418. See id. at 378 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the principal officer's testimony that
the decision not to park and lock the van "was his 'own individual discretionary decision' ).
419. See id. at 376 n.7 (indicating that the local guidelines placed limitations on a decision to
park and lock a vehicle after the arrest of a driver but that there were no limitations on a decision to impound).
420. See id. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
421. See Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983). The Supreme Court has also concluded that an inventory can protect against the presence of a dangerous item, such as a firearm.
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even to list on an inventory form most of the valuable items that
they found in Bertine's van. 422 Their intrusion looked much more

428
like a search for evidence than an administrative action.
In defining when administrative searches are reasonable,
the Court cannot avoid articulating substantive rules. For example,
in the car impoundment context, the Court should hold that it is
generally improper to seize without consent the car of an arrested
driver where the car could be safely parked and locked near the
scene. Nonconsensual impoundment should also generally be improper where another family member in the vehicle at the time of
the stop could legally operate the auto. These sorts of conclusions
were not required by the regulations in Bertine. However, to ignore
these as Fourth Amendment mandates is to abandon sensible oversight of governmental car impoundments.
In deciding on substantive rules to govern administrative
searches, the Court would have to balance competing interests on a
contextualized basis. The competing interests involved, for example, in the execution of administrative highway checkpoints or of
mandated urine-testing of public employees would differ from those
involved in the impoundment of automobiles. Even in a limited context, a single formula would not lead to perfect resolutions of varying factual scenarios. The Court would have to invest the resources
to decide more cases on a more individualized basis. However, these
efforts should improve current doctrine. The Court's deference to
local policies has under-protected legitimate privacy interests.
The open-ended clauses would also remain available to confront improper discrimination in the execution of administrative
searches. The Court's current approach builds on the illusion that
deference to the promulgation of local policies will help to thwart
offensive discrimination. However, there is little inherent pressure
at the local level towards the production of non-discretionary

See, e.g., id. at 646 (recognizing that "[d]angerous instrumentalities-such as razor blades,
bombs, or weapons-can be concealed in innocent-looking articles").
422. Bertine,479 U.S. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

423 See id. at 367 (Marshall, J, dissenting). Justice Marshall discussed the problems in his
dissent:

For example, Officer Reichenbach failed to list $150 in cash found in respondent's wallet or the contents of a sealed envelope marked "rent," $210, in the
relevant section of the property form. His reports make no reference to other

items of value, including respondent's credit cards, and a converter, a hydraulic
jack, and a set of tire chains, worth a total of $125. The $700 in cash found in

respondent's backpack, along with the contraband, appeared only on a property
form completed later by someone other than Officer Reichenbach.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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search-and-seizure policies, and, even if there were, those policies
could simply be under-applied on race or caste grounds. 424 Therefore, even under the Court's current doctrine, improper discrimination in administrative searches must be remedied through the openended clauses. 4 25 How those clauses should be construed is not easily resolved. Yet, that resolution must come, just as in the Fourth
Amendment context, through the construction of substantive rules
and standards by the Justices.
VI. CONCLUSION

Beginning in the era of the Warren Court, misuse of the
equality idea infected constitutional criminal procedure in ways
that continue to distort doctrine today. The problem arose from the
Supreme Court's willingness to promote equality as if it were a selfdefining goal and one to be pursued through the specific criminal
clauses in the Bill of Rights. Neither of these assumptions is sensible. Prescriptive equality can be pursued only in relation to substantive standards concerning how government should treat people,
and, even then, only makes sense as a command to follow the substantive standards. Likewise, pursuing equality under the criminal
cduses as if it were self-defining can only serve to obscure and pervert the substantive standards that those clauses embody.
The Justices must confront the call for equality as they
regulate criminal procedure under the Constitution, but they
should approach this task by acknowledging the derivative nature
of equality. The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly directs states to
ensure "equal protection" for all persons, a command that applies to
the criminal process. While the Justices must give meaning to this
clause, they should recognize that even an explicit command of
"equal" treatment is only a rhetorical device, authorizing the Court
to construct substantive standards regarding governmental conduct. The Justices should also recognize that equality has no role
under the specific criminal clauses, even as a rhetorical device, because the clauses themselves amount to a call for substantive standards.

424. See supratext accompanying notes 320-22.

425. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) C'lTjhe constitutional basis
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory action of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir. 1997) (declaring that

the Equal Protection Clause "provides citizens a degree of protection independent of the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures").
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To demonstrate the misuse of prescriptive equality in constitutional criminal procedure, I have explored segments of the
Court's work under a variety of criminal clauses: the Fifth Amendment privilege and Sixth Amendment right to counsel as applied to
suspect interrogation; the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments as applied to capital sentencing; and the
Fourth Amendment as applied to administrative searches. In the
interrogation context, the Court's creation of the Miranda doctrine
was propelled by its drive to treat impoverished and ignorant suspects the same as wealthy and well-educated ones, even though
that goal required subverting the substantive standard in the Sixth
Amendment concerning the attachment of the right to counsel and
the substantive ideals embodied in the Fifth Amendment privilege.
In regulating capital sentencing, the Court called for equality of
treatment, but failed to provide standards by which to determine
when capital murderers are the same or different. Likewise, in defining limits on administrative searches, the Court proceeded as if
equality itself, without substantive standards derived from the
Fourth Amendment, was a viable constraint on governmental action. In each of these areas, the Court's work resulted in doctrine
that departed from constitutional neariing in ways that persist today.
The irony in the Court's misuse of prescriptive equality under the criminal clauses is that the Court has effectively constrained similar misuse in its equal protection doctrine, where one
would expect the problem to be greatest. During the pre-Brown era,
the Court appropriately regulated the criminal process under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by articulating substan42 6
tive rules concerning the treatment of persons by government.
Problems arose during the era of the Warren Court. Between Brown
and the early 1970s, the Court frequently relied on the vague rationale of prescriptive equality when it struck down state criminal
427
procedures under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.
However, by the early 1970s, the Court returned to the practice of
articulating substantive bases for its decisions under these openended clauses. 428 Earlier rulings based on limitless equality rhetoric
were also reinterpreted on narrow substantive grounds. The result
is that misuse of prescriptive equality has distorted criminal-

426. See supra text accompanying notes 82-91.
427. See supratext accompanying notes 92-134.
428. See supratext accompanying notes 151-72.
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procedure doctrine more under the specific, criminal clauses than
under the open-ended clauses.
The Court's focus on equality under the criminal clauses has
also accomplished little in the way of ameliorating significant injustice in our criminal process. The resulting doctrines have not significantly combated prejudices based on race or caste. They have
done little, if anything, to protect the personal privacy of citizens.
They have done little to protect suspects from physical or serious
mental abuse by the police. 429 They have also done little to protect
against the conviction of the innocent.130 Despite the proclaimed
goal of the Warren court to provide "equal justice for the poor and
rich, weak and powerful alike,"43 the doctrines created under the
criminal clauses in pursuit of this credo appear, at best, tangentially related to core concerns about mistreatment of suspects or
accused persons.
My argument that the Court has misused equality under the
criminal clauses does not discount the problem of improper discrimination in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Race
and caste prejudice in the criminal justice system are serious problems. 432 The Supreme Court can appropriately ground decisions pro-

tecting against such prejudice on the Constitution. However, the
Court need not subvert the function of the criminal clauses in this
process.
The proper approach for applying the Bill of Rights and reconstruction amendments in criminal procedure is through a focus
on substantive standards concerning how government should treat
persons. The Court should give effect to the substantive values that
the criminal clauses embody rather than ignore their meaning in an

429. Even Miranda doctrine has probably done little to reduce significant mental abuse of
suspects in police stations, and the Mirandacourt itself noted that the problem was not physical
abuse. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) C'lTjhe modern practice of in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented."). franda supporters themselves have noted that "the underlying psychology of police interrogation has not changed since
1966." Weisselberg, supra note 200, at 153; see also Schulhofer, supra note 178, at 880-81 (noting that, despite Miranda,"it is hard to see how the intimidation can be reduced very much").
Moreover, the benefits on this score of the right-to-counsel aspects of Miranda seem minor. I
have argued that this part of the doctrine was the most objectionable. Sec supra text accompanying notes 368-76.
430. The Court's capital-sentencing cases also are not easily understood as protecting those
who do not warrant the death penalty. The Court has never clarified what substantive measures
define who warrants the death penalty. Without reference to such standards, the efficacy of the
Coures doctrine in protecting those who do not warrant capital punishment cannot be determined. See supra text accompanying notes 227-61.
431. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956).
432. See COLE, supranote 16; KENNEDY, supranote 16.
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effort to pursue the vacuous notion of equality. The Court must
sometimes conclude that additional protections are necessary to
remedy offensive discrimination. In these situations, the Court can
turn to the open-ended clauses, such as the Ninth Amendment, or
the Equal Protection, Due Process, or Privileges and Immunities
Clauses. The Court can preserve the meaning of the specific, criminal clauses by viewing these open-ended clauses as a viable source
of supplemental protection. As with the criminal clauses, however,
the resolution of what the open-ended clauses should require must
come from the substantive construction given the clauses by the
Justices rather than anything intrinsic to the notion of equality.

